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On the question of state-market relations, the neoclassical 
economic view regards a minimal state as essential for economic growth. 
The statist view in political economy studies, on the other hand, 
stresses the active role of the state in promoting economic development. 
Both views tend to treat “state” and “market” as opposing forces: A 
developmental state is associated with industrial planning and active 
interventionist measures to “govern the market”, whereas 
market-conforming liberalization is usually seen as a sign of the state’s 
retreat in the face of globalized market forces.  My study of economic 
reforms in China, however, indicates that a state may pursue 
market-conforming liberalization to advance its developmental goals. 
 This dissertation seeks to account for the logic behind the apparent 
anomaly of state-market relations in the course of China’s economic 
reform through examining the reform processes of key economic sectors. 
The study pays special attention to the historical and institutional 
contexts where reforms took place and evolved and uses institutional 
change and the ensuing socioeconomic dynamics to explain the course 
and outcome of the reforms. It argues that administrative 
decentralization in China changed the Chinese state’s internal 
 structure and in turn adversely affected the central state’s autonomy 
and policy enforcement capacity. To regain state authority and control, 
central policy makers resorted to market-conforming liberalization. 
Rather than the state intervening in the market or the state giving way 
to market forces, this process entails the Chinese state’s effort to 
re-create a developmental state through the creation of a liberal market. 
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 CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Since 1978, China has followed a distinctive path of economic 
reform and liberalization. Over the years, China has maintained an 
average annual growth rate of 9.7%.1 The reform years have witnessed 
a transition from a command economic system to a market one. By the 
mid 1990s most of the agricultural and industrial consumer prices were 
free of government control; and the scope of mandatory production 
planning fell to only 5% from 95% of total industrial output prior to 
reform. Meanwhile, the Chinese economy has been internationalized. Its 
total trade increased by 24 times in the past two decades.2 Having 
emerged from its previous seclusion and isolation, China ranked as the 
3rd largest trading nation in the world in 2004.3  In 2003, China 
surpassed the United States to become the largest recipient of foreign 
direct investment with a total FDI inflow of US $54 billion. 4 
Institutionally China formally joined the WTO in 2002, committing itself 
to free trade and further liberalization of its domestic economy.  
Underlying the dramatic changes that have happened in China are 
three major processes: development, marketization, and liberalization. 
China’s economic takeoff is often regarded as another successful 
example of late development. Yet compared with earlier “late developers” 
                                                 
1 Source: State Council Development and Research Center. 
2 Zhu Rongji, “Report on the outline of the Tenth Five-Year Plan for national economic 
and social development at the 4th session of the 9th National People’s Congress, March 5, 
2000. 
3 Source: State Council Development and Research Center. 
4 UNCTAD. World Investment Report. 1994. 
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 such as Japan, Korea and Taiwan, China has faced different 
international and domestic conditions. Whereas the favorable political 
conditions of the Cold War allowed the latter countries to pursue an 
export-led strategy while keeping their domestic markets relatively 
protected, the internationalization of the Chinese economy has 
coincided with the trend of globalized trade and finance. Internally, 
China’s drive for economic development since 1979 has been 
accompanied by the transition from a planned economic system to a 
market one. The question for the Chinese government, therefore, is not 
only about the relative position of the state vis-à-vis the market, but also 
about creating a market in the first place. On a more general level, 
China’s economic transformation is part of the nation-states’ experience 
with globalization. In China, as in many other developed and developing 
countries, the national economy has undergone the process of 
liberalization.5 What is special about the Chinese experience is that the 
processes of economic takeoff, marketization and liberalization have 
been taking place almost simultaneously rather than sequentially as is 
the case with most NIEs and developed economies. The Chinese 
experience itself, therefore, provides an opportunity for observing and 
assessing the effect of the interactions of these processes. Unraveling 
the logic of the reform experience in China may also serve as a starting 
point for further comparisons and investigations along one of the three 
dimensions of development, market transition and liberalization. 
                                                 
5 For liberalization in developing economies, see Alex. E. F. Jiberto and Andre 
Mommen (1996); Will Martin and L. Alan Winters eds. (1995); Rob Vos, Lance Taylor 
and Ricardo Paes de Barros (2002). For deregulation and liberalization in developed 
economies, see Steven Vogel (1996); James Malcolm (2001); Louis W. Pauly (1998). 
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 This study focuses on the Chinese experience itself and starts with a 
few intriguing questions that the three intertwining processes have 
posed to China scholars and political economists: Whereas the Chinese 
reform has been generally described as following an incremental 
approach, how does the Chinese government eventually take the 
decisive step towards full marketization and liberalization of its 
economy? What factors caused the Chinese government to prefer a 
relatively hands-free approach to an active interventionist one in 
fulfilling its growth objectives? 
The Chinese reform has been a story of growth. During the reform 
years, the Chinese state has focused on “economic construction” and 
taken economic growth as its primary policy objective. Accordingly, 
people tend to view the Chinese state as a socialist developmental state 
and expect it to assume an active role in “governing the market”. Indeed, 
at the onset of the reform the Chinese state was in full command of the 
economy through micro management. Even today, the state still has a 
strong presence in market activities. Yet over the years the Chinese 
state has shown an increasingly determination to decouple itself from 
the market. Whereas some East Asian developmental states such as 
Japan and Korea sought to promote economic growth through 
industrial planning, sector-specific interventions, export promotion and 
import protection,6 China appears to be more disposed to conform to a 
                                                 
6 See, for example, Chalmers Johnson (1982), Robert Wade (1982), Alice Amsden 
(1989), Frederic Deyo (1987). 
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 liberal economic order than its East Asian predecessors at the 
comparable stage of economic development. 7  
China’s embracing the world market is not without its costs. While 
China’s export-oriented companies look forward to benefiting from this 
liberal order introduced to China through the country’s WTO accession, 
other domestic players are exposed to sharply increased competitions 
from the international market. In the short to medium term, full scale 
liberalization is likely to have an adverse effect upon social equality, 
widen the gap between rural and urban areas, and exacerbate 
unemployment.8 What prompted the Chinese government to commit 
itself to a liberalization strategy despite negative domestic repercussions 
that could pose threats to its economic security and social political 
stability?9 What was the rationale behind the Chinese state’s policy 
choice and the country’s reform trajectory? 
 
The Logic of China’s Economic Reform: Competing Explanations 
Existing studies of Chinese reforms have had very different 
interpretations of the logics behind the reforms and equally different 
evaluations as to where they were heading to. Susan Shirk, in The 
Political Logic of Economic Reform in China, argues that China’s reform 
has followed a political rather than economic logic. The sequencing of 
                                                 
7 According to Nicolas Lardy (2002), the decade prior to China’s WTO accession 
already saw China’s deep integration with the world economy. Not only were its trade 
and inward FDI expanded at a rate unmatched by other East Asian NIEs and 
developing countries in general, it also became a major overseas investor; with 
systematic efforts to remove tariff barriers in the 1990s it had the lowest level of tariff 
protection among all developing nations. 
8 See Shaoguang Wang (2000),Huang Jikun, Chen Chunlai (1999) and Nicholas Lardy 
(2002) for evaluations of short term and medium term costs of China’s WTO entry.  
9 See Gordon Chang (2001) for pessimistic forecasts about a liberalized China. 
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 the reform and the mode of institutional transformation are determined 
by competitions among individual political leaders as well as among 
various bureaucratic interests. More often than not, reform measures 
are adopted out of consideration for appealing to a certain constituency 
rather than for economic benefit and efficiency. She concludes, based 
on such observations, that reform in China will be fragmented and 
incomplete, as the political logic has prevailed over the economic one. 
Under this view, full-scale market-conforming liberalization is not the 
likely outcome of China’s reforms.  
Another view, however, argues for the merit of China’s gradualist 
approach and describes the reform process as Pareto-improving and 
leading the country smoothly from plan to market. Barry Naughton 
observes that the dual-track approach in China ensures that the entire 
system does not collapse overnight while market elements grow over 
time and force state sectors into competition. The process is analogous 
to deregulation reforms in developed market economies where selective 
entry ensured that change is initiated and competition increased with a 
minimum of disruption. Under this economic logic, China will “grow out 
of the plan” towards a free and market economy.10  
A third view sits somewhere in-between. Andrew Wedeman observes 
that the gradualist reform was not rolled out as a smooth evolutionary 
process as the “growing out of the plan” view portrays. Rather, China 
did fall into the pitfalls of partial reform as incremental change 
unleashed a wave of rent seeking and gave rise to local protectionism. 
                                                 
10 see Barry Naughton (1995); “China’s Transition in Economic Perspective” in 
Goldman and MacFarquhar (1999). 
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 According to Wedeman, however, such rent seeking and local 
protectionism ironically served to fulfill what formal reform failed to 
achieve as they crippled the state’s ability to control price, thereby 
forcing de facto price reform and undermining the institutional 
foundations of the planned economy.11 In other words, the apparent 
chaos and disorder resulting from fragmented authority and unbridled 
rent seeking undermined the institutional foundations of a planned 
economy, freeing the artificially fixed prices and moving the economy 
towards its market equilibrium point.  
Naughton’s growing-out-of-plan argument provides an economically 
coherent explanation of the logic of incremental reform. By portraying 
the reform process as one of smart design and smooth evolution, 
Naughton demonstrates how a dual-track and apparently incomplete 
reform approach was crafted to produce economically optimal outcomes. 
However, Naughton’s sophisticated account of the economic processes 
in China seems to provide an ex post facto explanation of the logic of 
China’s economic reform. It is true that the Chinese economy has 
emerged out of plan and that the dual-track system has been giving way 
to a standardized market system. However, at the onset of the reform 
policy-makers hardly had a clear picture of how the market is going to 
outgrow the plan. In fact, it was amid disputes over different models and 
occasionally suspected power struggles that the path of reform has been 
blazed. 
Shirk’s study, on the other hand, explores the political rather than 
economic logic underlying the reform process. Under Shirk’s account, 
                                                 
11 Wedeman (2003): 1-22. 
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 the reform process was slow and partial not by design but as a result of 
political compromises made between different political actors.  Shirk’s 
model captures well the dynamics of the decentralization era, revealing 
the tension within the decentralized structure and the actual politics 
behind the apparently incremental change. With a rational-choice 
institutionalist approach, however, Shirk largely treats institutions as 
rules of the game within which individual political actors engage in 
repetitive rounds of political bargaining and calculations. The historical 
evolution of state institutions and the possible impact of institutional 
change on the nature of politics were left under-explored. As a result, 
Shirk’s model can hardly explain the reform outcomes since 1992 when 
the Chinese government committed itself to building “market economy 
with Chinese characteristic.” In the 1990s, market conforming reforms 
in crucial economic sectors, and privatization in the name of reforming 
state-owned enterprises was finally put on the agenda. By the time 
China acceded to the WTO, doubts about the thoroughness of the 
Chinese reform were largely gone. To account for the new developments, 
Shirk resorts to ad hoc explanations citing factors ranging from political 
diplomatic considerations such as China’s intention to beat Taiwan in 
the GATT/WTO accession race and its need to obtain permanent MFN 
(later PNTR) status through GATT/WTO membership to transnational 
factors such as pressures from the international market and possible 
collaboration between domestic pro-liberalization sectors and 
international business interests.12  
                                                 
12 Susan Shirk (1994): 55-56. Susan Shirk’s (1993) analysis of the logic of China’s 
economic reform is largely based on a rational-choice institutionalist approach. 
Whereas later on she argues that there are reasons to expect China’s economic reform 
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 Like Shirk, Wedeman also treats the stalled reform of the late 1980s 
as a political liability of incremental change rather than an intended 
move on the part of the central government to prepare the country 
economically for the next round of bolder reforms. Yet in his account the 
political evils of the partial reform such as rent seeking and local 
protectionism turned out to be a blessing in disguise as they eventually 
“dissipated the rents that vested bureaucratic interests had sought to 
defend”. 13   Underlying the dismal political competition and 
rent-seeking was an economic law that drove the market towards its 
equilibrium point. The central government launched a new round of 
top-down reform just to “bring regime policy back into line with 
economic reality”. Wedeman’s study provides rich detail and contextual 
analysis of central-local political-economic struggles under the 
decentralized planning system. The ultimate explanation Wedeman 
offers, however, is one imbued with a neoclassical economic logic, 
showing how market-oriented transformation was self-generated from 
political setback and stalemate of the previous round of reform. Yet it 
appears to have understated the complexity of the new round of 
market-conforming reforms. The reform initiative of 1992 entailed a 
series of marketization and liberalization measures of which price 
reform was only one objective. Local dynamics could have provided a 
momentum for change. But pending a strong initiative and decisive 
measures from the central government, it is hard to imagine that “the 
                                                                                                                                            
to go forward (1994), she admits that developments since the 1990s cannot be 
explained by her earlier model of central-local political interactions. (Shirk, Talk on 
China’s Economic Reform at Peking University November, 2005) 
13 Wedeman, op. cit.: 22. 
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 economic reality” of a national market and a more open economy could 
be born out of regional segregation and rivalry. The question of rationale 
and motivation for change is left ambiguous in Wedeman’s account.  
This study builds on Shirk and Wedeman’s analyses of central-local 
politics in the decentralization era and pays special attention to the 
historical and institutional contexts where reforms took place and 
evolved. In fact, Wedeman argues that rent seeking by local 
governments that were numerous and scattered had a different 
institutional effect than rent seeking by powerful oligarchs as was the 
case in Russia. In this way, he goes one step further than Shirk to 
explore the effect of earlier reform measures on latter rounds of reform. 
However, Wedeman’s treatment of institutions is still similar to Shirk’s, 
i.e., institutions are seen as the rules of the games under which rational 
players seek to maximize their payoffs. The Chinese reform, however, 
has not only been a process of the state or societal actors making 
rational calculations and moves under system constraints , but also one 
of institutional change, which primarily concerns the change to the 
internal structure and organization of the state. Changes in 
institutional structures would eventually change the rules of the game 
for actors involved and reset the course of reform at the subsequent 
stage. The outcomes of China’s economic reforms and the country’s 
overall developmental trajectory need to be understood and explained in 
this light. 
My argument is that administrative decentralization in China 
changed the Chinese state’s internal structure and in turn adversely 
affected the central state’s autonomy and policy enforcement capacity. 
 9
 State autonomy is premised upon the coherence and cohesiveness of 
the state’s bureaucratic structure and is defined as the ability of the 
state to achieve relative independence from the demanding clamor of 
special interests (whether class, regional or sectoral).14  As economic 
authority was delegated to provincial governments and profit-sharing 
schemes between the central government and provincial authorities 
were introduced on a regional particularistic basis, bureaucratic 
coherence and cohesiveness required for an autonomous state were 
weakened, which eroded the ability of the central state to enforce its 
development and growth strategies. To regain control, central policy 
makers realized that it was necessary to reassert state autonomy and 
they attempted to do so through marketization and decoupling the state 
from microeconomic activities. Rather than the state intervening in the 
market or the state giving way to market forces, this process, to a 
certain extent, entails the central government’s effort to re-create a 
developmental state through the creation of a market.  
Such an explanation requires a historical institutionalist analysis of 
the Chinese state and its relationship with the market. Under historical 
institutionalism, the state is treated both as an actor and as an 
organization. As an actor the state makes rational moves based on 
incentives given by institutional constraints. As an organization, 
however, the state’s organizational attributes are historically grounded 
and constructed. The actual incentives and interests that motivate state 
                                                 
14 Leftwich (1995): 408; Nordlinger (1987): 361. For discussions on state autonomy 
and state capacity, also see Michael Mann, “The Autonomous Power of the State: Its 
Origins, Mechanism and Results.” in John A. Hall, ed. (1986); Peter Evans (1988); Joel. 
S. Migdal (1989; 2001); Migdal, Kohli and Shue (1994); Atul Kohli (2004). 
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 actions, therefore, are endogenous to the institutional structure of 
which the state is a part. A close examination of the changes in the 
Chinese state’s organizational structure during the reform era and the 
ensuing socioeconomic dynamics may help us identify the sources of 
institutional incentives and state interests and delineate the logic of the 
Chinese state’s liberalization initiatives. 
 
State-Market Relations in Modernization and Development 
Exploring the logic behind the Chinese economic reform and the 
Chinese state’s policy choices requires us to examine the relationship 
between state, market activities and economic development. Treating 
the state as a collection of interest-maximizing individuals may lead to 
negative evaluations over the state’s ability to pursue consistent 
developmental goals.  Treating the state as an autonomous 
bureaucratic organization, on the other hand, leads statist scholars to 
stress the state’s ability to promote economic development through 
active intervention in market activities. This latter approach, however, 
takes state autonomy for granted and overlooks the fact that the degree 
of state autonomy is largely determined by its organizational attributes, 
which vary across different institutional structures that are historically 
shaped. In exploring state-market relations, the statist approach needs 
to be informed by a historical insitutionalist analysis in order to uncover 
the logic behind a state’s choice of approach to the market.  
State, Market and Economic Growth 
The relationship between “state” and “market” has always been a 
central issue for discussion in the studies of political economy. 
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 Neoliberal/neoclassical economic doctrines regard a minimal state as 
essential for economic growth.15 In general, scholars applying the logic 
of neoclassical economics to political economy studies paint the state as 
a negative factor in market activities and economic development.  State 
intervention beyond this minimal role induces rent-seeking activities, 
distorts market operations and hinders economic development. The 
desire of office holders to obtain and perpetuate abnormal rents makes 
it illogical for them to behave in ways that are consistent with the 
common good. 16 Underlying this view is the treatment of the state as 
an aggregation of individual utility maximizers. According to Anne 
Krueger, competition for entry into government service is, in part, a 
competition for rents.17 Once in office, self-interested politicians and 
bureaucrats seek to reward and retain their supporters by directly 
distributing resources to them or intervening in market activities in 
their favor. This, however, is achieved at the expense of economic 
efficiency and proper functioning of the market. Accordingly, this 
economic view of politics, sometimes called neo-utilitarianism, 18 
proposes that the state’s sphere should be reduced to the minimum so 
as to allow market mechanism to work wherever possible.19  
                                                 
15 See Douglass North, (1981): 20. 
16 For the theory of rent seeking, see T. N Srinivasan (1985); and James Buchanan, 
Gordon Tullock, and Robert D. Tollison (1980); Charles K Rowley, Robert D. Tollison 
and Gordon Tullock, eds. (1988). For rational choice analyses, see Margaret Levi (1988, 
1997) and Robert H. Bates (1981, 1988). 
17 Anne Krueger (1974): 293. 
18 See Peter Evans (1995):22-25. 
19 Neo-utilitarianism’s negative assessment of the state’s role in economic activities 
derives from both neoclassical economics and the new institutional economics; the 
latter amends the neoclassical economic view by incorporating institutions into 
economic analysis. However, institutions are treated as a set of constraints on 
behavior in the form of rules and regulations and the state is seen as nothing more 
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 One problem with this view, however, is that the very depiction of 
the state as a collection of rent-seeking and interest-maximizing 
individuals makes the minimal state that is conducive to economic 
development logically impossible to realize, as there is no reason to 
believe that politicians and bureaucrats would forgo personal wealth 
and privileges for the welfare of the economy. Moreover, this is not only 
a logical problem. In reality we have seen many instances of state-led 
liberalization or deregulation programs. If the state is nothing but a 
bunch of self-interested individuals who benefit the most by keeping 
their rental havens, these state-initiated efforts would be virtually 
inexplicable. The process and outcomes of the Chinese reform, for 
example, pose such an empirical problem. If the first decade of the 
Chinese reform can still be explained as redistribution of political and 
economic benefits among central and local politicians, the state’s push 
for economic liberalization in the second decade of the reform era is 
indeed an anomaly to the neo-utilitarian expectation of state behavior.20   
In contrast to this “reductionist” view of the state, there has been an 
academic tradition of treating the state as an institution insulated from 
societal interests. The early roots of the “statist” tradition can be found 
in Max Weber’s “bureaucratic state”. The Weberian state is antithetical 
to the neo-utilitarian depiction. Weber believes that modern 
bureaucratic state distinguishes itself from pre-bureaucratic forms of 
state with its ability to rise above individual interests. Bureaucrats with 
defined and specialized roles find their interests fulfilled by carrying out 
                                                                                                                                            
than an organization for reducing the transaction cots of economic activity. (Douglas 
North 1981, 1984, 1990). 
20 See fn 12.  
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 their assigned duties and contributing to the goals of the state 
apparatus. The existence of such a bureaucratic apparatus is necessary 
for providing and maintaining the order required by the capitalist 
market.21  
Weber’s conception of the state is recaptured by various 
institutional arguments about the role of state involvement in assisting 
and improving market operations. Studies about modernization and 
development, for example, rest upon the conviction about the relative 
autonomy of the state vs. the society. These studies, however, go beyond 
the Weberian state that provides a stable environment for private capital 
to argue for a more interventionist role of the state in promoting 
economic development. Alexander Gerschenkron, in studying “late 
development” of Europe, argues that in countries where private 
economic networks are underdeveloped, the state had to play the role of 
“investment banker” in financing industrialization so as to acquire 
production technologies and catch up with already industrialized 
countries.22 Albert Hirschman’s observes that for “late late” developers 
of the Third World, what is in shortage is not only capital, but the 
“ability to invest”, i.e., “the ability to make and carry out development 
decisions.” The state, therefore, had to go one step further: It had to lead 
and induce entrepreneurial activities so as to “channel existing or 
potentially existing savings into available productive activities.” 23 
A more recent statist enterprise is the study of developmental states 
of East Asia. Chalmers Johnson first used the concept of capitalist 
                                                 
21See Max Weber (1968):54. 
22 Alexander Gerschenkron (1962): 12-22. 
23 Albert Hirschman (1958): 35-36. 
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 developmental state to describe the Japanese state. The notion was 
then used by other scholars like Robert Wade, Alice Amsden and 
Frederic Deyo in their studies of East Asian NIEs. 24  A common 
characteristic of these studies is that they set out to explain the 
successful growth stories of East Asian countries. What they find is that 
a highly autonomous state with a strong commitment to economic 
development has been the major force shaping capitalist development in 
those countries. The East Asia Model under their accounts, therefore, is 
one of active participation by the state in promoting economic growth 
through industrial planning, sector-specific interventions and careful 
control and negotiation of international ties.25  
Whereas Gerschenkron and Hirschman’s studies focus on why 
states need to intervene in promoting economic development, studies of 
East Asian developmental studies seek to explore the causality between 
“state intervention” and “economic growth”. The former arguments are 
more historically contingent whereas the latter ones seem to be looking 
for a more generic explanation about state market relationship. This, 
however, makes the arguments in the latter category vulnerable when 
empirical situations turn against them. For example, when Asian 
economies were struck by the Asian Financial Crisis, many critics see 
the root of the problem as lying in the non- “market-conforming” nature 
of government regulations and unnecessary and unhealthy 
                                                 
24 See Chalmers Johnson (1982), Robert Wade (1990), Alice Amsden (1989), Frederic 
C. Deyo, ed., (1987). 
25 For general literature on state-centric political analysis since the rise of statism in 
the late 1970s, see Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skopol, eds. 
(1985); Bob Jessop. (2001); Gianfranco Poggi (1978); Stephen Krasner (1978, 1984); 
Howard Lentner (1984); Peter Hall (1986);Forrest D. Colburn (1988); Linda Weiss and 
John Hobson (1995). 
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 government-business collaborations. The very model that had been 
used to account for the “miracles” now was put under fire. Whether 
state intervention should be blamed for causing or worsening the crisis 
remains a question to be explored. But obviously the East Asia model 
cannot account for all success cases. In China, for example, high growth 
rates have accompanied market-conforming reforms.26 The government 
appears to be keener in leveraging the country’s existing comparative 
advantage to participate in free trade rather than pursuing active 
industrial planning and interventionist policies. Why could China 
reproduce the economic miracle of its East Asian neighbors without 
replicating their model? A more modest and yet more relevant question 
is: why didn’t the Chinese state choose to emulate its East Asian 
predecessors given their cultural affinities as well as China’s tradition of 
state control over the economy?  
In this regard, the Gerschenkronian and Hirschmanian approaches 
are closer to getting the answer: By putting states and markets into 
specific historical and comparative contexts, they see state-market 
relations not merely as independent variables accounting for growth, 
but as outcomes to be explained as well. 27 
                                                 
26 For a review of China’s market-conforming reform in the 1990s and efforts to 
comply with the WTO requirements, see Nicholas Lardy (2002: Chapters 1-3, 5). Lardy 
observes that before China joined the WTO, the Chinese government had already 
taken drastic reforms in many economic sectors. Average tariffs were lowered by 2/3 
and import quota and licenses were reduced by 80%. Market-conforming enterprises 
restructurings were taken in traditionally state-dominated industrial sectors such as 
textiles, construction materials, nonferrous metals, steel, chemicals, petroleum, 
railway, mining, etc. Price reforms were completed for most industries except for a few 
key products and services such as postal service, natural gas, electricity, etc. 
27 Historical institutional analysis generally treats state-market relations or state 
policy outcomes as dependent variables to be explained by historically determined 
institutional structure. See, for example, Peter Katzenstein, ed. (1978); John Ikenberry 
(1988);John Zysman (1994); Thelen and Steinmo, “Historical Institutionalism in 
 16
 State Structure, State Autonomy and State’s Approach to the 
Market 
When the paths of development are seen as historically contingent 
and a state’ s approach to the market is treated as an outcome to be 
explained, domestic institutional structure becomes a major 
explanatory variable to be investigated. 
Both Gerschenkron and Hirschman see the state’s approaches to 
the market as deliberate choices aiming at promoting industrial growth. 
However, they are in the first place, determined and confined by the 
preindustrial situations of late developing countries. The actual role of 
the state in promoting development, therefore, may vary from country to 
country. The internal workings of different political regimes, combined 
with different timings of industrialization, lead to different paths of 
development. 
Other authors have also investigated into the origins and rationale 
of various types of state-market relations. Gary Hamilton and Nicole 
Biggart, for example, challenge the argument that views the 
development of East Asian NIEs as following a single model. They 
compare the cases of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan and find out that 
contrary to the usual depiction of East Asian development as 
characterized by the intervention of strong states, the role of state and 
its relationship with business varies from country to country. And such 
varied state-business relations, according to Hamilton and Biggart, 
should be seen in a much larger context, as flowing from the attempt on 
                                                                                                                                            
Comparative Politics,” in Steimo, Thelen and Longstreth eds (1992); Paul Pierson 
(1996, 2004); Kathleen Thelen, “How Institutions Evolve: Insights from Comparative 
Historical Analysis” in James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (2003). 
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 the part of the political leaders to legitimize a system of rule in the 
society. And to do so they focus on the cultural historical origins of the 
organization of the state and the state’s relations to the society.28 
Peter Evans goes one step further in The Embedded Autonomy by 
exploring not only the rationales behind developmental state’s different 
approaches to the market, but also the prerequisites and conditions for 
a state to effectively pursue its developmental strategy. Evans judges 
that the debate about how much states intervene have to be replaced 
with arguments about different kinds of involvement and their effects, 
as in the contemporary world state involvement is a given.  However, 
according to Evans’s analysis the form of state involvement is not a 
matter of choice but institutionally determined. Evans observes that the 
Weberian bureaucracy that is coherent and cohesive cannot be taken 
for granted in reality and state structures, which are not generic but 
vary across countries instead, define the range of roles that the state is 
capable of playing. 29 The key, therefore, is to identify differences in 
ways states are organized and then connect these differences to 
variations in states’ approaches to the market. 
Similarly, Atul Kohli’s study of states and industrialization in the 
global periphery also explores the institutional foundations of states’ 
approaches to the market. Kohli argues that states that are able to 
effectively pursue their developmental goals are characterized by 
                                                 
28 See Gary Hamilton and Nicole Biggart (1998) and Orru, Marco, Nicole Biggart and 
Gary Hamilton (1997). 
29 Peter Evans (1987: 10-12). 
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 cohesive politics, i.e., by centralized and purposive authority structures 
that often penetrate deep into the society.30    
For both Evans and Kohli, the emphasis of their study is not on how 
a Weberian bureaucratic state promotes growth and development, but 
on evaluating the degrees of proximity of state structures in reality to 
the ideal-type Weberian state and the corresponding effects on these 
states’ relationship with the market. 
Moreover, both Evans and Kohli hold that state autonomy does not 
preclude linkages between the state and the society. Evans argues that 
to formulate and implement development programs to reach 
developmental goals, the states need to be embedded in a concrete set of 
social ties that binds the state to society and provides institutionalized 
channels for the continual negotiation and renegotiation of goals and 
policies. This is what he calls “the embedded autonomy”. Kohli observes 
that cohesive-capitalist states have usually carved out a number of 
identifiable links with society’s major economic groups and devised 
efficacious political instruments. In this sense, state autonomy is less a 
matter of organizational insulation from the society than of 
bureaucratic capabilities to maintain policy independence. 
By looking into the differences in state structures and their effects 
on state autonomy, Evan’s, Kohli’s as well as Hamilton and Biggart’s 
studies offers a promising analytical perspective with which to 
investigate the logic behind the variations of states’ approaches to the 
market.  
                                                 
30 Kohli (2004): 10. 
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 By the same token, treating the state as a historically grounded 
institution and analyzing the effect of institutional change on state 
interests and actions my help us uncover the rationale behind the 
apparent anomaly of state-market relations in China and solve the 
puzzle as to why China was able to move away from the political 
equilibrium of partial reform to embrace full-scale market-conforming 
liberalization.  
 
From Decentralization to Liberalization: The Chinese State’s 
Pursuit of Autonomy 
Examining the characteristics of China’s state structure and its 
evolution during the reform era may help us uncover the logic behind 
the apparent anomaly of state-led liberalization in China. Cross-country 
studies mentioned above compare institutional structures spatially to 
account for differences in states’ approaches to the market across 
countries. This study, on the other hand, examines China’s domestic 
institutional structure temporally to explore the underlying reasons 
behind the changes in the state’s policy outcomes. At the core of this 
analysis, therefore, is structural change. Whereas study of stable 
structures is more concerned about general patterns and continuities of 
state behavior in historical and institutional contexts, an investigation 
of structural change is more concerned about the state’s specific policy 
choices and its decisions. In a sense, it is a situational analysis where 
politics kick in and where decisive action can “change history”.31  
                                                 
31 Peter Gourevitch (1986). 
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 When we ground our understanding of the Chinese reforms on an 
analysis of the characteristics and changes of the country’s state 
structure, the apparent puzzle of state-led liberalization becomes 
explicable. Seen in this light, market-confirming reforms and 
liberalization measures were not byproducts of deals struck between 
politicians seeking political rents, nor did they indicate the state’s 
subservience to free market forces. Rather, they stemmed from the 
state’s quest for autonomy.  
The pre-reform Chinese state has been regarded as a socialist 
developmental state. If a developmental state is characterized by 
cohesive politics, that is, by centralized and purposive authority 
structures that often penetrate deep into the society32, theoretically 
speaking the organization of the Chinese state meets this criterion. 
Under the party-state system, the state is in a sense omnipresent 
through the state’s vertical administrative apparatus and the party’s 
supervising mechanism. Each ministry has its “party members’ group”. 
Each local government – from provincial level down to district or 
township level -- has its party committee. And each work unit has its 
party branch. These party committees and branches are composed of 
the core administrative members of the governments or organizations. 
Party secretaries at each level supervise the operations of their 
organizations and are accountable to party committees of the higher 
level. Through the party’s network, the state reaches virtually every 
corner of the society. The state apparatus is composed of both the 
central state and its policy enforcers along the pipelines of the party 
                                                 
32 Atul Kohli (2004: 10). 
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 system, which include local governments at different levels and even 
administrative authorities at the grassroots level. This institutional 
structure gave the state strong mobilization power when the country 
was under centralized control. The will of the central state was enforced 
through these channels down to the bottom of the society.33 
The actual organization of the Chinese state, however, has been 
marked by both integration and segmentation ever since the Great Leap 
Forward of the late 1950s. Vivienne Shue observes that amid 
decentralization and recentralization attempts during the 1950s and 
1960s the Chinese administrative organization evolved into a system 
characterized by institutionalized tension between central and regional 
authorities, i.e., between the vertically linked state ministries and 
regionally or horizontally based local planning committees. Whereas the 
state apparatus was undeniably highly integrated, local-based offices 
had an inclination to pursue the interest of their own areas and when 
necessary, against the demands of the vertical state apparatus.34 In the 
economic sphere, given its small and spatially concentrated industrial 
base, Chinese planners allowed tightly centralized industries to coexist 
with loosely planned and coordinated rural economy, which 
strengthened the vertical segmentation of the periphery and encouraged 
the model of self-reliant, comprehensive, but locally bounded 
economies.35 
The apparently omnipotent and omnipresent state apparatus that 
penetrated deep into the society was therefore intersected by 
                                                 
33 For an overview of the party-state relations, see Shiping Zheng (1997). 
34 Vivienne Shue (1988: 53-56) 
35 ibid: 59-69 
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 horizontally-based local authorities and interests. Whereas during the 
Maoist era, the state tolerated localism and saw in localist motives “one 
of the more important mobilizable forces for balanced economic 
progress”36, under the new scheme of administrative decentralization 
during the reform era, the central state’s policy enforcement capabilities 
were seriously weakened as localist pursuits were reinforced by new 
economic incentives. Although decentralization measures successfully 
revitalized the Chinese economy, they also magnified the problems 
inherent in the organization of the Chinese state. 
Decentralization of the early 1980s was not the first time the central 
government attempted to delegate economic planning authorities to 
provincial localities. 37 However, it was unprecedented in the fact that 
comprehensive revenue sharing packages were introduced between the 
center and provincial authorities on a regional particularistic basis, 
which gave provincial administrative authorities considerable 
discretionary power in raising and allocating revenues. 38  At the 
provincial and sub-provincial levels, local states grew significantly as 
the downward transfer of property rights and fiscal responsibility 
prompted local governments to expand their organizations and staff. 39 
For almost all economic sectors ranging from trade to tourism, local 
administrative offices were set up to supervise the sectors alongside 
locally based ministerial offices.40 Forces to “intersect the vertical lines 
                                                 
36 ibid: 63 
37 In this study local authorities mostly refer to administrative offices at the provincial 
level. 
38 See Richard Baum and Alexei Shevchenko in Merle Goldman and Roderick 
MacFarquhar (1999: 334-335) and Shaoguang Wang in Walder (1995:87-113). 
39 Richard Baum, Alexei Shevchenko, op.cit.: 339.  
40 World Bank (1995) 
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 of ministerial authority designed to link the center and localities” as 
observed by Shue were stronger than ever.  
In the meantime, the dual-track price system was adopted in many 
industries and sectors and market mechanism began to function in the 
above-plan portion of the economy, whereas region-based fiscal 
arrangements reinforced vertical segmentation of the economy and 
resulted in market fragmentation and local protectionism.  
Given regional particularistic fiscal incentives and geographically 
segmented market dynamics, not only were local governments at the 
provincial and sub-provincial levels more motivated than ever to pursue 
local interests but they were also equipped with more means and 
resources than ever before to do so. Generally speaking, local 
authorities have engaged in microeconomic activities as profit-seeking 
entrepreneurs, competitive developers or protective patrons.41  
China scholars have observed that at the basic local level there is a 
growing trend toward the fusion of political and economic power as local 
governments directly took part in entrepreneurial activities or even 
reorganized themselves into profit-making commercial corporations.42 
                                                 
41 Baum and Shevchenko have developed a typology of local states in China, which 
includes entrepreneurial states, developmental, clientelist and predatory states. Baum 
and Shevchenko argue that predatory states can be institutional in nature, involving 
excessive exactions by local officials on behalf of their cash-starved state agencies. 
Bernstein and Lu (2003), however, attribute predatory behaviors to decentralization of 
state power; the state is unable to control subordinate agents and their excessive 
extractions at lower levels. Evans (1987) and Kohli (2004) define predatory states as 
states totally captured by societal interests that lack the ability to prevent individual 
incumbents from pursuing their own goals. With this definition in mind, the existence 
and practice of local predatory states constitutes evidence of the erosion or loss of 
autonomy on the part of the Chinese state. Since the focus of study here mainly 
concerns how local states engage in local industrial activities (either through local 
developmental policies or direct entrepreneurship), the predatory state type is not 
examined here.  
42 Ibid: 339; Nan Lin(1995：301-354); Walder (1995); Blecher (1991). 
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 At the provincial and municipal levels “incorporation” of the entire 
government is rarely seen. Yet there are cases of the government’s 
partial “spin-off”. In a study of the real estate management and 
commerce departments in Tianjin, Jane Duckett shows that individual 
bureaus of the Tianjin government during the reform era are directly 
involved in profit-seeking and risk-taking business through setting up 
new business ventures by investing bureau funds in the same way as 
private entrepreneurs or the managers of economic firms. Duckett 
differentiates this state model from the model of local developmental 
state and sees state entrepreneurialism as evidence of the state’s 
voluntary adaptation to the market. Yet seen in a wider perspective, 
however, such spin-offs and the associated activities may well pose a 
problem to central administrators. As Duckett describes, those 
incorporated state units begin to identify themselves with the industrial 
and sectoral interests that they are supposed to supervise and regulate 
and some of them even become industrial leaders. As links in the 
central state’s policy enforcement mechanism, however, these units, 
having acquired a dual identity, may welcome central initiatives that 
will improve their market positions but are likely to obstruct those that 
threaten their profitability and privileged positions in the market.43   
Other scholars have studied and presented cases of local developmental 
states during the reform era.44 Local agents are developmental when 
they are oriented towards increasing economic output and productivity 
                                                 
43 See Christine Wong “Material Allocation and Decentralization” in Perry and Wong 
eds. (1985). My interviewees at the MOFTEC (now Department of Commerce) also saw 
new trading corporations set up by local governments as participants and facilitators 
of interregional arbitrage that went against state policy in the 1980s and early 1990s. 
44 For example, Blecher and Shue (1996) and Jean Oi (1999).  
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 while they themselves are not connected to particular enterprises within 
the sphere of their administrative jurisdiction. 45  However, under 
geographically bounded fiscal and sectoral preferential policies and 
given price distortion and the scarcity of resources, it is natural for 
these local developers to compete against other localities in order to 
maximize economic gains for their own areas, which makes their 
behavior hardly differentiable from protectionist and clientelist patron 
other than the fact that they are protecting and striving for benefits for 
the locality as a whole rather than for particular corporate interests.46  
Although at the local level these governments may well maintain their 
role and image as promoter of higher-order goals for both the state and 
the society, on the national scale their role as policy enforcement agents 
of the central state becomes problematic as they calculate and behave 
increasingly as principals on behalf of local interests.47  
Decentralization measures, therefore, brought significant changes 
to China’s domestic institutional structure. The old system of high 
degree of centralization compensated by managed localism was 
transformed into one with strengthened local offices and fiscally 
                                                 
45 Baum and Shevchenko. op. cit. 
46 The difference between a developmental state and a clientelist state, according to 
Baum and Shevchenko, is that the former is concerned about increased 
output/productivity and is not connected to enterprises whereas the latter is the other 
way around. Jean Oi (1999), for example, describes how local developmental states 
engage in competitive and protectionist practices to maximize economic gains for their 
localities.    
47 Oi (1999:196-197). It can be reasoned that the competitive and protectionist 
tendency of local developmental states in the decentralization era was determined by 
regionally differentiated and segmented fiscal incentives that put such local states into 
a zero-sum game against other localities or even the central government. In areas 
where the economic structure was less affected by the wave of reform and opening up, 
local states may well promote the higher-order developmental goals without being 
overly parochial in its relationship with the central state. See for example Blecher and 
Shue (1996). 
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 weakened center. More than ever, the empowerment and expansions of 
horizontal authorities crosscut or even obstructed the vertical pipelines 
that reached from the center to the grassroots. In many cases officials 
on the vertical system assigned to supervise a specific area also tended 
to identify themselves with the interests of the locality. 48 As a result, 
the coherent and cohesive bureaucratic apparatus that was required for 
an autonomous developmental state was being weakened and 
compromised. 
To regain control, the state did not resort to administrative 
recentralization as it had done before during previous rounds of 
decentralization in the 1950s and the 1960s. Recentralization of this 
type would mean a rollback of the reform program upon which the 
Chinese state had built its legitimacy and creditability in the post-Mao 
era.49  Such attempts would also encounter strong resistance from 
local governments and the wider society that have on the whole 
benefited from the reform initiatives. 50  The central state, instead, 
sought to reassert central authority through further decontrolling the 
economy. By disentangling itself from microeconomic activities, the 
central state aimed to remove the sources of rent, restore bureaucratic 
                                                 
48 Vivienne Shue observes that even in the pre-reform era, some cadres in vertically 
linked bureaus may have stood to advance their own careers by promoting the 
interests and performance levels of the locality in which they happened to be assigned. 
This kind of situation, however, was more typical during the reform era, as economic 
interests kicked in to tie cadres on the vertical links directly to the localities they were 
assigned to. Pending systematic evidence, my interviews with managers at the 
headoffices and municipal branches of major state-owned trading corporations and 
commercial banks confirmed this point. 
49 See Wang Gungwu in Jonathan Unger ed. (1996); Nicholas Lardy (1998). Also see 
Andrew Wedeman (2003) for the irreversibility of the reform program. 
50 See Susan Shirk (1994).  
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 coherence and cohesiveness of the state apparatus and regain the 
autonomy needed for effective management of the economy. 
 
Reforms of Foreign Trade and Banking: Decentralization and 
Liberalization in Two Critical Sectors 
To examine how changes in China’s domestic institutional structure 
and the ensuing political dynamics shaped state-market relations and 
to explore the logic underlying the trajectory of the country’s economic 
development and its integration with the world economy, I chose my 
cases of observation at the sector level at the outset of my research. A 
sector here is broadly defined as a domain of economic activities. My 
preliminary research included literature surveys on foreign trade 
(commodity trade), foreign direct investment, banking, insurance, and 
telecommunications, all of which were crucial sectors for China’s WTO 
accession negotiations that have been put under media spotlight. 
Following my research trips to China in 1999 and 2000, I chose the 
sectors of foreign trade and banking finance for intensive case studies.  
First of all, the cases of foreign trade and banking meet the 
requirement of unit homogeneity and therefore provide good basis for 
possible comparison and contrast. 51   These two sectors are 
self-contained units for studying the effect of institutional changes on 
reform outcomes. The development of specific service industries such as 
insurance and telecommunications were tied to China’s WTO accession 
deals and were part of the liberalization outcomes. They could only be 
explained, therefore, by looking at the process of the foreign trade 
                                                 
51 See King, Keohane and Verba (1994: 91-94) on the criteria for unit homogeneity. 
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 reform as a whole. Similarly, foreign direct investment was a new 
economic element that the government introduced during the reform 
era and the sector itself was a product rather than a target of reform. 
The institutional context for studying decentralization and liberalization 
was lacking in the FDI case.  The reform processes of the foreign trade 
sector and the banking sector, on the other hand, were largely 
independent of each other. Institutionally, both sectors experienced the 
initial administrative decentralization and the eventual move towards 
liberalization. Each of them provides a relatively complete and 
standalone context for observing the behaviors and interactions of 
actors at different levels and for exploring possible patterns underlying 
the reform process.  
Moreover, both the cases of foreign trade and banking are of critical 
empirical significance. Not only were both sectors at the intersection of 
domestic reforms and the “opening up”, they were also the focal points 
of macroeconomic and microeconomic policies. Reforms of foreign trade 
and banking system usually entailed important macroeconomic 
adjustments whereas microeconomic effects of reform measures on 
industries and regions were themselves epitomized in these two sectors. 
Studying these two sectors and examining the relationships and 
interactions between the central state, provincial authorities, societal 
and market forces may help one go beyond sectoral logic towards a more 
generalized explanation about the logic of economic liberalization in 
China. 
Furthermore, the selection of these two cases allowed me to observe 
the effect of key variables and processes while controlling for the effect 
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 of other factors. The reform of the foreign trade sector pioneered China’s 
economic internationalization. Even at the decentralization stage of the 
reform, international actors began to participate in China’s foreign trade 
activities through establishing export processing and production 
facilities in China under the auspices of preferential FDI policies.52 The 
reform of the banking sector, on the other hand, proceeded in a 
relatively closed setting and the presence of foreign players in banking 
activities was minimal. The presence of international actors in the 
foreign trade case and, relatively speaking, the lack of participation by 
such actors in the banking case provided ground for assessing whether 
a domestic institutional analysis could consistently explain the logic of 
China’s economic liberalization across cases. 
Finally, whereas institutional change as the intended key 
explanatory variable was present in both cases, the reform processes of 
the two sectors demonstrate a certain degree of variations with regard to 
the specific mode of institutional restructuring. In both cases the 
institutional transformations began with administrative 
decentralizations, which aligned the provincial governments more and 
more with local interests as economic incentives kicked in. However, 
decentralization in the foreign trade sector was carried out with 
regional-particularistic arrangements with regard to foreign exchange 
retention, whereas decentralization in the banking sector on the other 
hand entailed a more straightforward redistribution of power between 
                                                 
52 Most of FDI in China, especially in the early years of the reform, were greenfield 
facilities engaging in processing trade. According to Song Hong, the share of 
processing trade in China's exports has been more than 50%. And the share of 
Foreign-Funded Enterprises in China's exports has also been more than 50%. 
(Executive Intelligence Review: July 22, 2005).  
 30
 the center and localities. Accordingly, interactions among different 
players displayed different dynamics in the two sectors.  
In the case of foreign trade, the central government had originally 
intended to set up a decentralized but planned system of trade. But 
local interests, vying for privileges in trading rights and revenue 
retention, created a market of inter-provincial “internal imports and 
exports”, which seriously hampered the state’s ability to implement its 
foreign trade plans. In an attempt to reassert its authority, the central 
government resorted to market-conforming reforms, which finally led to 
the liberalization of the trade authority. In this course, provincial and 
sub-provincial governments as well as business interests largely 
supported the moves. As the dual exchange rate system was removed 
and foreign exchange became more accessible, the incentive for 
smuggling across provinces was reduced. Localities instead became 
increasingly interested in improving the efficiency of their import and 
export activities and making necessary adjustments on the basis of cost 
and benefit calculations. The measures the central government took to 
standardize and liberalize trade practice coincided with their needs. In 
this sense, the central state, local authorities and business interests 
were on a “joint project” for a more thorough reform of the trading 
system.53  
As for reforms of the financial sector, the central government 
wanted to create a banking system that was distinguishable and 
separate from the fiscal authority but at the same time located within 
                                                 
53 The “band wagon” effect of regionally differentiated decentralization measures on 
further reforms is also discussed by David Zweig (2002) and Dali Yang (1997).   
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 the state planning framework. Resembling the credit-based “late 
development model”, such a system would serve as an instrument of 
state’s industrial policy. Yet under decentralized politics, 
representatives of the “state” at different levels have acquired different 
incentives. The newly commercialized banks found themselves subject 
to administrative orders and making loans not on commercial basis, but 
out of consideration for departmental/local interests. Loans and credits 
flew to state-owned enterprises that had no ability to generate adequate 
returns. Banks themselves were virtually insolvent. The overall 
economy suffered from “overheating” from time to time as local 
governments tried to obtain credit for their enterprises “above the 
quota”, which caused over expansion of credit. Whereas trade 
decentralization had unexpectedly created dynamic, though primitive, 
markets for the state to regulate, decentralization of the banking sector 
turned self-interested local states into entrepreneurs, each seeking its 
own “industrial policy” by drawing funds from the central government’s 
account. 54 Moreover, the twisted relationship between banks, 
governments and enterprises posed obstacles to reforms in other crucial 
sectors such as reforms of the state-owned enterprises. The central 
government found it neither effective nor possible to solve such 
problems through issuing administrative directives. To regain control 
the state needed to decouple itself from microeconomic activities and 
become an autonomous regulator and macroeconomic player. Only 
                                                 
54 The “entrepreneur” here is used in Hirschmanian sense and refers to local 
governments’ role in making investment decisions and channeling funds into 
industrial projects. Such decisions can be made for either developmental or 
entrepreneurial purposes. 
 32
 market-oriented banking reform and liberalization could help it reach 
such an end. Despite resistance from vested interests, the state went 
ahead to pursue this course, beginning with the reform of the central 
bank modeled after the Federal Reserve, recapitalization of state-owned 
banks, and increase of foreign bank participation to boost competition. 
And with China entering the WTO, a schedule has been finally set for 
full-scale liberalization of the banking sector.  
Overall, both cases, each from a different angle, argue against the 
view that treats reform outcomes as political deals struck between 
central and local actors. According to this view reforms in China were 
being carried forward as local officials gave pressures to certain central 
leaders who otherwise preferred status quo. The reform coalition was 
not stable, however. As soon as further reforms would touch their 
vested interests, both central and local leaders would be loath to 
change.55 But the cases of foreign trade and banking shows that in 
either a “real economic sector” where most local parties benefited from 
the decentralization or in the financial area where the costs of the 
reform were borne and resistance to further changes stronger, it was the 
central state that took the initiative to set the course for further reforms. 
And the changes did not occur along the line of decentralization and 
recentralization but took a decisive turn towards market-conforming 
liberalization instead.   
In the next two chapters, I will explore in full detail the processes of 
reforms in these two sectors respectively. Transformations in the two 
sectors share a similar logic: The central government’s decentralization 
                                                 
55 Shirk (1994); “The Politics of Industrial Reform” in Perry and Wong (1985). 
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 initiatives changed the organizational dynamics of the Chinese state, 
which exerted an impact on the sector’s reform trajectory in the 
subsequent period. In both cases the final policy outcome was 
liberalization. But contrary to the conventional belief that such an 
outcome is a sign of the state giving in to global market forces, the cases 
show that such an outcome largely arose from the need of the central 
state to reassert its autonomous control over the society and the 
fragmented markets. Meanwhile, as decentralization played out 
differently in the two sectors, different institutional dynamics ensued, 
which helps account for the differences in the speed of liberalization and 
in the actual methods employed in liberalization processes. 
 
Economic Liberalization and Ideological Justification 
Whereas the two empirical cases provide evidence as to what 
motivated the state to pursue liberalization and how liberalization 
helped the state redress the problems it had been faced with, they 
naturally beg another question: Given the fact that the Chinese central 
state’s autonomy was seriously eroded due to administrative 
decentralization, why was it able to rally domestic support and enforce 
economic liberalization? I will explore answers to this question by 
looking at the role of ideology in policy legitimation and enforcement 
process. 
In the wake of the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese government led 
by Deng Xiaoping positioned economic revival and development as the 
country’s top priority in order to save the country’s economy from the 
verge of bankruptcy and to regain political credibility of the communist 
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 party. The reform process in China was filled with political struggles. 
Oppositions to reform policies were often expressed not as direct 
objections to the reform programs the government initiated but as 
disputes and confrontations in the ideological sphere. Facing party 
conservatives’ resistance to reform initiatives on the ground of socialist 
orthodoxies, Deng and the reformist government positioned market as a 
neutral tool to promote economic growth and enhance national strength, 
thereby appealing to the nationalist aspiration for national glory56. 
Subsequently, the Chinese government presented the liberalization 
program as a natural extension of the plan-to-market transition and 
combined the rhetorical power of neoliberal economic doctrines and a 
nationalist end goal to justify its liberalization move. 
At the core of the analysis is the concept of economic nationalism. 
Economic nationalism as I discuss in this study has two analytical 
attributes. First, the concept is defined in terms of purpose or objective 
rather than specific policy approaches.57 Secondly and relatedly, the 
purpose or objective here denotes social consensus rather than state 
policy goals. Studies on economic nationalism have shown that states 
could counter-intuitively pursue liberal economic policies for nationalist 
purposes. 58  In the Chinese case, however, nationalism was not 
necessarily the motivating force behind the state’s liberalization 
initiative. As argued above, the Chinese government pushed for 
                                                 
56 See Jonathan Unger ed (1996), Wang Gungwu (1996) Wei-Wei Zhang 91996),Maria 
Hsia Chang (2001) Peter Hays Gries (2004) for discussions on the rise of nationalism 
during the reform era and its relationship with the economic reform program.  
57 On this point I share Derek Hall’s view about defining economic nationalism as 
goals rather than policies. See Derek Hall in Eric Helleiner and Andreas Pickel (2005): 
119. 
58 ibid. 
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 economic liberalization in order to reassert state authority and control. 
In this course, Chinese leaders and official media tweaked neoliberal 
economic principles to be in line with an economic nationalist end goal. 
At this level the story is largely rationalist as economic nationalism was 
invoked to serve the state’s practical end. On the other hand, however, 
economic nationalism was not merely a legitimating tool whose content 
was supplied by the specific context of political struggles over competing 
policy preferences,59 but was an expression of social consensus shaped 
and informed by historical memory an experience. In fact, it was the 
social criteria against which expedient ideological discourses like 
neoliberalsm were adjusted and repackaged.  
In Chapter 4, I will explore origins and attributes of Chinese 
nationalism and its role in China’s modernization process, examine the 
rhetorical compatibility between nationalist economic goals and 
neoliberal/neoclassical discourses, and demonstrate how the Chinese 
state exploited such rhetorical compatibility to legitimize the 
liberalization drive and facilitate its enforcement. 
 
Research and Documentation 
In gathering my evidence, I began my research with both primary 
and secondary literature. The former include government reports, 
publication of policy guidelines, published speeches of political leaders, 
official statistics issued by relevant state departments, national and 
provincial yearbooks. The latter include press reports, periodicals, and 
scholarly publications in both English and Chinese that range from 
                                                 
59 Maya Eichler in Helleiner and Pickel (2005):72-74. 
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 studies of foreign trade and banking and of reform politics, central-local 
relations and state-society relations in general to policy oriented studies 
conducted by state-sponsored research institutes and centers in China. 
Analysis based upon these sources of information was supported and 
reinforced by interviews with a number of “key informants” conducted 
prior to China’s entry to the WTO. In 1999 and 2000 I made a couple of 
research trips to Beijing, China where I interviewed a number of 
ministerial officials and managers from state-owned corporations and 
banks, out of which 16 interviews were finally used for this study.60 The 
interviewees included section-level heads at the Ministry of Foreign 
Trade and Economic Cooperation (now Ministry of Commerce) and the 
People’s Bank of China, and managers at both the headquarters and the 
Beijing municipal branches of three state-owned commercial banks, as 
well as managers at three state-owned specialized trading companies 
and one major conglomerate.   
Although the number of interviews may be too small to offer any 
systematic evidence, they provided insider views and perspectives on 
the impact of decentralization and liberalization on those organizations 
and individuals concerned. Interviews with managers from the major 
state trading companies and state banks, in particular, allowed me to 
gain insight into the reach of the state at the micro corporate level and 
the changed role and identity of former state policy enforcers during the 
reform era. In the past those managers were virtually government 
officials, as their corporations were indeed part of the state’s 
                                                 
60 Interviews with managers at the People’s Insurance Company of China and officials 
at the Beijing Telecom Bureau were not counted as eventually the insurance and 
telecommunications sectors were not included in this study. 
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 administrative arms. As reforms were rolled out, these organizations 
were “commercialized” and managers found themselves increasingly 
responsible for the profits and losses of their companies. Juxtaposed 
between the central state and the growing sectoral interests and subject 
to the leaderships of both vertical and horizontal authorities, their 
experiences helped me gain a concrete understanding of the nature and 
dynamics of institutional changes in these particular sectors. 
 
China’s reform experience entails the three interrelated processes of 
development, marketization and liberalization and speaks to the central 
theme of political economy studies – the relationship between the state 
and the market. As a late developing country, China has demonstrated 
a greater propensity to liberalize its economy than most East Asian NIEs 
at the comparable stage of economic development. While international 
conditions in an age of globalized trade and finance have obviously 
impacted the Chinese government’s economic policy making, this study 
argues that an understanding of the rationale and timing of economic 
liberalization needs to be grounded in the context of the Chinese state’s 
institutional change. By adopting a hands-free approach towards the 
economy and decoupling the Chinese state from microeconomic 
activities, the central government in China sought to redress the 
socioeconomic consequences of the previous round of institutional 
reform and to regain policy autonomy and effective control over the 
economy. A statist analysis of the Chinese state’s options and choice in 
economic development and transition, therefore, is compatible with a 
liberal economic outcome. The case of China’s economic liberalization, 
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 in this sense, provides a new piece of empirical evidence for the statist 
claim about the pattern and nature of state-market interactions in the 
greater research project of state-market relationship under economic 
globalization.61  
                                                 
61 See, for example, Ikenberry (1988) and Vogel (1996), which argue that more state 
control and regulation can result from economic deregulation and liberalization. 
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 CHAPTER TWO 
FOREIGN TRADE REFORM 
 
One of the most conspicuous and profound changes that have taken 
place in China over the past two decades is the transformation of the 
foreign trade sector. Before reform, foreign trade was one of the most 
centrally controlled sectors in the economy. Twelve specialized national 
import and export corporations under the supervision of the Ministry of 
Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (MOFERT) monopolized the 
entirety of foreign trade of the country.1 The Chinese economy was semi 
autarkic, with foreign trade making up less than 10 % of its total GNP.2 
China ranked 36 of the world’s trading nations, its imports and exports 
accounting for less than 1% of the world’s total.3 
Since the introduction of foreign trade reform in 1979, the foreign 
trade sector has experienced fast growth and total transformation. 
Between 1978 and 2002, China’s annual growth rates of imports and 
exports amounted to 14.7% and 15.7% respectively, whereas average 
GDP growth rate was around 9.7% per annum for the same period.4   
In 2004 China surpassed Japan to become the 3rd largest trading 
nation in the world, its foreign trade totaling more than US $ 1 trillion. 
China’s economy has become highly dependent on trade. In 2003 its 
                                                 
1 The MOFERT was later renamed as MOFTEC (Ministry of Foreign Trade and 
Economic Cooperation). In 2003, MOFTEC, the State Economic and Trade 
Commission, and the State Planning Commission were merged to form the Ministry of 
Commerce. 
2 Sources: China’s White Paper on Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (1999); 
Ministry of Commerce: Import and Export Statistics. 
3 David Wall, Jiang Boke and Yin Xiangshuo (1997): 110-111; China Daily (November 
27th, 2003). 
4 Source: Ministry of Commerce: Import and Export Statistics. 
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 trade dependence reached 60%, whereas top trading nations such as 
the US and Japan only have a trade dependence of around 20%.5 
Although scholars suspect that China’s trade dependence in recent 
years may have been overestimated due to an undervalued RMB 
exchange rate or an underestimated GDP growth rate, or a combination 
of both, China’s economic openness and heavy involvement in world 
trade have become an undeniable or even alarming fact for a country 
with a huge domestic market.6  
China’s excellent trade performance has earned it second place 
worldwide after Japan in foreign exchange reserve, its foreign exchange 
reserve amounting to $ US 610 billion in 2004 (See Figure 2.1. for a 
graphical portrayal of China’s foreign reserve between 1979 and 2003). 
And according to China’s official report, the country enjoyed a $ US 80.3 
billion trade surplus with the US. 7 The surge of China’s trading power 
reminds one of the earlier versions of economic miracles in East Asia in 
the last century, where Japan and East Asian NIEs such as Korea and 
Taiwan achieved economic takeoffs through an export-led growth 
strategy. At first sight, the Chinese experience bears a great deal of 
similarity to the other East Asian nations’. Even Chinese newspapers 
often describe China’s opening up as following “a strategy of developing 
export-led outward-looking economy”.  
 
 
                                                 
5 Figures are based upon press releases by the State Council Press Office in 2003 and 
2004, and UN Project LINK data. 
6 See discussions about China’s trade dependence in Zhang Jun, “Review of the 
Chinese economy in 2003, ” Jiefang Ribao (January 3rd, 2004 ) 
7 The US claims that its deficit with China was as high as US $162 billion, which 
includes trade with mainland China and transit trade through Hong Kong.  
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Figure 2.1. China’s Foreign Reserve 1979-2003 
Data Source: State Administration of Foreign Exchange Control 
 
Under closer examination, however, China has displayed different 
dynamics from the East Asian earlier movers when it comes to foreign 
trade practice and performance. The East Asian experience is 
characterized by sector-specific interventions, export promotion and 
centralized policy making on trade and industry issues.8 In contrast, 
China’s authority for foreign trade policy making during the reform era 
has been dispersed across several agencies. Its foreign trade policy is 
generally not linked with industrial assistance to specific domestic 
sectors.9 Its imports have grown together with exports and in many 
                                                 
8 See Robert Wade (1992): 270-320. 
9 World Bank (1994): 133-134. 
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 years China was even running a trade deficit10. Finally, China’s high 
rate of trade dependence as mentioned above indicates that its economy 
is more open than its East Asian neighbors at the comparable stage of 
economic development.   
What then is the logic behind China’s foreign trade reform? Given 
the tradition of planning and control in its pre-reform economic system, 
why did China choose a “liberal” approach over a “governed market” 
approach of East Asian NIEs? Given the fact that China had secured, 
through the Uruguay Round of the GATT talks, most of the benefits for 
those sectors where the country enjoyed a “comparative advantage”11, 
why did the Chinese state resort to full-scale trade liberalization, which 
would inevitably expose many of the country’s ailing domestic sectors to 
international competition? 
One explanation for China’s policy choice is that China was pushed 
by external pressures to pursue trade liberalization. Such pressures 
came from several dimensions. Firstly, by 1994 China was under the 
pressure to conclude its GATT talks in order to automatically become a 
founding member of the WTO.12 A second and more specific concern 
was Taiwan’s bid for GATT/WTO membership. Susan Shirk argues that 
China sought to rejoin GATT/WTO because it wanted to join the 
organization ahead of Taipei to fulfill its national pride. Thirdly, 
Securing GATT/WTO membership would also allow China to rid itself of 
                                                 
10 See Appendix 2-1: China’s Imports and Exports Since 1978. 
11 See Nicolas Lardy (1994), Hong Kunlian and Hong Keren (1994), Gu Weiping (1994), 
Ren Quan and  Sheng Baoliang (1994), Shao Wangyu (1995), Zhang Yao (2003) for 
reviews of the Uruguay Round of the GATT talks and China’s rights and obligations as 
a developing country.  
12 Wang Yaotian and Fu Ming (1994):24. Also see Li Xiaogang (1994): 23-24.  
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 the annual review of its MFN status by the US government.13 These 
political diplomatic concerns weighed more heavily on the state’s 
political scale than economic considerations. 
While all these factors may have impacted China’s WTO accession 
process, the external pressure argument tends to evaluate China’s 
decision to liberalize its economy as one move in a short term political 
game rather than in the context of the 15-year long persistent efforts of 
domestic restructuring 14 . It was true that in 1994 the Chinese 
government set a goal for the country to rejoin GATT before January 1st, 
1995 in an attempt to secure the WTO founding party status for China. 
Such a move, however, was mainly intended to obtain the opportunity to 
formally conclude the deals that had been struck between China and 
GATT members during the Uruguay Round.15  In other words, the 
Chinese government was not forced to liberalize its economy under the 
pressing need of joining the GATT/WTO. Rather, the attempt to join the 
GATT/WTO by the 1995 deadline was a logical step in advancing its 
opening-up strategy. Moreover, if China’s decision to liberalize its 
economy was motivated by the expedient concern for WTO founding 
membership, we would expect to see China drop or reduce its effort for 
                                                 
13 Susan Shirk (1994: 70-72). 
14The entire GATT talks lasted for 15 years. China decided to rejoin GATT in 1986. The 
negotiations were on and then off in the early years. On December 15th, 1993 the 
Uruguay Round of the GATT talks was concluded. China set its objective for rejoining 
GATT before January 1st, 1995 in order to become a founding party of the WTO.  It 
took another 8 years, however, before China was finally admitted to WTO in 2001. 
15 See Wang Yaotian and Fu Ming. op. cit.; Liu Ke (1994): 23. And according to Ren 
Quan and Sheng Baoliang (op. cit.), China contributed to the final successful 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round by reducing tariffs on over 800 items of agricultural 
goods and over 5000 items of non-agricultural goods and by opening up a selected 
number of service industries. For all Uruguay Round agreements to take effect, they 
would have to be signed by the contracting parties of the WTO. 
 44
 WTO accession after its failure to rejoin GATT at the end of 1994. The 
reality, however, shows that China continued to pursue WTO 
membership after 1995 and intensified its effort to comply with WTO 
standards by voluntarily and substantially lowering tariff levels and 
speeding up domestic reforms.16  
Besides, the claim that China’s liberalization efforts are driven by 
political diplomatic considerations such as Taiwan’s WTO membership 
and Sino-US bilateral trade relations tends to interpret China’s national 
interests too narrowly. In fact, the issue of WTO entry was a security 
issue for China in the sense that negative repercussions could pose 
serious threat to the country’s political stability and the legitimacy of 
the communist rule. 17  Pessimistic writers were talking about the 
possible “collapse” of China in the aftermath of its WTO entry. 18 
Moreover, challenges and costs associated with the WTO accession were 
not only looming ahead in the medium and long run, but also were 
imminent in the short term. According to Lardy, the comprehensive and 
deep commitments China made to economic liberalization since 1995 
far exceeded those of the contracting parties of the WTO. Domestic 
                                                 
16 For example, at the APEC meeting in Osaka in 1995, China declared a unilateral cut 
of tariffs on more than 4000 lines of imports and abolishment of import licensing and 
control over a variety of commodities under 170 tax codes; Long Yongtu, then Minister 
Assistant of MOFTEC pledged that the promises China made at APE apply to its WTO 
negotiations. See Wang Wei (1995). The Chinese government also intensified its effort 
to reform the foreign trade regime and other relevant areas such as allowing foreign 
enterprises to engage in foreign trade activities in China, granting national treatment 
to foreign products and enterprises, further reforming the foreign exchange control 
system, etc.  
17 During the 1990s, many Chinese scholars conducted studies on economic security, 
evaluating the negative repercussions of globalization and China’s WTO accession to 
China’s economy and social stability. See, for example, Xia Shen (1996); Wang Zhaocai 
et al (1998); Lingdao Juce Xinxi (Information for Decision-makers Magazine) (1998) 
18 See Gordon Chang, The Coming Collapse of China (2001). 
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 restructurings required by these commitments would inevitably incur 
high costs in many economic and social areas in the short term.19 In 
other words, Chinese political leaders were not trading long term risks 
for short term political gains. China’s determined efforts to pursue 
economic liberalization require an explanation that goes beyond citing 
the few political diplomatic concerns to answer why the Chinese 
government chose to do so despite the high stakes involved. 
Another possible explanation for China’s liberalization is that 
domestic players in favor of internationalization and liberalization may 
have overshadowed those inward-looking players in influencing 
policymakers’ decision making process.20 This guess, however, is not 
consistent with the reality in China. China’s WTO preparations and 
negotiations followed a highly centralized process. During the talks 
domestic firms had minimum information about the terms of the 
agreements and the likely impact upon various industrial sectors. It was 
always the central government that set the general directions and 
pushed the talks through difficult circumstances.21 
This study attempts to explain the logic behind China’s trade 
liberalization in the historical and institutional context of the reform of 
the country’s foreign trade system. Like reforms in other areas, China’s 
foreign trade reform has been described as following a gradual and 
                                                 
19 See Lardy (2002), Chapters 1 and 3. 
20 See Jeffrey Frieden and Ronald Rogowski “The Impact of the International Economy 
on National Politics: An Analytical Overview” in Helen Milner and Robert Keohane 
(1995) for an argument about how internationally competitive sectors in the domestic 
economy push for liberalization.  
21 According to Susan Shirk (1994:73), trade talks were defined as foreign policy 
issues: the Foreign Ministry, MOFTEC, the Bank of China, the tourist administration, 
and the SEZ office met and made recommendations directly to senior CCP leaders, 
thereby bypassing the industrial ministries. Also see Xia Huasheng (1999). 
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 incremental approach. Nevertheless, as far as state strategy is 
concerned, “gradualism” merely tells part of the story. This term tends 
to depict a picture of coherent, continuous as well as incremental 
change. A closer look at different stages of China’s foreign trade reform, 
however, suggests that trajectory of reform was far from predetermined 
at the outset. Nor were steps of the reform truly even and incremental.  
Rather than consistently pursuing a strategy of trade liberalization, 
foreign trade reform in China started with administrative 
decentralization. It was only when China intensified its efforts to rejoin 
GATT (later WTO) in the early 1990s that market conforming measures 
were underway. As part of the decentralization program, trade 
decentralization was intended to redistribute power between the central 
state and provincial governments as well as between the center and 
departments in charge of different industrial sectors. The principles 
behind trade practice largely remained unchanged from the era of 
central planning: exports were regarded as means to acquire foreign 
exchanges needed for “domestic economic construction”. Some scholar 
commented that trade decentralization along administrative lines on a 
particularistic basis would cause the central and local political 
authorities to develop an interest in perpetuating an incompletely 
marketized system. And “without any transformation of communist 
political institutions, achieving a more universal foreign exchange and 
trade regime will be more difficult than carrying out the initial 
measures.” 22  Evidently, the outcome of the trade reform diverges 
from this prediction: Full-scale market-conforming reforms have 
                                                 
22 Susan Shirk op.cit.:53-54. 
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 replaced the incomplete and particularistic approach, while communist 
political institutions remain intact. Meanwhile, as I will show this 
chapter, the central government initiated and led the liberalization drive 
rather than simply bringing policy back in line with economic reality.23 
The driving force behind China’s market-conforming move was political 
rather than economic.  
In examining the process of China’s foreign trade reform, I divided 
the reform into three stages. The first stage was from 1979 to 1987. 
During this period, the Chinese government broke the central state’s 
monopoly on foreign trade by delegating foreign trade authority to 
administrative organizations at the provincial level. Like reforms in 
other areas that were carried out since 1979, foreign trade 
decentralization started from experimental zones and was gradually 
rolled out across the country. The Chinese government at this point 
regarded export activities as a means to acquire foreign exchange and 
its foreign trade strategy remained to be one of import substitution. The 
second stage of reform spanned between 1987 and 1991. The central 
government enforced a contracting system to divide responsibilities 
between the center, foreign trade units, and localities respectively. With 
a regional particularistic arrangement, the central government intended 
to align its foreign trade strategy with its overall strategy for regional 
and industrial development. In 1991, however, the central government 
decided to abolish the strategy of regional differentiation in foreign trade, 
                                                 
23 See Andrew Wedeman (2002) for an argument that sees market-oriented reforms of 
the 1990s as driven by the law of the market underlying regional tension and rivalry. 
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 and since then China’s foreign trade reform entered the phase of market 
conforming liberalization. 
Key to this process was the fact that decentralization of the trade 
regime changed the internal structure of the state as local governments 
increasingly acquired a “dual role” – state policy enforcer on the one 
hand and local interest sponsor on the other. In a sense, the 
bureaucratic autonomy of the central state was being eroded as the 
coherence and cohesiveness of its policy enforcement mechanism was 
weakened by administrative decentralization and as horizontal 
authorities intersected the vertical linkages of the central state 
apparatus24. In order to regain central authority and policy autonomy, 
the central state resorted to market-oriented liberalization to decouple 
the state apparatus from microeconomic activities and thereby restore 
bureaucratic coherence and cohesiveness. Meanwhile, decentralization 
prepared institutional basis and support for the liberalization program 
as liberalization measures coincided with the need of local governments 
and business interests who had been vying for greater trading privileges 
and foreign exchange retentions under the particularistic 
dencentralization program. Trade liberalization became a “joint project” 
that the central state, local authorities and the society pursued.  
An examination of China’s state structure and its changes needs to 
start with its party-state system. As explained in the introductory 
chapter, theoretically the reach of the central state is in a sense 
omnipresent through the party-state’s administrative apparatus. Party 
committees are present from central level ministries, provincial 
                                                 
24 See Introduction for discussions on this point. 
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 governments to village and township governments and grassroots work 
units with the lower level committees to higher level ones. The state 
apparatus is composed of both the central state and its policy enforcers 
along the pipelines of the party-state system, which include local 
governments at different levels and even administrative authorities at 
the grassroots level. With this institutional structure, state capacity was 
strong. The will of the central state was enforced through these 
channels down to the bottom of the society, giving the impression of a 
“strong state”.  When administrative power was decentralized, however, 
local administrations’ agenda tended to diverge from the central 
government’s. China has had a history of central-local friction and the 
so-called warlordism, where central authority was weakened and local 
powers asserted themselves. But the very feature of the party-state 
institutions further compounded this problem: the central state was 
relying on the party-state apparatus to enforce its policies, including 
decentralization measures, whereas local administrative entities at the 
provincial level and below that were part of the state apparatus were 
increasingly concerned about “parochial interests”, which led to 
distorted effects of state policies, as the newly empowered horizontal 
authorities intersected the central state’s vertical policy enforcement 
network and eroded its policy autonomy. The dynamics of foreign trade 
reform in China needs to be understood in this light. 25 
 
 
                                                 
25 In the next few sections when I study the process of reform, I will sometimes use 
“the central state”, “the central government” almost interchangeably. 
 50
 Foreign Trade Decentralization Phase I (1979-1987) 
The initial focus of China’s economic reform was on internal 
development, with an emphasis on revitalizing the agricultural sector 
and import-substituting industries. The main purpose of the reform was 
not to abolish the planning system, but to improve its operation and 
efficiency. As Deng Xiaoping observed in 1978, too much concentration 
of economic management power at the center was not providing 
incentives for localities, enterprises and individuals to improve the 
profitability and efficiency of economic activities.26  To re-instill vigor 
into the economy, a decentralization program was rolled out after the 3rd 
session of the 11th plenum of the CPC central committee. Foreign trade 
was one of the many economic areas the program covered. 
Foreign trade was once the most centrally controlled economic 
sector in pre-reform China. All import and export activities were strictly 
directed by state plans. The prices and quantities were determined at 
the domestic level without reference to supply and demand conditions 
in the international markets. The state purchased goods from domestic 
producers and sold them abroad through its specialized trading 
companies. Altogether twelve specialized national trading corporations 
(national FTCs) monopolized all foreign trade transactions of the 
country under the supervision of MOFERT. At the provincial level, 
foreign trade bureaus and branches of national trading corporations 
were there to enforce plans and orders set by MOFERT and national 
trading corporations. They themselves, however, did not have any 
autonomous power in the business of foreign trade, as even the slightest 
                                                 
26 Deng Xiaoping (1993):150-152 
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 change of the trade plan required the approval of the higher authorities. 
The main purpose of exporting activities was to obtain foreign 
exchanges needed to finance strategic imports such as grain and 
industrial materials. The overall size of foreign trade was small. And an 
overvalued domestic currency created a bias towards imports and 
against exports.27 
When the “reform and opening up” policy was adopted in 1979, 
priority was given to reforms in the rural sector. Industrial development 
strategy remained largely unchanged, with an emphasis on heavy 
industry. Foreign trade reform, as part of the “opening up” efforts, was 
intended to complement domestic economic construction by increasing 
foreign exchange earnings needed for purchasing advanced equipment 
and technology. In fact, decentralization of foreign trade authority was 
not an entirely new policy. Back in the Great Leap Forward period, the 
Chinese government had already made such an attempt. In 1959, the 
central government decentralized foreign trade planning authority to 
localities while keeping the financial authority in foreign trade under 
central control. The initiative was cancelled in the subsequent 
retrenchment period of 1963-1965, as under the decentralized planning 
system localities across the country competed with each other to shoot 
for higher foreign trade targets, driving the overall foreign trade plan of 
the country out of control.28 The new decentralization initiative in the 
reform and opening up era was not very much different from the 1959 
program in the sense that it was still decentralization along 
                                                 
27 For descriptions of the pre-reform foreign trade system, see Yin Jinqing (1998): 
20-33.  
28 Ibid: 24.  
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 administrative lines. 29  Foreign trade authority was granted to 
provincial and sub-provincial governments, not individual enterprises. 
And the planning mechanism remained intact. Yet this time the Chinese 
government, drawing lessons from the past, started the reform from 
selected “experimental” regions. And the decentralization program gave 
more emphasis on profit sharing between the center and the localities in 
the hope of making the latter more responsible for their planning 
activities. These arrangements, on top of decentralization of foreign 
trade authority enforced through the existing state apparatus, created 
unexpected dynamics in the foreign trade sector.  
The Process of Decentralization 
Between 1979 and 1983, the central government took some initial 
steps to delegate foreign trade authority to localities. Geographical 
decentralization was undertaken on an experimental and particularistic 
basis. Four Special Economic Zones (SEZs) – Shenzhen, Zhuhai, 
Shantou, Xiamen – were set up to engage in export-oriented activities. 
Special arrangements were made with the SEZs to ensure their access 
to imports and foreign exchange so as to boost their export industries. 
The center granted Guangdong and Fujian, SEZs' hosting provinces, 
expanded rights to conduct foreign trade. The two provinces were 
allowed to set up their own import and export corporations and carry 
out their own foreign trade plans. The center also allowed SEZs to retain 
100% of the foreign exchanges they gained from exports and the two 
                                                 
29 For the characteristics of the 1959 decentralization program, see Vivienne Shue 
(1988). 
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 hosting provinces to retain 30%.30  Before long, “municipalities directly 
under the state control”, namely, Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin, were 
also allowed to set up their own FTCs and were granted partial 
authorities to plan their foreign trade activities.  
This new scheme was hardly market-oriented: domestic producers 
continued to be denied direct access to international trade; import & 
export activities continued to be subject to trade plans, albeit under a 
more decentralized authority. The arrangement nonetheless gave 
unprecedented incentives for the SEZs and their hosting provinces to 
expand foreign trade activities as now they could use their earnings 
from exports to finance imports needed for projects of local economic 
construction.  
The rapid improvement of economic performance of the SEZs and 
their hosting provinces, especially Guangdong that resulted from 
preferential policies in trade, investment, and taxes drew envy from the 
other provinces and encouraged the central government to further roll 
out the decentralization program. In 1984, China declared that it was 
going to open 14 coastal cities to enforce its “coastal development 
strategy”, signifying the state’s determination to step further on the 
course of reform and opening up.31 Soon, throughout the country, more 
and more local FTCs were set up or “spun off” from national FTCs. 
Similarly, government ministries and departments in charge of specific 
                                                 
30 See the State Council, “Regulations on Issues Regarding Developing Foreign Trade 
and Increasing Foreign Exchange Income” (1979) and State Council, “Provisional 
Regulations on Tax Reduction and Exemption for Special Economic Zones and the 14 
Coastal Cities (1984). 
31 Hainan Island, which was then part of the Guangdong province, was assigned as an 
open economic area with a status similar to the SEZs. 
 54
 industrial sectors established their own FTCs.  In 1984 and 1985 alone, 
400 new FTCs were approved by the state. The state also granted 
trading rights to selected industrial units, thus breaking the monopoly 
of specialized trading companies over import and export activities.32  
As more and more provinces, industrial departments, and their own 
FTCs engaged themselves in the foreign trade business, they were eager 
to export to obtain foreign exchange without paying heed to the profits 
and losses of their export activities – anyway the state would finance the 
domestic currency losses associated with exporting activities. The 
central state, under increasing financial problems, saw the solution to 
this problem in separating the administrative authorities from economic 
entities and establishing connections between industry and trade so as 
to remove the price wedge between domestic and international prices.33   
To achieve these objectives, the state introduced the foreign trade 
agency system in 1984. Under this arrangement, FTCs served as 
intermediaries between producers and users abroad. They passed the 
international prices to domestic producers/users and charged a 
commission fee for each transaction. Domestic producers were 
encouraged to form “free associations” with FTCs and accept 
international prices.  FTCs, on the other hand, could hope to make 
profits out of such transactions and therefore rely less on state 
subsidies and move towards independent accounting.  
The system, however, didn’t work as well as the state had expected. 
Under the agency system, FTCs and domestic producing units were 
                                                 
32 Yin Jiqing. op. cit.: 39. 
33 Interviewee 1 (MOFTEC); Also see David Wall et al (1997), Yin Xiangshuo (1998): 
101. 
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 supposed to form alliances in researching the international markets and 
negotiating with foreign importers and exporters. It was expected that 
the producing units would reveal their production costs to FTCs 
whereas FTCs would share the information concerning costs for 
obtaining foreign exchange.  In reality, however, both FTCs and the 
producing units were reluctant to share the information. Given that 
foreign exchange was “scare resources” under the Chinese system of 
import and export control, both FTCs and domestic producers 
attempted to maximize their margins in foreign trade transactions and 
their interests virtually went against each other. Rather than forming 
alliances with producers, getting transparent on foreign exchange costs 
and playing an intermediate role to charge a commission fee, most FTCs 
chose to continue purchasing goods directly from factories and then 
exporting them on their own account. 34  
Characteristics and Consequences of Decentralization Phase I  
The first phase of decentralization shattered the monopoly of the 
state and national FTCs over foreign trade. Between 1979 and early 
1987, over 2,200 new FTCs were set up, which included 500 plus 
specialized FTCs, over 300 FTCs subject to ministerial or departmental 
leaderships, and more than 1200 local FTCs. Over 200 industrial 
production units were granted the rights to conduct foreign trade. 35  
The planning system was also loosened and partially transformed. 
The foreign trade plan became more export driven, with a target for 
export fixed, and import activities to be planned within the foreign 
                                                 
34 Liu Xiangdong (1998): 224. 
35 Sources: MOFTEC, State Economic and Foreign Trade Commission. 
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 exchange constraints implied by the export target. The export plan was 
divided into two parts: the command plan and the guidance plan. The 
command plan specified export targets in quantitative terms and 
applied only to specific products.36 The guidance plan only set value 
targets for provincial governments to reach. It was up to provincial 
authorities to determine how to reach them. In 1986, around 60% of 
exports were subject to the command plan and 20% to the guidance 
plan, the remaining 20% being “above plan” exports. 37 
What was not changed during this period was an overvalued 
domestic currency. Before reform China held an exchange rate that 
overvalued its currency and biased against export. After reform began, 
the Chinese currency continued to be overvalued, although there was a 
tendency towards devaluation. At the onset of the trade reform, an 
Internal Settlement Rate (ISR) was introduced for trade transactions. 
The rate was higher than the official exchange rate and was intended to 
alleviate the adverse effect of overvalued currency upon export trade. 
The ISR system was abolished in 1985 after the official exchange rate 
was brought in line with the ISR. The unified exchange rate, however, 
still overvalued RMB yuan.38 In the meantime, foreign exchange trading 
rooms were allowed to be established, first in Guangdong, and then in 
the major commercial cities of other provinces, where enterprises, upon 
authorization, could buy and sell foreign exchange entitlements at the 
“swap rate”.39 Overall, RMB remained overvalued throughout the 1980s, 
                                                 
36 Yin Xiangshuo. op.cit.: 91-92. 
37 World Bank (1994): 25.  
38 See Yu Yongding and He Fan eds. (2004): 56-70.  
39 Yin Xiangshuo. op.cit.: 111-117. Also see David Wall et al. (1997) 
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 which kept the cost of exports high and structurally incurred losses for 
the producers and FTCs.  The state, instead of confronting the problem 
of distorted exchange rate upfront, continued to cover FTCs’ domestic 
losses through providing fiscal subsidies, as during this period, the 
main objective of promoting export activities was to obtain more foreign 
exchange to finance import. Even after the state began to adopt “Coastal 
Developmental Strategy” and opened more areas along the 
Southeastern coast of China to the outside world, this focus on 
domestic economy remained unchanged. In 1986, the then Prime 
Minister Zhao Ziyang, known as China’s radical reformer, said that “the 
Chinese economy, generally speaking, should be built upon its domestic 
market... In coastal areas where conditions permit, outward-looking 
economy should be gradually developed so as to generate more foreign 
exchange for the state.”40 
Yet an administrative incentive to boost export, coupled with a 
continued import substitution oriented practice on export subsidies and 
exchange rate, produced an unintended effect nationwide. As the 
number of enterprises with foreign trade rights increased, and the scope 
of commodities under the guidance plan expanded, provincial and 
departmental FTCs were competing for sources of exportable goods. 
Domestic prices for such goods were driven high, as different localities 
and departments, port cities and inland provinces competed against 
each other. In the international market, the situation was just the 
opposite: FTCs and enterprises with direct trading rights were in price 
                                                 
40 Zhao Ziyang’s comments on foreign trade reform on his trip to Guangdong Province 
(1986).Sheng Bin describes the foreign trade strategy of this period as “import 
substitution compensated by export orientation.” Sheng Bin (2002): 175. 
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 wars against each other to get their goods sold. The result was “raised 
procurement prices at home, slashed prices abroad, outflows of profits, 
and reduced bargaining power with foreigners on the part of the state.”41  
All FTC losses were to be compensated by state subsidies. In 1986 alone, 
losses of FTCs financed by the central government amounted to about 
RMB Y 25 billion, more than 2% of China’s gross national product. 42 
While volumes of export increased, overall foreign exchange reserve 
did not expand significantly during this period and the figure even went 
negative in some of the years. On the one hand, the major components 
remained to be low value added raw materials, as the focus of the 
provincial governments was on exchanging goods for hard currency, 
rather than on linking foreign trade with industrial policy and 
development strategy. On the other hand, with an overvalued domestic 
currency, and loosened control on foreign trade, imports flowed in to 
accommodate the surge in domestic demand. Decentralization based on 
geographic particularism further compounded the problem: SEZs and 
provinces with preferential treatment took advantage of their expanded 
trading rights to import manufactured goods, mostly consumer goods, 
and resold them in the domestic market.43 While the state was covering 
their losses in exports, local FTCs in these zones and provinces were 
making money through “internal imports”, which was virtually an illegal 
practice under China’s import and export control of that time. Local 
governments, however, were ready to cross the lines in pursuit of 
                                                 
41 Interviewee 1. Also see Shirk (1994): 49. Wedeman (2003) contains detailed 
discussions concerning inter-regional “warfare” between domestic producers. 
42 World Bank (1994): 26. 
43 See Susan Shirk in Perry and Wong (1985: 211-213). 
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 economic profits. The most notorious case was the Hainan Scandal in 
1985. As an open economic area, Hainan was granted the freedom of 
arranging its own imports. Officials in Hainan made huge profits by 
reselling imported vehicles to provinces where imports of automobiles 
were not allowed. By the time their misconduct was discovered by the 
center, they had already spent US $1 billion importing automobiles and 
other consumer durables.44 
As China’s foreign exchange reserve was severely depleted by 
frenzied import activities, the central government initially took actions 
to freeze the foreign exchange retention program, which could mean an 
end to the decentralization drive.45 Just as the central government did 
in the aftermath of the Great Leap Forward, the state could resort to 
recentralization to restore the authority of the center and tighten control 
over foreign trade. But this time in the new era, reform and opening to 
the outside world had become China’s “basic national policy”. 
Decentralization was being carried out in many economic areas. Foreign 
trade decentralization as well as preferential treatment of foreign direct 
investment had become symbols and indicators of the opening-up policy. 
Backing off from such an initiative could undermine the 
creditworthiness of the reform package and the legitimacy of the central 
state. Rather than permanently taking back foreign trade rights from 
localities, therefore, the central government soon determined to redress 
the problems by “deepening” its reform efforts of trade 
                                                 
44 Lardy (1992): 56. 
45 Shirk (1994), and my interview with managers at Sinochem. 
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 decentralization.46  The key, therefore, was to create a mechanism 
whereby companies and government organizations continue to have the 
incentive to expand exports but will not do so at the expense of the 
central state. And this ushered in the next round of foreign trade reform. 
 
Foreign Trade Decentralization Phase II (1987-1990) 
In view of the problems arising from the first round of foreign trade 
decentralization, the central government decided that the primary task 
at hand was to give the right incentive to export activities so as to build 
the much needed foreign exchange reserve. The center realized that the 
chaotic situations in the foreign trade area had resulted in part from 
self-interested activities of provincial and sub-provincial governments 
and assertion of departmental interests under a decentralized trade 
regime. Enterprises, FTCs and government organizations did not care 
about the cost efficiency and profitability of foreign trade operations 
because they were not held responsible for their losses and were even 
encouraged for that. 47  The crux of the problem was that while the 
central state had designed the decentralization program and expected it 
to be enforced through every link on the state apparatus, part of the 
state apparatus was affected and transformed by decentralization. As 
governments at the provincial level and below became motivated than 
ever to pursue local interests, their role as state policy enforcer became 
problematic. How to redefine their role so that state initiatives would not 
be compromised and state interests would not be infringed upon was a 
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 critical question that the next step of the reform needed to address. To 
this end, the central government was seeking a mechanism to legitimize 
the pursuit of local interests while at the same time specifying their 
obligations to the center. The contracting system that the state had 
applied to many economic areas since reforms and opening up appeared 
to be a promising solution. This was still a solution along administrative 
lines under the framework of “planned commodity economy” rather 
than a market conforming one, although more economic incentives were 
introduced into the system to reshape the dynamics between the center, 
FTCs and localities.  
As I will describe below, the central state, in adopting the 
contracting system, started with “tiao-tiao” contracting and then shifted 
to “kuai-kuai” contracting. The former involved more active efforts on 
the part of the central government to “rescue” central state interests 
from local interests by specifying obligations of state-owned FTCs and 
major industrial enterprises to the center, whereas the latter indicated a 
more formal acknowledgement of local governments’ newly acquired 
role.  
“Tiao-tiao” Contracting 
Beginning in 1987, the central government invoked the contracting 
system within the “foreign trade institutions” which comprised of the 
MOFERT, its subordinate specialized FTCs, and other industrial and 
trading companies subject to the state trade plan. Since the contracting 
system was enforced vertically along departmental lines, it was called 
“tiao-tiao” contracting, or “strip by strip” contracting.  Under this 
system, the MOFERT was the general contractor signing contracts with 
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 the state, in which three major targets were specified: foreign exchange 
earnings, export costs, and the ceiling of domestic currency losses 
against which state subsidies were to be provided.  
The MOFERT in turn signed contracts with the headoffices of 
specialized FTCs and industrial companies, specifying targets for the 
companies to reach. The latter then subcontracted the targets to their 
branches to fulfill. Whatever the companies earned above the quota 
were to be retained and divided up between the headoffices and the 
branches. The contracting system left out provincial governments and 
their newly created FTCs. But provincial branches of specialized 
national FTCs that had become “independent economic entities” during 
the previous round of decentralization were now bound by performance 
contracts with the national headquarters. So were branches of national 
industrial companies with direct trading rights. The state hoped to 
strengthen the foreign trade system’s ability to generate foreign 
exchange and promote exports through realignment of interests along 
different “strips”. While local governments and FTCs would still be 
prone to the pursuit of parochial interests at the expense of the center, 
the contracting system would hopefully keep the core organizations 
accountable to the center, not through direct orders, but with a 
profit-sharing regime. Along each “strip”, specialized FTCs, industrial 
companies and their branches were to form an artery where foreign 
exchange earnings flowed steadily to the center rather than diffused and 
lost in local governments’ import drives. 48 
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 Meanwhile, the center supplemented the tiao-tiao contracting with 
tax rebate policy for exports. While tax rebate was an internationally 
accepted practice for export promotion, it was new to the Chinese 
foreign trade system. Before its introduction, the Chinese government’s 
export subsidies took the form of direct fiscal allocation of funds to 
localities and government organizations. Tax rebate, on the other hand, 
was tied to specific products and companies exporting them.49 With 
varied rebate rates on different products, the new practice was intended 
to give incentives to exporters while optimizing the structure of export 
products. Due to domestic price distortions, companies had found it 
more lucrative to import than export, and to export raw materials rather 
than processed goods. The state expected to redress the bias and 
distortion through the new policy. 
The tiao-tiao contracting did have some positive effect on the 
country’s foreign trade position. In 1987, total imports and exports 
increased by 11.9% over the previous year. Total exports grew by 28.5% 
whereas imports decreased by 1.5%. Export cost dropped by 2.6%.50 
Both foreign exchange reserve situations and export profitability 
improved.   
New problem arose, however, as the new system divided the foreign 
trade sector into different factions of interests and intensified the 
tension between localities and foreign trade units along the “strips”. 
Normal exchanges and cooperations across “strips” were made difficult 
as administrative units and companies were wary of possible 
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 infringement of their departmental interests that would compromise 
their ability to fulfill the contracts. In provinces, battles over sources of 
export goods continued, but on a different dimension – previously such 
battles took place between different provinces, now they occurred 
between provincial FTCs and branches of national FTCs.  Procurement 
activities continued to be based on short-term considerations, as foreign 
trade units, eager to attain their own targets, still focused more of their 
efforts on beating their competitors in pricing than on rationalizing their 
export structure. 51  
“Kuai-kuai” Contracting 
Tiao-tiao contracting allowed the central government to see the 
positive effect of binding contracts upon FTCs and upon the country’s 
export earnings. But it also complicated the already chaotic situations 
at the provincial level where parochial interests were in constant conflict 
with the center’s.   
In 1987, following the CPC’s 13th national assembly, the Chinese 
government made a new initiative on its overall economic development 
strategy: It decided to promote export-oriented economy along the entire 
coastal line, focusing on labor-intensive processing industries, with raw 
materials imported from abroad and final products to be sold on the 
international market.52  Obviously, the Chinese leaders at this point 
intended China to emulate the model of East Asian NIEs. But given the 
large size of the country, the Chinese government again adopted a 
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 regionally differentiated approach, just as it did with the early rounds of 
opening up. 
This new grand strategy led the Chinese state to quickly adjust its 
approach to foreign trade reform. In 1988, the tiao-tiao contracting was 
replaced with kuai-kuai contracting, namely piece by piece contracting. 
The emphasis of the new contracting system was on central-local 
contracting. MOFERT entered into contracts with provincial level 
administrative units, which included governments of provinces, 
autonomous regions, provincial-level municipalities. Again, the 
contracts specified three major targets for localities to attain:  the 
amount of foreign exchange earnings, foreign exchange to be remitted to 
the central government, and a cap for state subsidies on export losses. 
The values of the targets were determined jointly by MOFERT, Ministry 
of Finance and the State Planning Commission according to an overall 
evaluation of a particular region’s fiscal conditions and its intended 
position in the country’s economic development strategy based on 
regional particularism. Contracted targets varied across geographical 
“pieces”. And hence the name “piece by piece” contracting. 
One important measure for the piece by piece contracting to work 
was to “unhook” provincial branches of national FTCs with their 
headoffices and reassign them under the leadership of provincial 
governments, where authorities directly in charge of these FTCs were 
local foreign trade departments/bureaus/commissions. Except for a 
few strategic sectors that continued to be managed by a few national 
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 FTCs and their branches, most branches of national FTCs were now 
part of the provincial foreign trade network.53 
Provincial-level governments, upon concluding contracts with the 
center, divided tasks among FTCs under their jurisdictions and 
supervised them to attain their targets.  Foreign exchange earnings up 
to the contracted amount were divided between the center and each 
locality, depending on the retention rate set by each specific contract. Of 
the above-target earnings, 80% were to be retained by localities, 20% to 
be handed in to the center. This latter arrangement was made without 
regional particularistic considerations and offered all provinces a flat 
rate of retention and hence a relatively leveled ground for competition.54  
This new scheme was intended to motivate localities, FTCs and 
industrial enterprises to increase exports and shoot beyond the 
contracted targets.  
Meanwhile, experiments were made with three industrial sectors, 
namely, light industry, arts and crafts industry, and clothing industry, 
where FTCs and enterprises with foreign trade rights were allowed to 
retain the bulk of their foreign exchange earnings. The state subsidies 
on export losses, however, were totally withdrawn. The enterprises in 
these three sectors were supposed to “assume sole responsibility for 
their profits and losses”.  The same policy was applied to the five 
special economic zones, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, Xiamen, 
Hainan,55  except that they continued to get an even more lenient 
                                                 
53 State System Reform Commission Research Institute (1998). 
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 retention rate – 100% of their foreign exchange earnings. More swap 
centers were established in provincial capitals, major coastal cities and 
provincial-level municipalities, and SEZs where enterprises were 
allowed to buy and sell their retained foreign exchange at the swap rate. 
The state loosened import and export control by limiting the range of 
commodities subject to “command plan” to a few strategic products and 
resources. These commodities were to be handled by state-designated 
national FTCs and their subsidiaries or branches. A few “important” 
products were covered by the state’s guidance plan. Most products were 
now open for FTCs of various kinds and strata to handle, although some 
of these products were subject to export quota or required import or 
export licenses.  
The tax rebate system developed during the tiao-tiao contracting 
period was continued and reinforced during kuai-kuai contracting.  
Rebates were made at different links of the value chain, including 
product taxes, sales taxes, and value added taxes in some cases.56 
All these measures were intended to make local governments and 
FTCs more export-oriented, more profit-driven, and less dependent 
upon state subsidies. Contracting along geographical lines and localized 
management of FTCs aimed at realigning the interests among local 
governments, FTCs and production units, thereby reducing “deadweight 
loss” arising from their frictions and conflicts.  The “geographical 
particularistic” arrangement of foreign exchange retention system was 
designed to bring export incentives in line with the country’s overall 
economic development strategy: regions where development of 
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 export-oriented industries was emphasized were granted generous 
retention rates and were encouraged to build its foreign trade networks 
more integrated with the international markets and less dependent 
upon state planning and subsidies. 
Results and Consequences of Foreign Trade Decentralization 
Phase II 
The contracting system gave a strong push on the country’s foreign 
trade activities. Between 1998 and 1990, total value of imports and 
exports grew by double digits and averaged over US $100 billion per 
annum. Exports grew by 20% per year. China’s overall trade 
dependence reached 13.7% and its exports ranked 14th among the 
world’s trading nations’. 57   
The contracting system with administrative units as contracting 
parties, though effective in revitalizing the foreign trade sector to some 
degree, produced new problems and tensions between the center and 
localities.      
First of all, whereas the central government intended to make 
enterprises more independent and profit-oriented through foreign trade 
contracting, the contracting system in part became a new platform for 
provincial governments to bargain with the center. Since the central 
government continued to provide provincial governments with fiscal 
subsidies on exports based on an estimation of the region’s average 
export costs, provincial governments found it only logical to maximize 
this part of earnings so as to create a favorable fiscal environment for 
their own regions. Rather than pressing FTCs and enterprises to reduce 
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 export costs, they tended to encourage them to raise their export costs. 
In this way, their provinces or regions would be able to obtain maximum 
amounts of state subsidies in domestic currency on top of the portion of 
foreign exchange they were allowed to retain. Although foreign trade 
contracts put a cap on export-related subsidies for each contracting 
region, total amount of state subsidies remained substantial. In 1988, 
the aggregate amount of export subsidies reached RMB Y 7 billion, 
equal to 4% of total export value. 58  On this issue, provincial 
governments and MOFERT, which represented the interests of the 
center, were virtually in a zero-sum game, as former benefited exactly 
from the latter’s losses, although such losses were limited to a certain 
range by foreign trade contracts.  
Secondly, this new around of decentralization in the form of 
geographical contracting aggrandized some of the problems that had 
already been in existence during previous stages of foreign trade reform. 
As more and more local enterprises gained access to foreign trade, 
competition in the procurement market intensified. As provinces were 
under the pressure to attain their targets stipulated by their contracts 
with the center, provincial governments were more active than ever to 
protect local business interests. Various local protectionist policies were 
created, blocking procurers from the other provinces to enter local 
markets.  Within each province, prices of exportable goods and raw 
materials continued to be kept at a high level as numerous trading 
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 companies and industrial enterprises were now eager to acquire the 
goods, export them and earn foreign exchange.59    
A more serious problem was the uncurbed internal “importing” 
activities. This problem started to emerge in the initial stage of the 
reform. Although the contracting was intended to make enterprises 
truly outward-looking, the geographical particularistic nature of the 
contracting ironically provided incentives for them to continue engaging 
in “inward-looking” transactions.60  
During the late 1980s, RMB continued to be overvalued. The actual 
cost for foreign exchange or the “swap rate” was higher than the official 
rate. On the other hand, domestic prices continued to be distorted 
under the planning system. When companies imported goods and 
materials that required import licenses or were part of the state’s 
“guidance plan”, the state would cover for the differences between their 
import costs and official price. The imports were then to be sold in local 
markets at the domestic prices. When domestic price was still lower 
than the import price calculated at the official exchange rate, the state 
would again cover the differences.61 In this way, the state was providing 
de facto import subsidies to local governments and enterprises. As 
coastal regions, especially SEZs and southern provinces enjoyed high 
foreign exchange retention rate and relative easy access to import 
licenses, companies in these areas were quick to learn that such 
privileges constituted a potential source for extra profits.  
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 Foreign commodities, especially consumer goods regulated by 
import licenses, did not stop within southern provinces and SEZs after 
being imported into China. Rather, they were transported and sold to 
other provinces. The deals were usually concluded in RMB yuan and at 
higher prices than the original import prices. Businesses in other 
provinces still found the deals acceptable or even lucrative, since import 
licenses for the same products would not be issued to their own 
provinces.62  
Officially, transactions of this sort had to be accompanied by both 
the import license and a special permit. Otherwise, imported goods were 
not allowed to be transported out of regions they were originally 
imported to. However, “importing” activities as such went on without 
much interruption. 
The provincial governments, while protective of their local markets 
for exportable goods, acquiesced to internal import activities and to 
some extent cooperated with such importers. For both suppliers and 
buyers, internal imports generated profits for their businesses and 
therefore increased the revenue income of the provincial authorities.  
The Guangdong provincial government, for example, later described 
its strategy as “moving ahead at the green light and detouring when 
seeing the red light.”  To take advantage of its import license rights and 
state subsidies, the provincial government virtually allowed its 
subordinate departments and enterprises to import certain consumer 
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 durables items and report them as “materials and technology needed for 
foreign-invested facilities”.63 
The actual transfers of imported commodities were largely 
channeled through informal inter-provincial networks. The formation of 
such networks dated back to the pre-reform period. During the 1970s 
when a province was in shortage of basic supplies such as coal and raw 
materials, enterprises usually sent procurement agents who had 
personal ties in other provinces to seek sources of such supply. In the 
reform era, such networks were turned into another use, which 
permitted officially banned imports to be transferred to those 
provinces.64 
Provincial governments and companies’ gains, however, came at the 
losses of the state. The central government was actually providing 
“two-way” subsidies – both import and export subsidies.65  Under the 
contracting system, therefore, local FTCs were still not fully responsible 
for their profits and losses and were largely after hard currency in their 
export activities. Meanwhile, importing remained to be attractive 
business due to lucrative domestic reselling. Overall, the system 
continued to be somewhat biased towards imports, although at this 
time developing export-oriented economy was the state’s priority. 
Between 1987 and 1990, three out of four years total value of imports 
exceeded that of exports, although exports were growing at a high rate.66 
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 A more serious concern was import and export structure. With the 
new coastal development strategy, the central government in the late 
1980s intended to encourage export-oriented light and processing 
industries while developing its import substituting capabilities in 
technology intensive manufacturing industries.67 The special dynamics 
resulting from regional particularistic contracting, however, tended to 
erode the central state’s effort in this respect. On the one hand, foreign 
exchange targets motivated local governments and FTCs to grab raw 
materials and primary products in domestic markets to exchange for 
hard currency. These products and materials, being low value added, 
made the value of exports grow at a slower pace than their volume. On 
the other hand, there was also a mismatch between imported goods and 
the state’s intended industrial policy. Often when the state decided to 
adopt import substituting strategy on a certain product, there was an 
opposite import policy initiated on the local side; parts and materials 
were imported in large volume, assembled and sold to the domestic 
market.68 Theoretically, the state could monitor and manipulate the 
composition and quantity of imports using import licenses. However, 
the effectiveness of this mechanism was undermined by the existence of 
interprovincial channels for “internal imports”.        
 
Liberalization of Foreign Trade  
Ten years of decentralization revitalized the foreign trade sector in 
China, just as decentralization did to the other economic areas. But 
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 decentralization also came with problems as described above. And 
rectification of the problems through tightening control always came at 
the expense of the economy. Just as government officials summarized 
the cycles of decentralization themselves, centralization leads to a 
moribund economy, decentralization leads to chaos, and chaos leads to 
recentralization. It is a vicious cycle.69  
Moreover, recentralization became more and more difficult as the 
Chinese economy had experienced all-round decentralizations in many 
areas leading to the expansions of local governments. Throughout the 
1980s, the central government intervened in provincial affairs in an 
attempt to stop “illegal transactions” and correct “economic 
irregularities”. It did so by issuing administrative documents which 
stipulated the limit of local governments’ authority in conducting 
foreign and interprovincial trade. But administrative orders were not 
effective, since unlike in the old days, provinces now had a vested 
interest in increasing local income even at the expense of the interest of 
the nation as a whole. As argued before, forcing provinces to give up 
such economic activities through harsh administrative orders meant to 
revoke the newly gained autonomy of the provinces and reverse the 
entire decentralization program, which would encounter strong 
resistance from the provinces and erode the legitimacy of the central 
government. 
On the other hand, pushing the reform along administrative lines 
seemed to have nearly reached a dead end, as the central state’s policy 
enforcement capabilities were hampered due to the expansion and 
                                                 
69 ibid; interviewees 1, 2.  
 75
 assertion of local authorities and their pursuit of local interests and 
developmental goals at the expense of the central state’s overall 
developmental strategy and policy goals.  
Ironically, one possible way to reassert central authority was to 
further decontrol the economy. By decoupling administrative 
authorities from microeconomic activities, the central state intended to 
disentangle its administrative arms from local and business interests 
and reduce the means and tools local authorities possessed to pursue 
parochial interests. In this way, the state apparatus may hopefully 
regain its bureaucratic autonomy needed for effective management of 
the economy. The central state did exactly that. From 1991 and on, 
China has intensified its effort to rejoin GATT (WTO). Reforms since then 
focused on creating leveled ground for competition, lowering tariffs, 
reducing licensing controls as well as establishing a new exchange rate 
system. 70 
Preparations for Liberalization 1991-1993 
The central government realized that two major factors had 
contributed to problems during the contracting period. One was 
preferential treatment of certain provinces and regions over others, 
which led to interprovincial trade that reduced economic efficiency and 
tapped away state interests. The other was non-separation of central 
state finance with local finances, which stayed in the way of the state’s 
effort to make local FTCs and industrial enterprises truly independent 
entities responsible for their profits and losses. To correct these 
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 problems, the central government took a sharp turn by reversing some 
key practices during the previous stage of foreign trade reform. At the 
end of 1990 the State Council announced its new program of foreign 
trade reform. Launched formally in 1991, the new problem contained 
the following key measures. 
Abolishing Export Subsidies 
Beginning from 1991, the state abolished all export subsidies. At the 
same time, official exchange rate (Yuan to dollar) was adjusted from 
4.72:1 to 5.22:1. The new exchange rate was getting closer to reflecting 
RMB’s market value than before, thereby improving FTCs and industrial 
enterprises’ chances to break even in their import and export activities.   
Synchronizing Foreign Exchange Retention Rates across Regions 
The new program changed regional particularistic nature of the 
foreign exchange retention scheme by synchronizing the rates along 
three categories of commodities -- “Special commodities” such as crude 
and processed oil handled by specialized national FTCs, “general 
commodities” and “machinery and electronics products”.  Special 
commodities were handled by a few designated FTCs, with most of their 
earnings remitted to the state. For the export of “general commodities”, 
the new program provided that 20% of the foreign exchange earnings 
were to be remitted to the state, 10% to be retained by the local 
government, 10% to be retained by domestic producers and the 
remaining 60% to be retained by FTCs. Those dealing with “machinery 
and electronics products” got 100% to retain, of which 10% went to 
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 producers and 90% to the FTCs. 71  This generous retention 
arrangement would allow FTCs and producing enterprises to import the 
materials and parts needed for the production of exportables in 
machinery and electronics industries. Overall, regional differentiations 
of retention rates were therefore eliminated. Companies and enterprises 
in different provinces were now playing on a leveled ground in their own 
business areas. 
Delinking Local Finances from State Finance 
The previous stage of foreign trade contracting subjected local 
branches and subsidiaries of national FTCs to the leadership of local 
governments. However, fiscally a local branch was still tied to the 
department in charge of its headoffice in the central government. The 
new program “peeled off” FTC branches completely from their 
headoffices and the central government by subjecting them to the fiscal 
system of their hosting localities. Starting from 1992, FTCs were 
required to file their financial plans only with their supervising 
administrative organs, which, in turn, would review the plans and 
report the data to higher level authorities for approval. The traditional 
top-down fiscal planning was in a sense reversed. Organizations and 
enterprises attached directly to the center and those attached to 
localities were now “eating in separate kitchens”. 
Standardizing Import and Export Control   
The new program called for “adapting to international norms on 
trade”. This involved reforms in import and export management. From 
                                                 
71 To ensure access to foreign exchange sufficient to meet its own requirements, the 
central government in this case reserved its right to purchase back 20% of the retained 
foreign exchange by FTCs and producing enterprises at the prevailing “swap rate”.  
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 January 1992 till the end of 1993, China undertook three rounds of 
reductions on import tariff rates affecting a total of more than 5,000 
tariffs lines. 72 Overall tariff level dropped by 7.3% as a result.73 Import 
substitution lists were also abolished in 1993, indicating the state was 
prepared to use tariffs rather than import protections to manage import 
activities.  Licensing control was also reduced. On the export side, the 
number of exports subject to licensing was reduced from 235 lines to 
114 lines. Except for the export of 16 categories of raw materials which 
were to be exported by designated FTCs, all other exports became open 
to all the FTCs.74 Import licensing and other forms of quantitative 
restrictions have also been on the decrease. By 1993 products under 
import licenses were reduced by over 53%, their value dropping from 
66% to 30% of the total value of foreign trade.75  In fact, commercial 
policies such as tariffs and licenses were not widely in use until in the 
reform era. With the command plan being loosened, these policies and 
regulations partly replaced administrative orders associated with the 
plan and laid down the foundation for a standardized trade system. The 
new program, through reducing tariffs and licenses not only further 
broke away from the practice of the planning system, but also took great 
steps towards trade liberalization and the GATT (WTO) standard.  
In a sense, the 1991 reform partially undid what the central 
government had carefully built in the past few years. With a regional 
particularistic scheme, the central government had hoped to exploit 
                                                 
72 Xie Jianzhong et al . eds. (1999): 149 
73 China’s White Paper on Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (1999). 
74 David Wall et al., op.cit.: 106. 
75 Zou Dongtao (1998): 74. 
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 local initiatives and at the same time maintain its ability to design the 
course of economic development and control the degree of opening up. 
Yet the dynamics emerging out of this arrangement turned out to erode 
the center’s planning and supervising capabilities. Caught between 
further weakening of its power vis-à-vis localities and withdrawal of the 
reforms it had initiated, the central government found a third way out: it 
tried to regain control of the situations by further decontrolling the 
economic actors.  With provinces and individual enterprises gaining 
greater access to imports and exports, and the gap between inland 
provinces and coastal areas and SEZs in foreign exchange retentions 
narrowed, incentives for provinces and businesses to engage in “internal 
importing and exporting” were reduced.  
The center’s new initiative was not without its risks. With export 
subsidies completely cut off and local finances totally separated from 
the center, FTCs and producing enterprises were on their own, without 
much time to improve the cost structure of their business before hand. 
MOFERT official observed that the new foreign trade system involved 
certain risks and would force the country to adjust its export structure 
and improve economic efficiency, which could mean weakened trading 
position in the short term.76 Loosened control over import licenses, 
though helping reduce domestic reselling activities, could also result in 
a rapid increase of imports under the already decentralized trade regime 
and in turn reduced the foreign reserve that the state had hoped to 
build. 
                                                 
76 Kaifang, vol. 1 (1991). 
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 As expected, imports did increase rapidly during between 1991 and 
1993. Average growth rate per year was over 20%. Exports, however, 
also grew at a relatively high rate of 14%,77 despite the withdrawal of 
state subsidies. In 1992, China made it to the 11th place in total exports 
among the world’s trading nations, up from the 15th in 1990.78  
This positive result was in part due to the growing participation of 
non-state actors, especially foreign companies, in foreign trade. The 
early 1990s saw a surge of foreign direct investment in China. Between 
1991 and 1993 FDI grew by 7 times, with more than 130,000 new 
projects approved in 1992 and 1993 alone. 79  As foreign trade 
regulations were further loosened, the presence of joint ventures and 
wholly foreign owned companies in the foreign trade sector expanded 
rapidly. In 1992 and 1993, foreign invested companies’ total value of 
exports increased by 44 % and 45% respectively. Their total value of 
exports amounted to 40% of their aggregate industrial output value and 
made up over 27% of China’s total export value.80 The increase of 
foreign invested companies’ participation in exports also helped improve 
China’s export structure by expanding China’s share of processed goods 
and industrial manufactures in the international markets. In three 
years industrial manufactures in total exports increased by more than 
7% whereas primary products dropped by about the same percentage.81 
The growth of non-state sector in foreign trade, therefore, aided the 
Chinese state in its endeavors to rectify problems of the previous stage 
                                                 
77 Average export growth rate was around 15% between 1988 and 1990. 
78 MOFTEC: Import and Export Statistics. 
79 MOFTEC: Statistics on the Use of Foreign Direct Investment. 
80 State System Reform Commission Research Institute (1998:77). 
81 Sources: MOFTEC import and export statistics. 
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 of reform. With this new engine of growth, the state was able to free itself 
from the heavy burden of export subsidies and effectively reduce 
“economic irregularities” arising from trade privileges without hurting 
too much the overall growth momentum of the foreign trade sector. 
Liberalizing Foreign Trade 
The 1991 initiative allowed the state to disentangle itself from 
micro-level trade activities by replacing several key practices of the 
planning era with market conforming ones. What were left untouched 
by the end of 1993, however, were the infrastructure of the foreign 
exchange retention system and the de facto dual exchange rate system. 
Both systems were “innovations” under the decentralization drive 
and were designed to provide incentives for exports under a 
decentralized yet still planned trade regime. As mentioned earlier, after 
China formally abandoned the dual exchange rate system by unifying 
the internal settlement rate with the official exchange rate in 1985, dual 
exchange rates continued to exist in the country. Official exchange rate 
(Yuan to Dollar) was adjusted upwards several times but still overvalued 
the domestic currency. Meanwhile, authorized enterprises could trade 
part of their retained foreign exchange in foreign exchange trading 
rooms or “swap centers” at the swap rate. Although regional 
differentiations over retention rates were abolished in 1991, enterprises 
were still subject to different retention schemes pertaining to the 
industries or businesses they were in. For the same amount of foreign 
exchange earnings, enterprises could end up exchanging for different 
amounts of domestic currency: those with higher retention rate were 
allowed to trade more at the swap rate, and therefore obtain more RMB 
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 for their foreign exchange earnings than enterprise with lower retention 
rates.82 
At the beginning of 1994, the Chinese government took the step to 
formally unify the exchange rates. Unlike previous rounds of 
adjustment where an official exchange was artificially determined by the 
People’s Bank of China as part of the state planning, now exchange rate 
would be determined by demand and supply of the market and would be 
applied to the payment and settlement of all trade and non-trade 
transactions. The ultimate aim was to make RMB a convertible 
currency.83 
Related to the exchange rate reform was the abolishment of foreign 
exchange retention system. Enterprises could now sell their foreign 
exchange income to banks licensed to conduct foreign exchange 
transactions and can purchase foreign exchange freely after providing 
valid documents indicating their need for foreign exchange in legal 
business activities. 84  
The unification of exchange rate and the abolishment of the foreign 
exchange retention system naturally put an end to the contracting 
system between the center and localities. The center no longer issued 
“targets” for local governments and enterprises to attain. Instead, the 
central government was trying to conduct “guidance management” over 
import and export activities. This included a full-fledged export tax 
                                                 
82Because of these complications, some scholars even regarded the exchange rate 
system before 1994 as a de facto multiple exchange rate system. See discussions in 
Wu Nianlu and Chen Quangeng (2002). 
83 CPC Central Committee: Decisions concerning Building a Socialist Market System 
(November 14, 1993). 
84 Wu Nianlu and Chen Quangeng (2002): 136-143. 
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 rebate system, a licensing and quota system for a few important and 
strategic products and a newly established policy bank that offered 
“policy credits” to the trading of machinery and electronics products as 
well as complete plants and equipments.  
Despite these “guidance” measures, the focus of the Chinese 
government was not on building an import and export regime linked 
with and driven by industrial policy. Instead, with its efforts to join 
GATT/WTO intensified in 1994, the Chinese government pronounced 
that its objective of foreign trade reform was to “achieve liberalized trade 
and eliminate trade barriers”. 85  
To this end, China lowered tariffs on 2989 tariff lines at the 
beginning of 1994, which accounted for over 45% of the total items 
under the Chinese customs’ tariff regulations. The overall tariff level 
dropped by 8.8%.  Tariff on major consumer durables such as 
automobiles was reduced by 36%. In 1995, tariffs on consumer goods 
such as cigarettes, liquor, audio and video cassettes were further 
lowered by an average rate of 35.5%. In 1996, another round of massive 
tariff reductions was enforced on 4997 tariff lines, lowering the overall 
tariff level to 23%. This level was further lowered to 17% in 1997 and to 
15% in 2000.86 And in accordance with its WTO commitments, China 
has been on its way to lower tariffs on all industrial goods to 10% by 
2005.87 
Meanwhile, the government also took measures to limit and reduce 
non-tariff barriers, although these areas were not covered by the 
                                                 
85 Jingji Ribao, August 14, 1994. 
86 Source: PRC General Administration of Customs, China’s Customs Statistics. 
87 Announcement by the Ministry of Commerce, 2003. 
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 requirements for WTO accession. Beginning in 1995, the Chinese 
government gradually reduced the number of product categories subject 
to import quota as well as the number of items on the “specially 
registered imports catalogue”, leaving most commodities to be traded 
freely across borders. Between 1995 and 1997, import licenses were 
removed for 18 product categories and 368 tariff lines, a reduction by 
32% and 52% respectively.88  
On the export side, except for 16 “most important” commodities that 
were subject to the state’s “unified handling” and about 95 products 
subject to quota regulations or requiring export permits, all the other 
products were now allowed to be exported by enterprises with foreign 
trade rights. In areas where government intervention was inevitable, the 
state also preferred market conforming mechanism to administrative 
orders. In 1994, for example, the Chinese government introduced 
“compensated bidding for export quota” for a few major commodities 
such as logs, yarn, and certain chemicals. Later, products available for 
bidding increased to 27 items. These products had caused intense price 
wars and in turn severe losses among FTCs in previous stage of the 
reform due to the sheer number of companies engaging in the business 
and high price elasticity of these products in the international markets. 
With a bidding system in place for compensated usage of export quota 
on these products, enterprises were put on a relatively equal footing for 
competition and were forced to evaluate the profitability of the 
                                                 
88Source: MOFTEC and General Administration of Customs: Circular on Adjustments 
on Import License Catalogues and Licensing Authorities.   
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 businesses they were bidding for as well as the cost efficiency of their 
operations. 89  
In parallel with the reforms of the exchange rate system and import 
and export regulations, the Chinese government also accelerated the 
process of delegating foreign trade rights to enterprises.  MOFTEC 
relaxed the qualification and ratification criteria for granting foreign 
trade rights, allowing more and more industrial enterprises to obtain 
the rights to import and export. By 1997, more than 8000 producing 
enterprises were granted the rights to export their products and import 
materials and parts for production all by themselves, their total exports 
making up one fourth of the country’s total exports.90 By the end of 
2000, such rights had been extended to 16,000 foreign invested 
enterprises (FIEs) and over 3,000 domestic producing enterprises.91 In 
the three years that followed China’s accession to the WTO, the Chinese 
government took steps to thoroughly transfer foreign trade rights to the 
enterprise level. Except for items such as crude oil, tobacco and grain 
that continued to be managed by designated trading corporations, the 
trading of other products has become accessible to individual 
enterprises, be they state-owned, private, or foreign invested.92 Instead 
of filing applications for examination and approval by government 
                                                 
89 Interviewee 2. 
90 At this point these producing enterprises did not have full rights to foreign trade – 
they could trade their own products or production-related goods and materials, but 
did not have the rights to procure exportable goods from other producers to sell abroad 
or to resell their imports domestically. 
91 FIEs comprised of three types of enterprises: joint ventures, wholly foreign owned 
companies, and cooperative ventures. Source of data: State Economic and Trade 
Commission and MOFTEC reports. 
92 Private enterprises were required to have a registered capital of RMB Y 5 million to 
engage in foreign trade. 
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 department in charge of foreign trade authorization, enterprises now 
only need to register with local bureaus of industry and commerce 
before proceeding to engage in the foreign trade business. The range of 
business enterprises may engage in has also been expanded. They can 
choose to manage their own products or to become trading agents for 
other enterprises.   
 
The Logic of Foreign Trade Liberalization 
Foreign trade liberalization since 1991 is a crucial component of 
full-scale marketization efforts undertaken by the Chinese state. An 
exploration of the logic behind such liberalization measures informs us, 
to a great extent, of the logic behind the entire marketization conforming 
liberalization program.  
As demonstrated in previous sections, in the past twenty years or so 
China’s foreign trade sector has experienced fundamental changes. 
Apparently, these changes occurred as if following a coherent design of 
the “opening up strategy”. But a closer examination of the reform 
process has shown that “the opening up” carried different meanings 
during different stages of reform, indicating that the fundamental 
purposes of foreign trade had shifted over time to shape the contour of 
the reform process.  
Underlying the three stages of foreign trade reform were three 
different strategies of economic development: import substitution 
strategy, export-oriented strategy based on regional particularism, and 
a liberal “free trade” approach. Apparently, given the planning capacity 
of the socialist developmental state as well as China’s cultural affinity 
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 with East Asian NIEs, people tend to believe that it would be easier for 
the Chinese state to adopt a “governed market” approach, emulating the 
export-oriented strategy of its East Asian neighbors. The reality, 
however, was that while China switched to export-oriented strategy for 
its coastal areas a few years into the reform era, export practice was not 
effectively linked with industrial policy as compared with its East Asian 
counterparts. And with its bid for GATT/WTO membership, the country 
soon headed towards market conforming liberalization of the foreign 
trade sector. 
Given its huge domestic market, the bold effort China has taken 
towards liberalization is especially impressive.93 Obviously, economic 
arguments on globalization would have difficulty explaining the 
remarkably high degree of economic openness of China, given that even 
many economically more advanced nations of similar sizes have lower 
degrees of trade dependence. As mentioned earlier, one possible political 
explanation is that foreign trade is a “high politics” issue in China and 
that China has been forced to choose a liberal approach over a 
mercantilist one in order to gain WTO membership and end the 
constant struggles with the US over the annual renewal of China’s 
MFN/NTR status.  But my interviews with MOFTEC officials and 
foreign policy scholars in China revealed that political pressure was not 
the major variable in shaping up the Chinese state’s policy decisions on 
foreign trade and WTO membership. The annual renewal process over 
                                                 
93 It is well argued that small states, exposed to international market forces, may 
choose to adopt a liberal economic policy. (Peter Katzenstein, 1985). Countries with 
huge domestic markets, it is conventionally believed, tend to be more conservative in 
this regard and their level of economic openness is usually lower than that of the small 
nations.   
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 the MFN status “might be annoying, but never truly dangerous,” given 
the substantial economic interests at stake in Sino-American trade. In 
fact, intensifying efforts to join the GATT/WTO was, in part, a means to 
enforce the state’s grand strategy of economic reforms, including foreign 
trade reform, and not the other way around.94  
Through reviewing the process of foreign trade reform in this 
chapter, I have proposed a different explanation on the logic of foreign 
trade liberalization in China: the trajectory of China’s foreign trade 
reform was set by changes in the institutional structure of the state and 
the central state’s reaction to such changes; it was for the purpose of 
regaining central state autonomy and macro control that the central 
state policymakers further decontrolled and liberalized the economy.  
This observation was made on the basis of the special 
characteristics of China’s pre-reform state structure: the omnipresent 
central state that reached into the society through the party-state 
system. Under the party state system, the Chinese state was not 
equivalent to the central state, but composed of the central government 
and its policy enforcers that were part of the party state network, which 
included local governments at different levels as well as administrative 
organizations for various industrial sectors and state owned trading 
units. The problem with decentralization was that the central 
government was trying to grant localities some autonomy of economic 
management and push state-owned trading corporations and industrial 
enterprises to be responsible for their profits and losses while at the 
same time still relying on the old state apparatus for enforcement of its 
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 trading plans. With new economic incentives, however, there was 
increasingly a “conflict of roles” on the part of the policy enforcers. 
In my interviews with managers at the headoffices of major trading 
corporations in Beijing, 95  many managers described the situations 
under the contracting system as confusing. Although these trading 
corporations were apparently “economic entities”, during the planning 
era they functioned more as arms of the state’s planning system. The 
organizational structure of their headoffices resembled that of 
government institutions. And state directives were taken and enforced 
as administrative orders. During decentralization period, however, 
these companies began to have an independent accounting system, and 
were increasingly concerned about their own profitability as a result.  
Conflicts occurred, therefore, between attaining “foreign trade targets” 
set by the central state and improving the company performance and 
profitability. As domestic pricing system and foreign exchange rate 
system during the decentralization period were still not market 
conforming, state plans and requirements of the foreign trade contracts 
often had to be fulfilled at the economic losses of the companies. My 
interviewees admitted that during the contracting period some 
companies used to utilize economic resources at hand to make money at 
the expense of the central government, e.g., reselling import licenses or 
imported goods subject to import licenses. Situations at the provincial 
level were similar. As the previous sections described, provincial and 
sub-provincial governments, under a decentralized foreign trade regime, 
                                                 
95 Sinochem, China MinMetal, China National Silk Import and Export Corporation, 
China National Arts & Crafts Import &Export Corporation, as well as China Resources 
National Corporation (Huarun conglomerate).  
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 were engaged in localist economic activities all at the expense of the 
central state. The competition between different localities caused 
further chaos in the foreign trade sector and eroded the central state’s 
ability to effectively link its industrial policy with foreign trade to enforce 
a truly export-oriented trade strategy. 
The institutional consequences of decentralization measures led the 
central government to reconsider its method of economic intervention. 
At first, the state sought to rectify the problem through combining 
decentralization with a binding contract system, only to find its policy 
enforcement capacity further paralyzed under the new system. It was in 
pursuit of solutions to problems in this new situation that the central 
government resorted to market conforming liberalization. In the course 
of disentangling itself from microeconomic activities and straightening 
out economic irregularities with a macroeconomic approach, the 
meaning and functions of the state apparatus were partially 
transformed. The central state, with MOFTEC, the State Economic and 
Trade Commission and the State Planning Commission as policy 
making and enforcement bodies, was becoming a normal state with 
macro control and management capabilities. The merging of the three 
organizations into the Department of Commerce further transformed 
the role of the state – from one of administrative planning to one of 
supervision and coordination through a modern professional 
bureaucratic organization. 
One final question is that why the liberalization drive did not 
encounter significant resistance from self-interested local governments 
and micro players, who might have developed a vested interest in the 
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 decentralized yet non-market conforming trading practice. My 
interviews revealed two major factors. One was the “bandwagon effect” 
among localities. As the decentralization program and especially the 
contracting system were enforced on a regional particularistic basis, 
localities had been vying for privileges granted to special economic zones, 
open cities and coastal provinces. And foreign trade was regarded as a 
lucrative business sector by local micro actors. Liberalization measures 
were welcomed by the “underprivileged” provinces as they were finally 
granted equal trading rights and “development opportunities”. 96   
The second reason was the growth of non-state sector in economic 
activities and the inclusion of non-state actors, especially foreign 
invested enterprises, into foreign trade. As foreign trade privileges and 
preferential treatment on foreign direct investment were usually granted 
hand in hand to certain provinces and regions, provinces, cities, and 
special economic zones with privileged trading rights were also hosts to 
most foreign invested companies, many of them export-oriented 
enterprises in light industries and processing industries. With these 
enterprises gaining direct access to foreign trade activities, hosting 
provinces or cities’ economies would benefit as a whole. Moreover, 
thanks to the regional particularistic strategy of industrial policy during 
the decentralization period, these provinces and cities had developed an 
overall economic structure based on labor-intensive processing 
industries, light industries and electronic manufactures, sectors in 
which China had a “comparative advantage” and a “competitive 
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regional particularistic decentralization created competitive pressures for further 
opening up. 
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 advantage” in the international market.  Liberalization would allow 
more local enterprises to engage in foreign trade and generate more 
revenue for local governments. Although full-scale liberalization tended 
to remove some of the privileges these regions enjoyed in the previous 
stages of reform, the overall benefits far outweighed the costs. Market 
conforming liberalization in foreign trade, therefore, became a “joint 
project” pursued by the central state, provincial and sub-provincial 
governments as well as foreign trade related business interests. 
 
Foreign trade was one of the pioneering sectors of China’s reform 
and opening up program. The reform experience of this sector well 
captures the dynamics of institutional change in China in the past 30 
years and offers a self-contained context for studying the relationships 
and interactions between the central government, provincial authorities 
and market forces. This chapter demonstrates that administrative 
decentralization in the foreign trade sector changed the internal 
structure of the Chinese state and undermined the central state’s policy 
enforcement capabilities. The central government sought to reassert 
state authority and control through introducing market-conforming 
liberalization.  
China’s WTO accession efforts constituted an important part of 
China’s journey towards trade liberalization. Yet the rationale behind 
China’s commitment to a liberal trade regime goes beyond tactical 
calculations over the political benefits of joining the WTO. External 
economic and political pressures may have influenced the country’s 
trade liberalization process by speeding up or slowing down China’s 
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 WTO negotiations at one point or another and may explain changes of 
negotiation tactics on the part of the Chinese government.97 However, it 
requires a different explanation to account for the motivation behind the 
Chinese government’s persistent efforts to remove trade barriers and 
enforce domestic setoral restructuring in the past 15 years. This study 
has attempted to offer such an explanation through investigating how 
the institutional effects of one stage of reform impacted the state’s 
choice of strategy in later rounds of reform.  
By taking the state as a historically grounded institution, this study 
has sought to interpret market-conforming liberalization of the foreign 
trade sector as an intentional move on the part of the central state. This 
contrasts with the rational-choice institutionalist treatment of the state 
as a collection of interest-maximizing individual politicians and solves 
the puzzle as to why China was able to move away from the political 
equilibrium of partial reform while delineating a political rather than 
economic logic of the Chinese state’s liberalization initiatives. 
                                                 
97 For example, the bombing of Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 resulted in a 
suspension of WTO talks between China and the US. 
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 CHATER THREE 
BANKING REFORM 
 
Financial reform is crucial to nearly all modernizing and liberalizing 
economies. In the case of China, scholars and policy researchers 
generally identify financial sector restructuring as a critical and central 
theme of the Chinese economic reform.1 This observation has a twofold 
meaning. On the one hand, it is widely acknowledged that the 
establishment of a sound financial system is indispensable to the 
country’s healthy economic development and growth as well as 
macroeconomic stability in the long run. On the other, the 
transformation of the financial system itself is linked with and affected 
by other important issues that China is faced with, such as the reform of 
the state-owned enterprises (SOEs), systems of foreign trade and 
investment, and even the country’s social security system.2  These two 
aspects make financial sector reform an issue of particular high stake 
and complexity on Chinese policymakers’ reform agenda. 
Whereas financial sector reform includes both banking system 
reform3 and the creation and development of the capital market, the 
former deserves primary attention in the specific socioeconomic context 
of China. Financial sector restructuring in China started with the 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Barry Naughton (1995), On Kit Tam ed. (1995), Raymond 
Blanchard, Jr (1997), Nicholas Lardy (1998);Donald D. Tong (2002); Wu Jinglian 
(2002); Dai Xianglong (2002). 
2 For discussions about the relationship between finance/banking, SOEs and social 
security, see Donald D. Tong. op.cit. 
3 Here the banking system comprises of banks and non-bank financial institutions 
such as credit cooperatives and trust & investment companies, as will be discussed 
later in the main text. 
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 creation of a two-tier banking system that replaced the monobank 
structure in the pre-reform era. In the first decade of the reform, the 
number of financial institutions multiplied and credits and loans grew 
dramatically to support the country’s economic growth. State-owned 
banks played a particularly dominant role in this process, accounting 
for 85% of the total financial assets, 80% of total loans and 75% of total 
deposits. 4 Capital markets, on the other hand, were underdeveloped 
during the same period. Apart from informal fund raising activities, 
stock markets did not start to develop until the early 1990s. And bond 
markets remained small as well. By the mid 1990s, funds provided 
through capital markets made up only around 20% of the total value of 
finance. 5  Financial institutions provided the other 80%, and 
state-owned banks alone provided 60%. Banks and non-bank 
institutions, therefore, assumed an important developmental role 
during the period of reform while they themselves were also undergoing 
major changes. How the banking system evolved and reasons behind its 
evolution constituted the main part of the story of financial reform.  
Moreover, what path the Chinese state chose in reforming the 
country’s banking reform had a direct impact on the development of the 
capital market and the “paradigm of financial reform” in entirety.  
White and Bowles proposed three paradigms of financial reforms for 
socialist and industrializing economies: “market socialism”, “finance 
and development” and “the NIC model of late development”. 6  The 
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 paradigm of “market socialism” refers to the model of reform of some 
East European countries in the 1980s, which involves a substantial 
amount of financial marketization but retains certain socialist political 
and institutional features such as planning and public ownership. 
“Finance and Development” paradigm refers to the neo-classical model 
of financial liberalization, which maintains that “the thrust of financial 
reform in developing countries should be to restrict the role of the 
government as an active promoter of development and promote its role 
as the regulator of a market-led development process supported by a 
market-based financial system.” This model of reform emphasizes 
“competition between banks and other financial institutions, the 
privatization of financial institutions and the encouragement of money 
and capital markets, especially equity markets.” The “NIC late 
development” paradigm refers to the reform experience of East Asian 
NIEs characterized by “an active interventionist state with control over 
the financial system to promote late development.” The state intervenes 
to “generate savings and allocate credit in developmentally crucial 
directions” and “create and advance key industrial sectors.” The state 
influences the allocation of bank credit not only through interest rates 
but also through policy loans to enforce its strategy of industrial 
development. 
As far as a country’s overall developmental strategy is concerned, 
banking and capital market are not two separate issues to be addressed, 
as the adoption of a particular strategic approach would determine the 
patterns and directions of development for both sub-sectors of the 
financial system. My study of financial sector reform, therefore, focuses 
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 mainly on the reform of China’s banking system. By exploring the 
evolution of the banking system and the logic behind it, the study may 
hopefully unravel the complexity of the multi-dimensional reforms of 
the entire financial system.  
According to White and Bowles, financial reforms in China have 
been influenced by all the three paradigms. Making their observation in 
1996, they concluded that the future trajectory of financial policy and 
institutional change in China would involve “a moving tension and/or 
fusion” between the late-development and finance and development 
models, which had different underlying views regarding evaluations of 
the efficacy of market and state-led strategies. White and Bowles 
predicted that overall the result of the competition of the three models 
would be closer to the credit-based late development model of East 
Asian NICs or Germany as described by John Zysman7 rather than to 
the capital-market-based system along Anglo-American lines. This 
means that banks would play a dominant and developmental role in the 
country’s modernization process whereas the role of the capital market 
would remain limited. 
A review of banking reform in the past two decades suggests that 
whereas White and Bowles correctly identified the tension between 
different models of financial reforms in China, the actual developments 
in the financial area in recent years seem to point to a different direction 
than White and Bowles predicted. As banking reform is an ongoing 
process, existing studies describe and divide stages of the reform in 
various ways, depending on the timing of the investigation and the 
                                                 
7 See Zysman (1983): 286-287. 
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 author’s perspective.8 Yet just as in the case of Foreign Trade, there 
were two distinctive stages in banking reform: decentralization and 
liberalization. The 1980s and early 1990s saw the central state’s effort 
to establish a decentralized banking system while maintaining the 
state’s credit plan. From 1994 and on, however, the central government 
became more firmly committed to building a full-fledged commercial 
banking system and an independent central bank in charge of 
macroeconomic policies. If in 1996 it was still hard to determine, as 
White and Bowles argue, whether these measures would lead to 
financial liberalization or whether they were part of the revisionist 
efforts to build a banking system after the late development model by 
combining plan with market, by 2003 it seemed to be clearer that the 
initiatives that had started from 1993 and subsequent measures were 
                                                 
8 See, for example, Ou Jiawa in On Kit Tam ed. (1995) Zhang Chenghui in Masuyama 
et al eds. (1999), Feng Wei (2000), Donald Tong (2002). Generally speaking, banking 
reform in China can be divided into five stages. The first phase was from 1979-1984, 
during which the Chinese government tried to transform budget grants into bank 
credits and created a two-tier banking system to replace the monobank system. The 
second phase was from 1984 to 1988. This period saw a rapid development and 
diversification of financial institutions such as new national and regional banks, and 
non-bank financial institutions including trust and investment companies, finance 
companies, and insurance companies. The third phase was from 1988-1993, during 
which a stabilization program was introduced to curb the over-heatedness of the 
economy. New administrative policies regarding loans and credits were introduced to 
maintain macroeconomic stability. The fourth phase was from 1994-1997, during 
which several key issues were put on the agenda and implemented, such as the 
commercialization of the state-owned banks, the legislation of the central banking 
function of the People’s Bank of china (PBC), and the strengthening of supervision over 
financial institutions. Reforms after 1997 were characterized by intensified efforts to 
build an independent center bank, and to transform state commercial banks into true 
commercial banks. Asset management companies were set up to purchase 
non-performing loans of state-owned commercial banks so that the latter were given a 
chance to become truly profit-oriented and independent enterprises freed from social 
obligations under the planning system. In 2003, the Bank Supervising Committee was 
set up, which was intended to take over the supervising function of the central bank, 
allowing the latter to focus on monetary policy and macro control. In 2004, the central 
government “injected” US $45 billion to state-owned banks as reserve fund to prepare 
for their stockization (i.e., share-issue privatization). 
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 leading the country’s financial system more towards the “finance and 
development paradigm” than the “late development” model . On the key 
issues over which White and Bowles foresaw a competition between the 
two models such as central bank independence, the extension of capital 
markets, the extent of policy loans, the determination of interest rates 
and the role of foreign banks in the economy, solutions more in line with 
the liberalization approach than with the interventionist approach are 
being pursued.9 
What’s the logic behind the evolution of China’s banking system 
towards liberalization? A few external factors may have exerted certain 
degrees of influence over policy choices regarding the Chinese banking 
reform. For example, from the mid 1980s and on advocates of 
neoclassical doctrines such as the World Bank and later the IMF began 
to participate in Chinese domestic policy debate over banking and 
financial reforms. 10  Moreover, China’s accelerated efforts to join 
GATT/WTO in the mid 1990s gave China’s reform programs including 
financial reform another push towards the direction of liberalization.  
Finally, the Chinese government may have drawn lessons from the 
Asian Financial Crisis, and in turn became more dedicated to 
market-oriented restructuring in the banking sector in order to reduce 
and eliminate non-performing loans and strengthen financial security.11 
                                                 
9 See Robert Parry “Central Bank Credibility, Inflation, and Financial Reform” in Chen 
et al (2000); Feng Wei (1999:30-34). 
10 White and Bowles op.cit.  
11 See for example, Dai Xianglong (Governor of PBC) and Gao Shangquan (Standing 
Vice-President of China’s Institutional Reform Study Society) in Kang Shaobang ed. 
(1999). Also see Xin Wen (1998); Li Chengsen (1998) for scholarly reflections on the 
necessity of adopting market-oriented reform of the banking system in the aftermath 
of the Asian Financial Crisis. 
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 These factors may have impacted the Chinese banking reform at 
different points of time. However, they appear inadequate to explain the 
entire trajectory of the banking reform, especially regarding the timing 
of key decisions that shaped the contour of the reform process.   
In this chapter, I seek to explain the logic of banking sector reform 
through examining changes in China’s state structure and their impact 
on central state strategy. Existing studies of the Chinese reform have 
interpreted the Chinese reform either as a political game of deals and 
compromises or as shaped by the law of market.12  By treating the state 
as a historically grounded institution, this chapter will demonstrate how 
the central state developed a motivation to pursue market-conforming 
reforms in the banking sector. Similar to foreign trade liberalization, 
liberalization initiatives in the banking sector show that the central 
state was able to make strategic a move beyond the political equilibrium 
of partial reform. Meanwhile, although the move itself was 
market-conforming, the rationale behind it was political institutional 
rather than economic. 
Like foreign trade decentralization, the decentralization in banking 
and finance was initially intended to redistribute the power over credit 
planning and allocation between the center and localities. What was 
more complicated with the process of decentralization in banking was 
the fact that the central government had to build a banking system in its 
conventional sense from scratch, as during the pre-reform era, the 
                                                 
12 As mentioned in chapter one, Susan Shirk’s rational-choice model treats the state 
as a collection of rent-seeking and interest-maximizing politicians. Wedeman and 
Naughton, arguing from different perspectives, offer economic explanations about the 
logic of the Chinese reform. 
 101
 People’s Bank of China (PBC), the sole cash, credit and settlement 
center of the country, was merely an administrative agent of the state’s 
planning system. In the decentralization era the Chinese government 
tried to separate bank regulation and commercial activities by making 
the PBC the central bank and restoring or creating four specialized 
banks to undertake commercial activities. As reform went on, financial 
institutions were diversified to accommodate the decentralized credit 
allocation system. However, banks were not fully commercialized and 
the system as a whole was still expected to act as an arm of the 
economic planning system. In particular, local branches of both the 
PBC and commercial banks at the provincial level and below were 
subject to the double leadership of both the center and local 
governments. As local authorities were more incentivized than ever to 
pursue local economic interests under fiscal decentralization,13 local 
branches of both banking regulatory body and commercial banking 
institutions were oriented by local governments to serve local 
developmental or entrepreneurial goals. This in turn created an 
unintended effect upon the central state’s credit planning and the 
country’s macroeconomic environment. When administrative measures 
were exhausted without effectively rectifying the problems, the central 
government resorted to market-conforming and liberalization-oriented 
reforms to decouple the state from microeconomic activities. 
In the following sections, I will review the process of China’s banking 
reform, examine changes in China’s domestic structure and evaluate 
their impacts on the trajectory of banking reform. Whereas banking 
                                                 
13 See Christine Wong (1991). 
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 sector reform basically can be explained in the same logic as foreign 
trade reform, distinctive features of the decentralization process, such 
as high concentration of market power, absence of foreign actors in the 
banking system and relatively “egalitarian” rather than regional 
particularistic approach in decentralizing financial power, resulted in 
different institutional and market dynamics, which may explain why the 
path of banking reform has been particularly thorny and the process 
slow as compared with the impressive and forceful transformation of the 
foreign trade sector. 
 
Banking Decentralization 
Financial System under Centralized Planning 
In a market economy the primary role of banks and other financial 
institutions is to serve as an intermediary between savers and investors 
and to facilitate payments between economic units.14 But in pre-reform 
China, the banks were hardly “financial intermediaries”, but were 
administrative agencies of the state. Beginning in 1953, China began to 
build a monobank system after the Soviet model. Under this system, the 
People’s Bank of China (PBC) was actually the country’s sole financial 
institution. Its branches were set up all over the country in consistency 
with administrative divisions of regions. The PBC performing multiple 
functions and activities, ranging from formulating country’s credit and 
loan policies and conducting financial control and management to 
undertaking specific financial businesses such deposits, loans, 
                                                 
14 Nicolas Lardy (1998): 59. 
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 settlement, cash registering, etc. All the other financial institutions only 
existed in name. 15 
This monobank system was part of the state apparatus to enforce 
the state’s fiscal plan so as to facilitate capital construction and 
industrial production. The production and sales of state-owned 
enterprises as well as the scale of capital construction were planned 
directly by the State Planning Commission and the Ministry of Finance. 
The responsibility of the banking system was to provide the needed 
funds. In the banking circles, this process was widely described as “the 
State Planning Commission entertaining the guests, the Ministry of 
Finance ordering the dishes, and the banks paying the bill.” 16 Deng 
Xiaoping also commented that the pre-reform banks were not banks, 
but accounting offices, cashiers, and money issuing companies.17 
This system was largely a closed one. Funds were allocated 
top-down, whereas profits from state-owned enterprises were channeled 
                                                 
15 For example, the Bank of China was the foreign exchange section of the PBC, 
specializing in the country’s “external businesses”. The Agricultural Bank of China 
was set up in 1955 to manage funds for agricultural development. Its functions and 
roles overlapped with the PBC’s in many aspects. At the grassroots level branches of 
the two institutions sometimes clashed and conflicted with each other. As a result, the 
Agricultural bank was abolished, then restored, and abolished again and finally 
incorporated into the PBC in 1965. Similarly, the People’s Construction bank was set 
up in 1954 to undertake the responsibility for budget appropriation and fundraising 
for capital construction. Four years later it was converted into the Department of 
Capital Construction Finance of the Ministry of Finance but officially kept the name 
“People’s Construction Bank”. In the 1960s and 1970s the bank was reestablished, 
and then incorporated into the PBC and finally re-subjected to the Ministry of Finance. 
But even during its days of “independence”, the bank was more a fiscal agency of the 
state in charge of fund allocation, supervision and settlement for capital construction 
rather than a bank in its real sense. Apart from these state-owned “banks”, there were 
also Rural Credit Cooperatives -- institutions that were set up to meet the credit need 
in production activities and daily lives in rural areas. These institutions were virtually 
basic-level units of the PBC and in many places the credit cooperative and the PBC 
shared one office. 
16 Bank interviewee 1 (PBC) 
17 Deng Xiaoping (1993): 193. 
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 back to the Ministry of Finance. No transactions were allowed or needed 
between enterprises as the supply of production materials and sales 
activities were centrally organized and managed by the state. Hence the 
non-existence of commercial credit.  
The functioning of this system was premised upon centralized 
planning and the hierarchical enforcement mechanism of the party 
state. When decentralization took place and commercial credit allowed, 
the central state’s planning and control capacities were challenged (See 
Figure 3.1. for an illustration of the pre-reform banking system). 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Banks as State Agencies 
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 The Creation of the Two-Tier System 
As economic decentralization was carried out in China, the need for 
financial sector reform was pressing. Decentralization initiatives 
allowed enterprises to retain part of their profits. Reform of the wage 
system and adjustment in the procurement prices of agricultural 
products channeled more funds from the central government into the 
pockets of individuals in rural and urban areas. As a result, the 
proportion of fiscal income to total national income was decreasing. 
Between 1978 and 1983, government revenue as of GDP percentage 
decreased by more than 8 points. 18  Accordingly the central 
government’s disposable fiscal resources were shrinking.  Meanwhile, 
the burgeoning economy was creating a huger than ever demand for 
funds and credits. And profits retained by enterprises and boosted 
income of individuals constituted potentially new sources of funds for 
the banks to absorb. Back in 1979, the State Council already issued 
orders to restore the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), to separate the 
Bank of China (BOC) from the PBC, and to make the People’s 
Construction Bank of China (PCBC)19, which by then had been part of 
the state fiscal system under the leadership of the Ministry of Finance, 
“a “unit under the direct control of the State Council.” These measures 
were to support the reform and opening up programs that were being 
rolled out in the country. Yet the three banks remained to be specialized 
agencies of the state and their commercial banking activities too limited 
to satisfy the economy’s need for credit and capital.  
                                                 
18Calculated based on China Statistical Yearbook (1998). 
19 In 1996 PCBC was renamed as China Construction Bank (CCB). 
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 On the other hand, the revitalized economy also called for 
competent macroeconomic management. As elements of “commodity 
economy” had already been introduced into the country’s economic life, 
macro control and management by monetary authority was needed to 
curb economic overheatedness and disorder. 20  
Against this backdrop, financial sector reform was initiated with a 
focus on building a two-tier banking system. In September 1983, the 
Chinese State Council passed a resolution to separate central banking 
from commercial banking functions. The PBC no longer engaged in 
industrial and commercial credit activities or urban and rural savings 
businesses, and instead concentrated its resources on performing 
central banking functions. 21  Its commercial banking business was 
taken over by the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) 
created in 1984. The ICBC thus became the largest of the four 
state-owned banks with more than 405,000 staff members and over 
21,500 branches, sub-branches, business offices and savings bank 
offices, providing day-to-day financing for industrial and commercial 
enterprises and handling urban saving deposits. 22 
The separation of central banking from commercial banking and the 
establishment of the ICBC completed the transition of the banking 
system from a monobank one to a two-tier one. The PBC began to 
perform standard central bank responsibilities such as issuing 
currency, setting interest rates, supervising foreign exchange business 
                                                 
20 Bank interviewee 1 (PBC). 
21 State Council: Resolution on the Issue of the People’s Bank of China Performing 
Central Bank functions. September 17th, 1983. 
22 Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking 1986: II-46. 
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 and setting credit reserve requirements for the commercial banks. 
Meanwhile it was also assuming central planning responsibilities such 
as promulgating credit targets, coordinating activities within the state 
credit plan and adjusting the flow of funds across banks. Finally, the 
PBC also assumed the role of supervising and regulating financial 
institutions.  
The four state-owned banks, namely, the ABC, BOC, PCBC and the 
newly created ICBC, formed the mainstay of China’s commercial 
banking network. These banks, called state-owned specialized banks, 
initially had their specific scopes and types of business in their 
respective sectors. Since the mid 1980s, their businesses became 
gradually overlapping, hence introducing competition into the 
commercial banking sector. The ICBC, for example, was set up to 
handle commercial banking business in urban areas within China. 
Gradually, its businesses extended to rural and international areas. The 
BOC, in turn, lost its monopoly in foreign exchange business as ICBC 
and the other specialized banks were allowed to enter international 
business. And the ABC was allowed to set up branches in urban areas, 
taking deposits from individual residents and making loans to 
industrial enterprises. 23    
In addition to the four specialized banks, the latter half of the 1980s 
also saw creations of various new financial institutions, both banks and 
nonbank institutions. These include two national commercial banks, 
the Bank of Communications and CITIC Industrial Bank, a wholly 
owned subsidiary of China International Trust and Investment 
                                                 
23 Zhao Haikuan and Guo Tianyong (1998: 15-20) 
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 Corporation (CITIC). 24  These national “comprehensive” banks were 
allowed to conduct all commercial banking businesses without 
geographical or sectoral restrictions.  In the early 1990s three other 
national banks of smaller scale were established, namely, the 
Everbright Bank, the Huaxia Bank, and the Minsheng Bank. New 
commercial banks also include several regional banks, established by 
local governments in Special Economic Zones and coastal areas to 
support regional developments.25 
Nonbank financial institutions also began to flourish in the mid 
1980s. More than 1600 urban credit cooperatives were set up to serve 
urban individuals and collectively owned enterprises by the end of 1987. 
Various investment companies, such as trust and investment 
companies, finance companies, finance leasing companies, and 
securities companies, were established to engage in the business of 
investment banking. Many of these companies also entered commercial 
banking area, taking household deposits and making working capital 
loans to local industrial enterprises. 
Whereas these banking and nonbank institutions continued to grow 
in number in the 1990s, by the late 1980s a two-tier banking system 
with diversified financial institutions had already taken shape. 
Apparently, this transformation was a big step towards building a 
                                                 
24 CITIC was established in 1980, chartered by the State Council, to raise fund in the 
international capital markets.  
25 Major regional banks include: Shenzhen Development Bank, China Merchants 
Bank, Guangdong Development Bank, Fujian Industrial Bank, and Xiamen 
International Bank, Shanghai Pudong Development Bank, etc.  
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 banking system similar to that in market economies. But the banking 
system indeed was far from being commercialized and marketized.  
Banking Reform as Administrative Decentralization 
The two-tier banking system that was established in the 1980s 
carried some characteristics of both the market socialism paradigm and 
the late development paradigm. On the one hand, two key elements of 
the market socialist model, i.e., planning and public ownership, 
remained intact. On the other hand, following the late development 
model, the Chinese state went beyond socialist planning and employed 
monetary policy to advance its developmental goals. Under the 
administrative decentralization scheme that the Chinese government 
carried out in the financial sector as it did in the other economic areas, 
these characteristics combined to produce a series of social and 
economic outcomes that were unexpected of either model. 
Decentralization and the PBC 
After PBC became the central bank, finance authority and state 
fiscal authority were formally separated as the PBC was no longer 
affiliated with the Ministry of Finance (MOF).  Instead, the PBS was 
now a functional ministry directly under the State Council. In principle 
it was accountable only to the State Council, which appoints its 
Governor. But in reality the PBC’s autonomy as the central bank was 
rather limited. The PBC’s policy making body, called the Board of 
Counselors, was comprised of the PBC governor and deputy governors, 
one deputy minister each from the State Planning Commission (SPC), 
the MOF, and the State Commission of System Restructuring, as well as 
presidents of all the four SOBs, and the People’s Insurance Company. 
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 The PBC’s policy making autonomy, therefore, was significantly limited 
and compromised at the national level by the participation of the other 
state ministries and especially of the specialized banks (which were 
supposed to be targets of regulation by the central bank) in the policy 
making process.26 
This characteristic measured the degree to which the central bank 
functioned as an independent legal entity or as a subordinate state 
bureaucracy. What affected the effective functioning of the central bank 
the most, however, was its structure and organization at the local level. 
PBC’s branches were set up in accordance with the administrative 
jurisdiction of provincial, municipal, and county governments. Before 
1988, its provincial branches, sub-branches and county offices were 
subject to the “dual leadership” of the PBC headoffice and the local 
government. Whereas nominally PBC branches were accountable to the 
headoffice, it was the provincial governments that were responsible for 
appointing branch managers in consultation with the headoffice. PBC 
branches also had to coordinate key banking functions with local 
Finance and Planning Bureaus and to be responsive to the guidelines 
issued by local political authorities.27 
This “divided administration”, combined with new economic 
incentives in the decentralized economy, undermined the PBC’s 
capability to pursue national policy goals, be they macroeconomic or 
developmental. 
                                                 
26 See Jinglian Wu (1994): 4-5. 
27 World Bank (1991):4. 
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 Under fiscal decentralization scheme of the economic reform 
program, provinces were granted greater fiscal authority. The central 
government signed contracts with provinces on an individual basis, 
stipulating the amount of revenue to be remitted to the center each year. 
These contracts required local authorities to remit either a lump-sum 
amount or a fixed percentage of their local income annually. 28 The 
provinces, therefore, acquired an incentive to boost local incomes since 
they may retain a substantial part of the income after remitting a certain 
amount of revenue to the center. The profit-sharing arrangement was 
replicated between different tiers of local governments. Various tiers of 
administrative authorities, from provincial governments to village and 
township ones, were eager to set up factories and shops, introduce 
production lines, and build their own distribution channels, all in an 
effort to increase local revenue income.29 
The behavior of local governments at the provincial and 
sub-provincial levels went into conflicts with the central government 
and the PBC’s policy goals in two aspects. On the one hand, local 
governments’ investment frenzy often contradicted with the PBC’s 
macroeconomic objectives. Under the reformed banking system, credit 
plan remained in place and was a major monetary instrument of the 
PBC. The PBC set credit and monetary targets for commercial banks 
and used instruments such as additional lending, credit ceilings and 
quantity rationing to control money supply.30 Under the principle of 
                                                 
28 These contracts phased out in 1994, when China established a dual-level tax 
system, see Christine Wong (1997). 
29 Zhou Weilin (1997: 121-122, 133-137). 
30 Tam (1995): 60. 
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 “unified plan and hierarchical management”, local PBC branches had 
autonomous decision-making power over lending while having to 
adhere to the target control on the difference between lending and 
deposits. 31 Under this decentralized structure for controlling money 
supply, local PBC branches in principle had the responsibility of 
ensuring that local banks and enterprises complied with credit and 
monetary targets.  But due to interference by local administrative 
authorities, PBC branches tended to over-lend and, therefore, often 
compromised macroeconomic objectives for local developmental goals. 
This in turn resulted in loss of control over money supply and credit 
over-expansion. On the other hand, local entrepreneurial behavior also 
compromised the central government’s developmental objectives. As the 
central bank, the PBC in the 1980s had developmental functions and 
the responsibility to promote state strategy concerning regional and 
industrial development. The Bank lent directly to promote the country’s 
coastal development strategy and to key SOEs and special projects. 
Local PBC branches were expected to optimize credit structure to 
promote state developmental goals through their lending decisions and 
monitoring functions. But under the pressure and influence from local 
governments, they often diverted funds earmarked for special purposes 
to projects or enterprises sanctioned by local governments. 32 
Under decentralized financial authority and dispersed credit 
management regime, therefore, the central government’s ability to 
conduct macroeconomic control and promote economic development 
                                                 
31 Ibid. 
32 On Kit Tam ed. (1995: 125). 
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 through monetary policy was substantially compromised. The key factor 
here was the changed role of local governments and its impact on local 
PBC offices. In the pre-reform era the PBC branches had already been 
under the “dual administration” by both the center and local authorities. 
Pending fiscal and financial decentralization, however, local 
governments acted more as a link on the state apparatus, assisting and 
supervising bank operations and enforcing state policies. After the 
central state launched its initiative of “devolving authority and sharing 
profits”, local governments were increasingly acquiring a dual role: state 
policy enforcer and patron of local development. The central bank, with 
its branch structure and its dual leadership, was also experiencing this 
“conflict of interests”. As one interviewee from the PBC 33 commented:  
Prior to reform, the PBC had about 15,000 offices nationwide. 
Between 1979 and 1988, this number was reduced to about 2,400, as 
the PBC transferred its micro banking business to the ICBC, and its 
staff reduced by two thirds. But this does not mean the new system 
was easier for the headoffice to monitor and manage. Branch offices 
were empowered to have independent operations and have their own 
discretions over issues such as regional money supply in accordance 
with the actual situations of their hosting regions. This was supposed 
to improve the operational efficiency of the PBC. But the reality was 
that the headquarters tended to lose control over local affairs. Before 
1988, PBC branch managers were appointed by the provincial 
governments. Provincial authorities had a strong say in the bank’s 
operations and policies. Of course, both branch managers and 
                                                 
33 Interviewee 2 (PBC) 
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 provincial government leaders are state cadres. But in many areas 
local and central interests diverge. This is inevitable in the reform 
years. 
As decentralization progressed, the apparent strong multi-tier state 
apparatus tended to lose its policy enforcement capabilities as its local 
ends were increasingly entangled with local and societal interests. In the 
area of banking, this effect compromised the central state’s ability to 
promote its macroeconomic and developmental goals through its central 
banking operations. 
Decentralization and Commercial Banks 
The separation of the PBC from commercial banking and the 
creation of the ICBC signaled the establishment of a relatively complete 
commercial banking network 34 . In the second half of the 1980s, 
financial institutions were substantially diversified. The degree of 
market concentration, however, was still high. By the end of 1988 the 
four specialized banks’ combined shares of deposits and lending were 
estimated to be 93% and 94%35.  
These state-owned banks (SOBs)36 were organized hierarchically 
with their headoffices in Beijing and branches corresponding to 
provincial boundaries. Since financial reform began state banks went 
through “enterprization”. During the pre-reform years state banks were 
state agencies working within the budget system, subordinate to state 
fiscal authorities. In the decentralization years specialized banks 
                                                 
34 This network also encompasses nonbank financial institutions that engage in 
banking business. 
35 Tam (1995): 58. 
36 In this study, SOBs are equivalent to state-owned specialized banks. These two 
terms are used interchangeably. 
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 became relatively “independent” commercial entities. The profit 
retention system was applied to state-owned specialized banks as to 
many other state-owned enterprises. A specific retention rate was 
determined for each specialized bank. The banks were allowed to retain 
the agreed proportion of after-tax profits. Banks branches were granted 
greater autonomy with regard to business operations and personnel and 
financial affairs. Provincial and municipal branches adopted 
independent accounting and had the right to set up sub-branches and 
subsidiaries37.  Contract responsibility system was also introduced 
into specialized banks to specify the responsibilities and risks of bank 
branches. 
Despite the progress made towards commercialization, the 
specialized banks were not fully profit-oriented commercial entities. 
They continued to provide part of the policy loans to enterprises 
according to state credit plans. It was estimated that total outstanding 
policy loans amounted to one-third of total outstanding loans extended 
through the banking system at the beginning of the 1990s38. These 
loans were to be made at the interest rates determined by the state. 
Loan rates varied across sectors, regions, and enterprises reflecting the 
state’s policy preferences with regard to development priorities. These 
rates were set at the level of lending rates from the PBC to commercial 
banks. The latter were allowed a floating margin in rediscounting the 
loans. However, the flexibility was limited as the base rates were 
                                                 
37 Subsidiaries include entities such as UCCs (urban credit cooperatives), RCCs (rural 
credit cooperatives), and local trust and investment companies. 
38 Mehran et al (1996). A case study of an unidentified state-owned commercial bank 
by Song Zhexu(1996) shows that at the beginning of the 1990s about 70% of loans the 
bank extended were policy loans. 
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 administratively decided. The specialized banks, therefore, had to 
supply these loans without proper assessment of risks and enterprises’ 
loan repayment capabilities. The result was an accumulation of 
non-performing loans and deterioration of SOBs’ asset liability ratios. In 
fact, SOBs had little incentive to improve its loan portfolios and risk 
management, as their losses would finally be covered by the state. An 
interviewee from the BOC39  observed that this problem should be 
ultimately attributed to state ownership of the banks: 
State-owned banks are more or less like state institutions (guojia 
jiguan). From the headoffice down to branches and sub-branches, 
many characteristics of state administrative offices (xingzheng keshi) 
are retained. As commercial banks, we are supposed to serve as 
financial intermediaries to the society. But from time to time, we would 
act like government institutions. For example, SOBs sometimes provide 
free services to SOEs and other working units such as distributing 
salaries and wages on their behalves. But in fact every service has its 
costs and would have implications on the banks’ income and 
profitability. When banks extend loans to SOEs, this is often 
considered as a duty because we are both owned by the state and are 
virtually “one family”.  
The fact that state-owned specialized banks were not profit-oriented 
commercial banks like their foreign counterparts does not mean that 
they were not profit-seeking. Whereas banks did not pay due attention 
to the issue “bank solvency”, they focused on short-term profits, i.e., 
profits derived from differences between loan interests and deposit 
                                                 
39 Interviewee 3 (BOC). 
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 interests. These profits were directly linked to the level of bonus and 
welfare of bank employees. The top priority of SOBs, therefore, was 
attracting profits and expanding credits.  SOBs and their branches 
were eager to set up subsidiaries in urban and rural areas in order to 
compete for deposits. Between 1985 and 1988, bank branches, 
subsidiaries and offices across the country increased by almost 70%, 
total staff increased by 60%.40 Total deposits in the banking system 
increased by 80% in the three years. 41 
Accordingly, lending activities were expanding rapidly. The waves of 
credit expansion were propelled bottom-up by localities (regions). In 
principle, commercial banks should limit their lending volume within 
the “credit quota” set by the central bank, thereby maintaining the 
overall scale of credit and loan the central bank hoped to achieve. This 
re-lending quota was determined through negotiations with the center, 
where local governments already exerted their influence.42 Yet local 
branches of state banks often went further to make loans or issue credit 
before they petitioned for extra credit quota. Thus, such bottom-up 
pressure forced the state to change its annual credit plan. 
Again, as in the case of the PBC branches, local branches of the 
specialized banks were strongly influenced by local administrative 
authorities and were usually willing to cooperate with the latter to 
support regional developmental goals, which could be distinctively 
different from the objectives of the state’s overall developmental 
strategy.  
                                                 
40 World Bank (1991): 8. 
41 ibid. 
42 Wu Jinglian in Tam (1995): 95. 
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 My interviews with managers and employees at major commercial 
banks in Beijing43 suggest that two main reasons contributed to the 
collaboration between local governments and SOB branches. 
Firstly, the branch offices were tied to local governments through 
personnel relations. Unlike the case of the PBC where branch managers 
were appointed by local governments, branch managers of specialized 
banks were designated vertically by their headoffices. But speaking of 
organizational/personnel relations (zuzhi guanxi), leading cadres of the 
bank branches still belonged to the provincial or municipal system 
under the leadership of the local governments and Party Committees. In 
Beijing, for example, headoffice of the ICBC was a central level unit, 
whereas ICBC Beijing branch and sub-branches were all city level units. 
Staff of the branch and sub-branches replied on the city government to 
provide welfare, housing, and schooling for their children, etc. Bank 
managers’ future prospects were also tied to the city government to a 
great extent, as when the latter set up new city-level banks, trust and 
investment companies, or key projects, these managers could be 
transferred and assigned to important posts in the new organizations. 
Leading cadres of the banks also had a political career prospect tied to 
the local administrations. For instance, they could be promoted to join 
the leading team of the local government or and the Party Committee. 
All these factors led branch offices to willingly and actively cooperate 
with local governments when called upon. 
                                                 
43 Interviewee 3 (BOC-headoffice), Interviewee 4 (ICBC Beijing Branch), Interviewee 5 
(Beijing Bank of Commerce/ICBC Beijing/ PBC Beijing) 
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 Secondly, although it was the banks that extended loans to 
enterprises, how much of the loans the enterprises would repay 
annually was virtually determined by the local governments. In China, 
interests on loans were usually repaid before tax. The size of enterprises’ 
profit base before tax decided how much revenue the locality could 
retain after submitting the due amount to the center. Local 
governments, therefore, would use administrative means to determine 
the annual loan or interest repayment so as to maximize local fiscal 
income. Although SOEs and SOBs were supposed to act as corporate 
entities with independent accounting, in practice the “soft budget 
constraint” syndrome still existed. 44 Under state ownership, creditors’ 
rights and debtors’ responsibilities were not clearly stipulated. The local 
government, which represented the state at the local level, could still 
use administrative power to allocate resources among SOEs and SOBs, 
albeit indirectly rather than through the budget system. Bank branches, 
therefore, would naturally bow to the request of local authorities in 
making loans as eventually the economic well-being of their specific 
branches would depend on the discretion of the local governments 
whereas the risks and losses for the bank as a whole would be 
shouldered by the state. 
The source of this problem was the same as in the PBC case – local 
administrative authorities at different levels acquired a dual role under 
the decentralization program, which prompted them to pursue 
entrepreneurial goals that could diverge from those of the central state. 
                                                 
44 See Janos Kornai (1986): 3-30. Also see Kornai (2003), Justin Yifu Lin and Guofu 
Tan (1999). 
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 But the relationship between the state-owned commercial banks, local 
governments, and the central state was a bit more complicated. On the 
one hand, the central state was trying to build a commercial banking 
network to serve as financial intermediaries between investors and 
borrowers. On the other hand, it tried to maintain the developmental 
role of financial institutions with an attempt to incorporate their 
commercial activities into the planning system. This prevented these 
state-owned banks from fully assuming a societal role as they were tied 
back to the state by ownership and by the missions imposed upon them. 
Ironically, these ties in turn prevented the banks from fulfilling their 
due part in the central state’s overall development strategy as what they 
served were indeed the developmental or entrepreneurial needs of the 
local states. 
Consequences of Financial Decentralization 
The dynamics under decentralized financial regime had important 
consequences for China’s macro and micro economic situations, which 
eventually caused the central state to reconsider its reform approach. 
Conflict of macroeconomic and developmental goals: As mentioned 
above, the entrepreneurial behavior of local governments and state 
banking institutions’ collaboration with them led to over-expansions of 
credit. As local governments competed with each other to set up and 
duplicate projects, production lines, factories and shops, and as banks 
supplied funds to support this investment rush, the economy soon 
became overheated nationwide. In the second half of 1984, for example, 
money supply in terms of M145 increased by about 40% in the second 
                                                 
45 In China M1 refers to money in circulation and demand deposit by enterprises. 
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 half of 1984. Inflationary pressure was mounting. The central bank, 
however, was not effective and timely in taking adjustment measures to 
curb overheated microeconomic activities and stabilize macroeconomic 
environment. One important cause for this was the PBC local branches’ 
tendency to meet local governments’ needs rather than follow the order 
of the bank headquarters. While the decision to tighten money supply 
was already made at the Governor’s meeting in early 1985, enforcement 
measures were not taken until the latter half of the year.46  
When the center’s will was finally enforced, administrative means 
rather than monetary instruments such as adjustment of interest rate 
were used. The PBC issued directives to its branches, imposing credit 
ceilings on local banks and enterprises to tame down aggregate demand. 
This, however, caused another problem, which was credit shortage. 
Since supply of capital was cut back through administrative 
retrenchment, enterprises in different market situations were 
indiscriminately affected.  Factories whose products were in high 
demand were forced to stop production due to shortage of working 
capital.47 Under administrative directives, many local banks could not 
lend to enterprises in need of working capital even if they had excess 
reserves with the central bank, as they had reached the limit of their 
re-lending quota.48 
The retrenchment efforts, however, did not solve the problem of local 
governments’ intervention in the economy. Directives from the center 
only stipulated ceilings on credit quota. But local governments could 
                                                 
46 OU Jiawa in Tam (1995):63. 
47 ibid. 
48 Interviewee 5 ( ICBC Beijing/PBC/BBoC) 
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 still influence how credit within the quota was allocated. As one 
interviewee observed 49:  
The problem of credit over-expansion and economic 
over-heatedness was caused mainly by the investment fervor of 
different localities, with many duplicated projects (chongfu shangma 
xiangmu). For example, when one village set up a furniture (production) 
shop, all the other villages within the region followed suit. Or when one 
province introduced an assembly line, many other provinces would do 
the same thing and soon their products would be competing in a 
crowded market. There was a lack of economy of scale and economic 
efficiency. Macroeconomic control should aim at solving these problems 
and optimizing investment structure. But in reality, local governments 
often had different calculations as they always wanted to endorse 
their local (regional) key projects. During periods of tight money supply, 
they would influence local PBC and commercial banks to cut off credit 
on projects other than their key projects, although the former projects 
could be of higher priority from the perspective of the central 
government.  
At the level of the central government, widespread credit shortage 
phenomena caused decision makers to worry, as macroeconomic 
measures were slowing down economic growth, which was considered a 
top priority by the Chinese state during the reform era. To ease the 
credit shortage and maintain the momentum for high growth, the 
central government and the PBC eased credit control only a few months 
into the retrenchment program in 1985. Additional credit was added on 
                                                 
49 Interviewee 5. 
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 top of the original credit plan to supply enterprises in need of working 
capital. By the mid 1986, an easing of monetary policy was formally 
enforced. Whereas output growth accelerated as expected, inflationary 
pressures also came back as the economy began to overheat. Between 
1986 and 1987, GNP growth picked up by 3 %, whereas the rate of 
change in the general retail price index increased by 5%. This led to 
another round of short-lived retrenchment cycle in late 198750. However, 
for the same reason as before, the central government soon reversed the 
policy to ease money supply. By mid 1988, economy became severely 
overheated and inflation rose to more than 20%, which led to 
widespread withdrawal of deposits from banks and buying spree at 
shops in anticipation of further increases in prices. 
Under administrative decentralization, this conflict of 
macroeconomic and developmental goals was inevitable given the 
structural problems in finance and investment activities caused by the 
special dynamics and interactions between the center, the localities and 
state banks.  By resorting to administrative means to control money 
supply, the Chinese central state was constantly caught in the dilemma 
of attaining one goal at the expense of the other. In this regard, the 
experience of the Chinese financial sector echoed the country’s general 
experience during the decentralization era that Chinese officials and 
economists have summarized in one sentence: “loosening of economic 
control would invariably lead to chaos whereas tightening of control 
would invariably kill economic vigor.”  
                                                 
50 National Bureau of Statistics of China: Annual National Statistical Reports 1986 & 
1987. 
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 Financial regionalization and debt problems: Local credit expansion 
drives under limited supply of credit led to regionalization of financial 
and economic activities. Under the influence of local governments, local 
branches of SOBs tended to lend mainly to enterprises in the same 
region. The situation could worsen during time of tight money supply, 
when loans were made solely to local enterprises and were prevented 
from flowing out. The lack of mobility of capital not only regionalized 
financial activities, but also added fuel to credit expansion. As demand 
for capital could not be satisfied through mobility of funds like in a 
market system, each local government would only press local banks to 
extend additional loans, which in turn gave pressure back to the central 
government and the PBC to expand overall credit plan. 51 Moreover, 
during periods of tightened control, local governments would advise 
local banks to stop payment on goods and services purchased from 
enterprises outside the region, the latter mostly being large state-owned 
enterprises offering goods and services beyond regional boundaries. 
This practice led to indebtedness between enterprises, or between 
banks and enterprises, and contributed to the mounting “triangle 
debts” among SOEs. 52 
As for the banks themselves, one important means of credit 
management developed during the reform era was interbank lending 
and borrowing. During pre-reform years, the boundary between state 
budgetary system and financial system was blurred. Credit and cash 
                                                 
51 Interviewee 1 (PBC). Also see Xu Shipiao (1994) for an analysis of the credit 
overexpansion problem from the Central Bank perspective, and Hong Shen et al (1994) 
for a study of major reasons behind the distortion of state credit plans. 
52 Interviewee 5; Also see Zhou Weilin (1997: 151-157) for analyses about the triangle 
debt problem. 
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 plans were constantly adjusted by the state to meet the changing need 
of the banking system. When financial reform began and the central 
bank and commercial banks were separated, the PBC formulated new 
rules for commercial banks’ credit and cash management, which 
required the commercial banks to link the amount of lending to the level 
of deposit taking and disallowed overdrafts from the central bank.53 
Against this background, interbank money market was developed to 
allow lending between banks and across regions to provide banks with 
the needed liquidity to replenish their reserves.  
Although interbank market was hailed as a major development of 
financial marketization by the Chinese official sources, its functions and 
purposes were somewhat different from those of interbank activities in 
market economies. Normally, interbank borrowing is an instrument to 
ease banks’ fluctuations in liquidity and is conducted in relatively small 
amounts to cover a bank’s overnight open position. But in China banks 
often borrowed from each other not to replenish liquidity, but to extend 
the funds as loans to enterprises.54 The maturity of interbank lending 
could be as long as one year as opposed to a few days in the case of 
standard interbank market transactions.  And the amount of lending 
could be truly substantial, sometimes several times the level of bank 
reserves.55 
As interbank lending and borrowing became means to obtain 
loanable funds, the regional factor again kicked in. Local banks tended 
to limit lending and borrowing within their own region. A 1986 ICBC 
                                                 
53 PBC: Rules for credit funds management, 1984. 
54 Xia Bin “Analysis of China’s Interbank Money Market” in On Kit Tam (1995). 
55 Interviewee 3. 
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 study of financial reforms in ten cities suggests that 68% of interbank 
transactions by specialized banks and 87% of transactions by local 
trust and investment companies and other financial institutions were 
conducted within their own regions.56 
Another characteristic of interbank money market was the 
establishment of multiple interbank “lending centers”. For one city, 
there were usually various tiers of interbank markets, such as the 
center for interbank lending between the local PBC branch and 
branches of the specialized banks, the network for local UCCs and other 
financial institutions, as well as the center for national level transaction, 
mainly conducted by the specialized banks.57  Financial centers were 
set up and duplicated across the country, mimicking the situation in 
the real sector, where factories and shops for the production of the same 
physical goods were repeatedly built by various localities. As interbank 
markets in different regions were largely segregated and information 
often delayed or blocked, borrowers and lenders could not take 
advantage of an efficient market to optimize transactions and 
opportunities.  
Since “insolvency” was never a problem on SOB bank managers’ 
minds, they did not worry so much about defaults in interbank 
transactions, and instead were keen on expanding credit by means of 
interbank borrowing. Very often funds were not returned at maturation. 
Thus debts also accumulated between banks. In so doing, banks 
                                                 
56 Zhang Xiaojie and Zhao Yujiang (1988). 
57 Interviewee 3 (BOC headoffice). For more about problems and defects of China’s 
interbank market, see Luo Zhifang and Guo Jian (1994): 31-34; Zhao Dayun (1994): 
90-91. 
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 actually channeled banking institutions’ excess funds into local 
development and construction, getting themselves indebted and letting 
the state take the losses eventually.58  
 
Recentralization Attempts and Consequences 
By early 1988, waves of investment expansion had rendered the 
Chinese economy seriously overheated. Coastal provinces were 
accelerating their “outward looking” economies whereas provinces of the 
inner land were eager to catch up. Total demand for credit surged as a 
result. In the meantime, as radical price reforms began in early 1988, 
provinces competed with each other to adjust commodity prices upward 
to start the process of “full liberalization” of prices. Although presidents 
of PBC branches held a meeting in early 1988, seeking to reverse the 
unstable and abnormal macroeconomic situations by recalling 
shot-term loans, “controlling total amount of credit and making 
structural adjustment”,59 the credit expansion fervor could hardly be 
suppressed with these limited measures. As money and credit grew 
rapidly in the economy, inflationary pressure was also mounting. As a 
result, waves of panic buying swept across the country and beginning in 
May, run on banks happened in major cities such as Nanjing and 
Hangzhou. Bank savings deposit, which had been growing at an annual 
rate of 30% most of the time during the 1980s, fell to negative growth in 
August, 1988 whereas average retail price nationwide rose by 18.5%.60 
                                                 
58 Interviewee 3 (BOC). 
59 Interviewee1 (PBC) 
60 Zhao Haikuan and Guo Tianyong (1998)  
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 As credit expansion and the ensuing inflation spiraled out of control, 
the central government enforced a stabilization program in 1988 and 
1989 to “improve economic environment and straighten out economic 
orders”. The program entailed stabilization measures in the areas of 
monetary, fiscal, investment, price, wages, and trade policies. To the 
central government, the primary task was to tighten money supply and 
curb overheated investment. Adjustments in the financial sector were at 
the core of the stabilization program.   
Monetary policy adjustments consisted of interest rate adjustment 
and credit policy revision.61 But given price distortions in the domestic 
economy, the effect of interest rate changes was not immediate or strong 
enough on taming the wave of investment expansion. Normally, interest 
rate would be used as a macroeconomic instrument to adjust the level of 
investment and reallocate resources. But distortion of prices continued 
to draw funds into high-profit industries such as processing industry, 
electrical appliances manufacturing, etc., whereas basic industries that 
were less profitable were further depleted of funds under tighter money 
supply.62    
The primary tool for macroeconomic control, therefore, remained to 
be administrative directives over credit policy. The center set rigid credit 
targets on working capital and fixed assets for various economic sectors 
and imposed credit ceilings accordingly. Firm and compulsory credit 
quotas were established for provinces and provincial branches of the 
                                                 
61 With regard to interest rates, the center raised the long term lending and deposit 
rates by 1% in September 1988 and then increased all lending rates by 2% and all 
deposit by rates 3% in early 1989. Retail price-indexed interest rates were introduced 
from late 1988 to attract savings and stem panic buying. (World Bank, 1990: 12-13) 
62 Interviewee 5; also see Zhao Haikun and Guo Tianyong. op. cit.  
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 PBC were made responsible for controlling the total allocation of credit 
by local branches of the specialized banks so that they lent within their 
total local lending limits. PBC branches also took the responsibility to 
supervise and control non-bank institutions such as trust and 
investment companies (TICs) over their lending activities. Many of these 
companies were reorganized, merged or closed as a result, reducing the 
total number of TICs significantly. 63 
As monetary and credit policies were being enforced to cool down 
the overheated economy, the center was reexamining the 
decentralization measures that had so far been taken in the financial 
sector. By this time, it was clear to the central state leaders that the 
self-interested financial behavior of the local governments under 
decentralized regulations constituted a major hindrance to the central 
government’s achieving its own macroeconomic and developmental 
objectives. To the central government, the crux of the problem was how 
the tension between the center and the localities can be resolved in favor 
of the overall policy objectives of the state.  
The dominant view held that the chaos and irregularities in the 
financial sector were due to competition nurtured under 
decentralization. State banks were now doing business and competing 
with each other in all economic sectors, their pursuit of economic 
interest in constant conflict with the need of the state plan. To ensure 
effective functioning of the state planning system, this view argued, the 
central bank should exercise tighter control over the specialized banks, 
not only through monetary instruments, but also through reinforced 
                                                 
63 ibid. 
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 administrative means such as credit ceilings and targets. The 
specialized banks should limit their activities within their specialized 
sector and not diversify its business into other economic areas. As state 
banks, they should go beyond their commercial activities to assume the 
responsibility of macroeconomic adjustment, along with the central 
bank.64  
An opposite view also existed among economists and pro-reform 
policy makers who saw the root of the problem as lying in the 
incompleteness of bank commercialization. This view argued for further 
enterprization of the state-owned banks so that they establish an equal 
and cooperative relationship with industrial enterprises whereby banks 
make lending decisions solely on commercial ground rather than 
serving as state-owned enterprises’ welfare provider or extending policy 
loans on behalf of the state. And as commercial banks, SOBs cannot at 
the same time take the primary responsibility for macroeconomic 
control. Instead, the independent authority of the central bank should 
be strengthened, and indirect macro control measures such as deposit 
reserve ratio and rediscount rate should be promoted in lieu of 
administrative directives and guidance. 65  With commercial banks 
turned into modern and independent corporations fully responsible for 
their profits and losses, they would respond appropriately to the central 
bank’s macroeconomic control signals rather than coalescing with local 
governments to over-expand credits.  
                                                 
64 Summarized from discussions with interviewees 1, 2, 5. 
65 See Wu Jinglian in Tam (1995). 
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 Under the conservative political atmosphere in the aftermath of the 
failed price reform of 1988 and the social instability it caused66, the 
second approach did not appear to be a viable option for reformers. 
Even the fundamental strategy of the reform and opening to the outside 
world was questioned and challenged.  Administrative recentralization, 
therefore, prevailed during the retrenchment period. 
The stabilization efforts did curb credit expansion and brought the 
overheated economy down to earth.  The growth rates of industry and 
agriculture dropped to 6.8% and 3.3% respectively and GNP growth 
down to 3.9%.67  Many problems of overheating, such as shortages of 
energy and raw materials, inflation and rising prices, trade deficits, were 
lessened or cured.  
The negative effects of the stabilization program were also evident, 
especially in the financial area. One major symptom of administratively 
enforced macroeconomic control was the so called “hard landing” of the 
economy. Although the central bank had raised savings deposit rates 
and lending rates, enterprise paid little attention to these signals of 
economic contraction and monetary deflation. They continued to build 
their stocks of raw materials and kept on expanding production. When 
banks were finally tied by administrative directives over lending quota 
and ceilings, enterprises suddenly found themselves lacking working 
capital and demand in the market shrinking dramatically. As a result, 
their excess stocks of raw materials and finished goods accumulated, 
                                                 
66 It was widely believed among Chinese scholars that the social turmoil triggered by 
the students’ “democratic movement” in 1989 had its deeper roots in people’s 
discontent with the price reform and its consequences. 
67 World Bank (1990):23. 
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 causing cash-flow problems for these enterprises. This in turn led to 
high levels of arrears between enterprises, between banks and 
enterprises, and between different banks.  Under the circumstances of 
tight money supply, many local governments ordered banks within their 
administrative jurisdiction not to lend to parties outside their own 
regions and asked local enterprises to stop payments on purchases 
made in other regions. Inter-regional arrears and triangle debts 
mounted up. In 1989, arrears in interest and principal payments to 
banks amounted to 6% of the GNP. 68   Another consequence of 
economic hard landing was excess labor force. As factories reduced 
production or closed down temporarily, workers were sent home while 
maintaining their basic wages. SOBs, in turn, had to take over the 
burden of welfare provision for the socialist state, which further 
worsened the banks’ own financial situations. Ultimately, these 
financial losses and burdens would be passed on to the state. 
Moreover, banks also suffered from the conflicts between different 
aspects of the administratively enforced stabilization program. To curb 
inflation, price-indexed deposit rates were enforced to “recall money” 
from the real sector. In the meantime, lending rates were also raised but 
not as much as the deposit rates. Even during the period of economic 
contraction, the state had to keep growth incentives to a certain level to 
and had to support the operations of economically inefficient and 
debt-laden SOEs by extending loans to them at an accessible rate. 
However, as both prices and interest rates were administratively 
determined, the costs of balancing the state’s macroeconomic and 
                                                 
68 Ibid: 25. 
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 developmental objectives had to be borne by the state banks. 69 
Profitability of the banking system was further reduced.  
The stabilization program also depressed the formerly prosperous 
interbank money market. Due to economic contraction and tightened 
money supply, interbank loan transactions decreased sharply.  In the 
first half of 1989, the level of transactions dropped to 70% of the 1988 
level.70 In late 1989, interbank market activities almost ceased across 
the country. Under stringent credit quotas and ceilings, banks withheld 
from lending to other financial institutions even if they had excess funds 
for fear that the latter would not be able to repay the loan.71 
 In the wider economic sphere, the major drawback of the 
administratively enforced stabilization measures was felt in the conflict 
between the sectoral preferences of the credit policies and the regional 
economic dynamics. Unlike the regional differentiated arrangements in 
fiscal and foreign trade areas, credit policies were relatively consistent 
across geographical areas. Lending limits wee set to favor certain 
sectors and ownership forms over others. The result was that 
economically inefficient state-owned enterprises and the basic 
industrial sectors they dominated got the bulk of the total credit 
allocated whereas high growth industries where collectively and 
                                                 
69 Interviewee 5. 
70 Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking (1988; 1989) 
71According to interviewee at the Treasury Department of the BOC headoffice 
(interviewee 3), in standard commercial banking operations, excess funds would not 
be left idling as when they are turned into loans, they can generate income and will 
increase a bank’s earnings. The Chinese specialized banks, however, are state banks 
that are not entirely profit-oriented when making business decisions. Besides, even 
from an economic point of view, when monetary conditions are tight, keeping the 
excess funds would at least be no harm whereas lending them out would possibly end 
up only increasing the bank’s bad loans. 
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 privately owned enterprises populated were substantially cut back on 
credit supply. And this in turn indirectly and unevenly affected the 
growth momentum of different geographical regions.  As state owned 
enterprises and the relevant industrial sectors were concentrated in 
traditional industrial bases such as Shanghai and the Northeast 
provinces, whereas enterprises of new ownership forms such as 
township and village enterprises engaging in the manufacturing of 
processed goods flourished in coastal provinces such as Jiangsu and 
Zhejiang, regions of the latter type were more negatively influenced by 
the tightened credit policy.  A world bank study shows that in 1989 
there was a significant correlation between growth of credit and 
economic growth performance of the preceding six years.72  
In this sense, while the macroeconomic stabilization program cooled 
the overheated economy effectively, it did so almost by killing the engine 
of growth. Meanwhile, although the central government had intended to 
use credit policies as instruments to enforce certain industrial and 
sectoral policies, such an approach ended up further reducing economic 
efficiency, increasing SOE’s dependence upon the state, contributing to 
the problem of non-performing loans that would loom large in the 
1990s. 
 The June 4th Incident of 1989 further distressed the economy as 
tourism incomes and foreign investment declined substantially. Faced 
with the hostile international environment, Chinese political leaders 
adopted a conservative stance in the country’s economic and political 
lives. Possibilities of any bold reforms were not on the immediate 
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 horizon. However, the flip side of the incident was that with the 
legitimacy of the Communist regime more threatened than ever before 
and with the path towards political reforms blocked, the Chinese 
leaders reached the consensus that the “socialist cause” could only be 
sustained through economic growth. As Deng Xiaoping observed in 
1990, “the fundamental factor in maintaining political stability lies in 
sustained economic growth and improvement of people’s living 
standard.” “If the economy grows only at the relatively low speed of 4% 
or 5% per year, after four or five years, there is no guarantee that the 
people will continue to support us.”73  
This reasserted emphasis on growth prepared psychologically and 
politically for ending the austere program and starting a new round of 
development and growth drive. The concern about decentralized 
financial system and its tendency to induce credit-over-expansion paled 
in front of the utmost necessity to maintain a strong growth momentum. 
The stabilization program was formally put to an end after Deng 
Xiaoping made his Southern Tour Speech in 1992, during which he 
called for developing market economy and “socialism with Chinese 
characteristics”. 
 
Towards Banking Liberalization 
The Chinese economy entered another booming period in 1992. 
Soon, all the symptoms of monetary expansion and investment 
                                                 
73 Deng Xiaoping “International Situations and Economic Issues.” 1990. 
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 overheating reappeared. As a major consequence and indicator of 
over-expansion, inflationary pressure was mounting again.74 
In China’ economic circles, the debate about growth as a priority 
and macroeconomic stability was revived. One view, led by renowned 
economist Li Yining, argued that inflation was socially tolerable in a 
high-growth economy whereas a slowdown of the economy would cause 
unemployment, which would in turn result in social instability.75 The 
other view, led by equally renowned economist Wu Jinglian, argued that 
using monetary expansion to solve the difficulties SOEs face will only 
prove to be like “drinking poison to quench thirst” and that maintaining 
low unemployment rate by allowing high inflation rate has already   
been criticized as an erroneous application of the “Philip Curve” in 
Western economist circles76. 
Surrounding this debate were too more straightforward arguments 
about the necessity of actions on overheating. One view held that there 
was no such a thing as “an overheated economy”; the so called 
macroeconomic adjustment would only take the road back to 
centralized control of the pre-reform era. The other view argued against 
it, asserting that a sound macroeconomic control system is 
indispensable to the healthy functioning of a market economy. This view 
also objected to the proposal of a two level macroeconomic control 
                                                 
74 The price of investment items rose by 12.1% in 1992 and by 26.6% in 1993. 
Purchase prices of energy and raw materials rose by 11% and 35.1% in 1992 and 1993 
respectively. Correspondingly, average price of industrial output grew by 24% in 1993. 
Retail prices were rising again, of which increase in production costs accounted for 
70% of the total increase. (Economics Daily, October 24, 1994). 
75 Li Yining, “Jiuye Youxian, Jiangu Wujia Wending (Employment First, Price Stability 
Second)” in Gaige (Reform) (1994): 10-13. 
76 Wu Jinglian “Lun Tonghuopengzhang Zhengce Zhi Bu Kexing. (The inviability of 
inflation policy and the way out)” in ibid: 7-9. 
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 system jointly managed by the center and localities and instead 
emphasized that monetary authority and the power of macro control 
have to be concentrated at the center.77 
Obviously, the pro-expansion view had the backing of economic 
interests at the level of localities whereas the pro-macro control view 
concurred with the central government’s stance on these issues. The 
then premier Zhu Rongji expressed on several occasions that macro 
control was essential to social stability and the success and progress of 
the reform program and that unemployment as an economic and social 
problem can only be tackled by improving the social security net rather 
than by blind-mindedly expanding investment and production. 78 
However, although macro control by tightening credit and money may 
quell the current wave of over-expansion, the root of the problem 
remained: as long as the banking system cannot work independently 
from local governments, soon the central government will again find 
itself forced to expand credit and loosing macro control capabilities, 
unless it resorts to permanent recentralization of credit and monetary 
authority. This latter approach was facing increasingly strong 
opposition as the overall reform and opening up program headed 
onwards. As economist Wu Jinglian observes, as a result of ten years of 
economic development and economic reform, the changes that had 
taken place in the degree of complexity of China’s economy and the 
degree of its diversity were tremendous. It was extremely difficult to 
place one’s hopes in forced administrative methods of control to improve 
                                                 
77 See Tong Dalin (1994); Yu Guangyuan (1994); Xiao Zhuoji (1994); Fan Gang (1994); 
Hu Daiguang Economics Daily (Jingji Ribao) September 2, 1994. 
78 Market (Xiaoshou Shichang), no. 4, 1994. 
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 the situation in the financial sectors, especially if the aim was to fully 
mobilize funds, to have effective resource allocation and thus maintain 
long-term financial stability.79 
The central government realized that to regain effective macro 
control capabilities without compromising long-term developmental 
goals, the key issue to be addressed was the entanglement of the 
banking system with local administrative authorities. As described 
before, such entanglement was seen in two aspects. 
 On the one hand, the authority of the central bank was divided by 
its branches set up in accordance with geographical divisions of 
provincial administrative authorities. At the level of locality, the 
provincial government was the formal representative of public 
ownership and in a sense was the reified state to local economic 
organizations. Obviously, local governments’ agenda were increasingly 
different from the central state as decentralization progressed, their role 
shifting from one of policy enforcer to one of local interest sponsor. Local 
branch of the central bank, supervised by the local government, shared 
this characteristic of a dual-role player. The central state’s effective 
control over credit and money was significantly compromised as a result. 
Every time the center resorted to harsh administrative measures to 
discipline PBC branches, it did so to redress problems already in place 
due to inappropriate expansion of credit forced by the collaborating 
local governments and PBC branches. The country’s macro control and 
economic development activities, therefore, were always caught in a 
vicious cycle and conflicting with each other. 
                                                 
79 Wu Jinglian in Tam (1995). 
 139
 On the other hand, the role of specialized banks was ambiguous and 
confusing. As commercial banks they were supposed to operate as 
commercial organizations rather than as government agents. However, 
as there was no clear distinction between policy loans and commercial 
loans, the specialized banks were extending loans to cater to local 
development priorities. Loan decisions were made neither to reflect 
commercial assessment nor the policy goals of the central state. As 
funds earmarked for agricultural and sideline product procurements 
and for key SOEs or national projects were loaned to enterprises and 
projects that enjoyed local backings, the central state and the PBC 
therefore were forced to expand total credit to cover this funding gap.  
Meanwhile, loans extended to serve local entrepreneurial interests 
included many bad loans and non-performing loans, dragging the whole 
banking system towards insolvency. 
To disentangle the state monetary authority from local economic 
interests and the banking system from local administrative authorities, 
therefore, the central government chose two measures to begin with: the 
separation of policy banking from commercial banking and the building 
of a truly independent central bank.  
The Creation of Policy Banks 
The central government, led by Premier Zhu Rongji, embarked on a 
new round of financial reform in 1993.  One major step was the 
establishment of three policy banks in 1994.  The policy banks are 
“policy-oriented non-profit financial institutions to enforce the country’s 
industrial policy and regional development strategy.” 80 These banks do 
                                                 
80 Interviewee 1, PBC. 
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 not absorb deposits from the general public. Instead, funds were 
supplied to these banks mainly through fiscal appropriation, issuance 
of financial bonds, and loans by the central bank. The banks are 
expected to make lending decision based on overall assessments of 
“national interests” rather than out of consideration of corporate 
interests of the banks. 81 
While the state set up these policy banks to enforce its policy 
objectives in different economic areas, it was far from using policy 
lending as an instrument of credit-based active industrial policy. Indeed, 
the proportion of policy lending makes up a small percent of China’s 
total loans. 82 On the contrary, the main purpose for the establishment 
of the policy banks was to clear the way for further deregulation of the 
Chinese banking system and for fully commercializing the state-owned 
specialized banks. 
                                                 
81 In March 1994, the first policy bank, the State Development Bank, was established. 
Based in Beijing, the bank targeted at policy lending for key national projects. The 
bank was responsible for satisfying the funding needs of key construction projects 
nationwide while at the same time optimizing the total amount and overall structure of 
fixed asset investment. On the other hand, by concentrating the power of lending 
decision over key construction projects in the hands of the State Development Bank, 
the central government intended to avert the situations of duplicated projects and 
repeated investment that frequently happened under a geographically decentralized 
financial system. The second policy bank, China Import and Export Bank, was set up 
in Beijing in July 1994. The bank specializes in providing credits, loans and credit 
guarantees for foreign trade corporations. Its funds mainly came from issuing “policy 
bonds” and through raising funds in international financial markets. The bank was set 
up, in part, to coordinate with the reforms in the foreign trade area by replacing export 
subsidies and import protections with standard international practice such as buyer’s 
credit and seller’s credit. The third policy bank, China Agricultural Development Bank, 
was set up in Beijing in November 1994. The bank established branches all over the 
country to provide funds for the production, procurement, storage and marketing of 
agricultural and sideline products. Its main funding sources included deposits from 
enterprises, PBC loans, fiscal “agricultural supports”, and policy bonds. 
82 By 1998, total policy lending took up about 13% of total loans (Almanac of China’s 
Finance and Banking 1998). 
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 In fact, policy banks were set up largely as responses to existing 
problems caused by the mixture of commercial and policy lending 
rather than as interventionist arms of the state to “pick winners” and 
lead industrial trends. By centralizing the authority of lending decisions 
for national construction projects and agricultural activities, for 
example, the central government sought to rectify the problem of forced 
credit expansion due to the specialized banks’ unrestrained and 
undisciplined lending. Now that commercial banks were no longer 
assigned the tasks of policy lending, they could no longer divert policy 
funds for other purposes and push the center to expand credit beyond 
its original plan. Accordingly, as the credit expansion problem was 
ameliorated, the possibility was also less for the state to use harsh 
administrative measures to cut back the banks’ credit quotas at a later 
stage.83  The separation of policy banking from commercial banking, 
therefore, was a preparatory and necessary step for standardizing the 
Chinese banking system.   
The Building of Central Bank Independence 
The core measures of the new round of financial reform centered 
around the establishment of a truly independent central bank. Since 
the second half of 1997, the PBC took rapid actions to cut off its ties 
with commercial financial institutions and other for-profit economic 
                                                 
83 Of the three policy banks, the China Import and Export Bank appeared to have the 
strongest industrial policy outlook. The bank was set up to “promote the export of 
mechanical and electrical products, especially complete plants and equipment, as well 
as high-tech, high value added products.”  However, this measure was taken in the 
larger context of foreign trade liberalization – the state was trying to remove fiscal 
subsidies and adopt internationally accepted practice of providing credit and loan 
services to importers and exporters. And such services were more to facilitate trading 
activities rather than to actively provide extra incentives for exports. The more 
incentive-based measure was export tax rebates, discussed in Chapter 2. 
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 entities. At the branch level, many local financial institutions such as 
regional banks and trust and investment companies were often 
endorsed by both the local government and the PBC branch. The PBC 
headquarters ordered its branches to sever their ties with such 
institutions and companies so that the bank could focus its efforts on 
financial regulations, monetary control, and the provision of financial 
services to commercial financial institutions. 
The Central Bank Law 
A major step in building an independent central bank was the 
formulation and enforcement of the Central Bank Law, or the Law on 
the People’s Bank of China, effective May 1995. The law has clear 
provisions that separate the central bank from the influence of 
administrative authorities at various levels. Article 7 of the Law on 
PBC provides that  
“PBC shall, under the leadership of the State Council, 
independently implement monetary policies, perform its functions 
and carry out its operations according to law free from any 
intervention by local governments or government departments at all 
levels, public organizations or individuals.” 
Accordingly, the law stipulates that the People’s Bank shall not 
give any overdraw in exceeding financial budget of the government, 
and shall not directly subscribe to or act as sole sales agent for state 
bonds and other government bonds.84 Meanwhile, the PBC must not 
provide loans to local governments, governmental departments of 
various levels, non-bank financial institutions and other 
                                                 
84 The Law on People’s Bank of China, Article 28. 
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 organizations or individuals except to non-bank financial institutions 
specially permitted by the State Council; it must not act as financial 
guarantor for any organization or individual.85 In this way, the PBC is 
expected to acquire the role of an independent and detached 
regulator. 
The emphasis on central bank independence does not mean that the 
central government stayed passively out of banking issues. According to 
the Central Bank Law, the PBC is under the direct leadership of the 
State Council. And in 1995, Zhu Rongji, then Premier of the State 
Council, was also President of the People’s Bank of China. In fact, the 
central government took an active role in ensuring that the PBC is freed 
from the influence of administrative authorities. Since 1994, Zhu Rongji 
laid down the rule for the central government that the government may 
no longer borrow or overdraft from the central bank to cover the 
differences in its fiscal income and expenditures or offset its budget 
deficits.  
The central government also sought to increase PBC independence 
through the reform of its policy-making body. As mentioned before,  the 
PBC’s policy making body until the mid 1990s had been the Board of 
Counselors, consisting of the governor and vice governors of the PBC, 
one deputy minister each from the State Planning Commission, the 
Ministry of Finance, and the State Commission of Economic System 
Reform, and presidents of the SOBs and the People’s Insurance 
Company. The Central Bank Law of 1995 provides that a Monetary 
Policy Commission (MPC) should be established to replace the Board of 
                                                 
85 The Law on People’s Bank of China, Article 29. 
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 Counselors. To help enforce it, the State Council issued the 
“Regulations on the Monetary Policy Commission of the People’s Bank, 
of China” in 1997.  The MPC was composed of governor and 
vice-governors of the PBC, as well as representatives from departments 
and organizations in various economic areas, and one independent 
expert. The SOB chairs were cut from four to two and the People’s 
Insurance Company is no longer represented in the MPC, thereby 
reducing the influence of state-owned financial institutions over central 
bank policy making. And by adding an independent consultant to the 
Commission, the central government strengthened the role of 
professional opinion in PBC’s policy making. The structure and function 
of the MPC were modeled after the Open Market Operation Committee of 
the US Federal Reserves, and the Commission was expected to “advise 
the PBC and the State Council with professional, scientific and objective 
opinions and proposals over monetary policies based upon 
comprehensive analysis of macroeconomic situations.”86 
In terms of the approach to macro control, the central government 
encouraged the PBC to use indirect control and adjustment mechanism.  
The law provides that the ultimate aim of monetary policies is to 
maintain the stability of the value of the currency and thereby promote 
economic growth.87  In the past, the focus of PBC monetary policy had 
been on direct control over credit volume. Under the new law, the PBC 
should instead focus on the control of total money supply in terms of M1. 
Accordingly, the PBC began to mainly rely on monetary instruments 
                                                 
86 Interviewee 1 (PBC) 
87 Law on the People’s Bank of China, Article 3. 
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 rather than administrative directives over credit quotas for macro 
financial control. Instruments such as open market operations, 
discount and rediscount policy were adopted since mid 1990s and their 
business scope expanded over time. Interest rate formation system was 
also improved. The nationally unified interbank market was established 
in 1996, and interest rates were liberalized for the interbank market in 
June of the same year.  
By relying on these indirect control instruments rather than 
resorting to administrative recentralization, the PBC successfully 
assisted the central government in achieving “soft landing” of the 
Chinese economy following the economic overheating of 1992 and 1993. 
In 1998, in the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis, the PBC used 
various monetary instruments such as interest rate, reserves fund, 
open market operations and rediscount to stimulate domestic demand 
so as to keep the momentum of economic growth without devaluate its 
currency. The result was quite successful, indicating that the PBC is 
equipped with the basic ability to regulate the economy and make 
necessary macro adjustment base on indirect control mechanism.88 
Reform of the PBC Institutional Structure 
Although the Central Bank Law and subsequent measures 
strengthened the functional and financial independence of the PBC, the 
problem local governments’ interference in PBC businesses was not 
totally cured. The root of the problem lay in the structure of the PBC 
branches. PBC branches were set up in accordance with the 
administrative jurisdiction of local governments at provincial and 
                                                 
88 Zhao Haikuan and Guo Tianyong (1998: 207) 
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 municipal levels. Inevitably the operations of the PBC branches were 
subject to the influence of local governments, even though legally all the 
ties between the two were severed. At the national conference on 
financial work held in November 1997, a plan was laid out for the 
establishment of PBC branches “across administrative district 
divisions”.  The reform was enforced in late 1998 and at the beginning 
of 1999, the PBC formally abolished its branches at provincial and 
municipal levels and instead set up nine regional branches. 89  In 
provinces where a PBC branch was not present, an office of financial 
supervision and regulation was established to serve as the arm of the 
“cross-district” PBC branch. The main responsibility of such an office 
was to supervise the operations of all PBC sub-branches as well as 
monitor and regulate the activities of all the other financial institutions 
within the jurisdiction of the PBC branch the office is affiliated with.90 
It was desired that with this new organizational structure, the PBC 
would be largely protected from the interference by local governments. 
The reform was also designed to promote regional economic 
                                                 
89 The new branches include Tianjin, covering the city of Tianjin, Hebei and Shanxi 
Provinces and Inner Mongolia; Shenyang, covering Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang 
Provinces; Shanghai, covering the city of Shanghai and Zhejiang and Fujian Provinces; 
Nanjing, covering Jiangsu and Anhui Provinces; Jinan, covering Shangdong and 
Henan Provinces; Wuhan, covering Jiangxi, Hubei, and Hunan Provinces; Ghangzhou, 
covering Guangdong and Hainan Provinces and the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous 
Region; Chengdu, covering Sichuan, Guizhou and Yunan Provinces and Tibet; and 
Xi’an, covering Shaanxi, Gansu, and Qinghai Provinces and Ningxia and Xinjiang. The 
Beijing and Chongqing branches were abolished and their business put under the 
direct control of the PBC headoffice’s Business Department. 
90 Under the new system, there are altogether 20 such offices led by the 9 PBC 
branches, managing 326 “central subbranches” (i.e., subbranches established in 
provincial capitals) and 1827 county level subbranches. When the new branch 
structure was being established, all presidents of PBC branches were reassigned to 
different regions from their original ones and two thirds of cadres in charge of various 
departments of each PBC branch were shuffled across regions. 
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 development and bank efficiency, redressing the problems of “financial 
regionalization” and local protectionism under financial 
decentralization. The decoupling of PBC branches’ jurisdictions from 
the spheres of administrative divisions also strengthened the PBC’s 
ability to supervise and regulate the banking industry and to penalize 
violators of financial laws and regulations when necessary, thereby 
reducing moral hazards in the financial sector.91 
Liberalizing Commercial Banking 
The most critical yet thorny problem in the central government’s 
effort to free the banking system from local government influences was 
the reform of the commercial banking system. The separation of policy 
banking from commercial banking and the strengthening of central 
bank independence removed some key underlying causes for the local 
government interference into banking affairs. Yet to fully disentangle 
the banking system from local administrative authorities and the 
economic interest they endorsed, it was necessary to make the 
commercial banks truly “commercial’. 
The commercial banks, namely the state-owned specialized banks 
and other newly established national and regional banks, as well as 
non-bank financial institutions such as investment and trust 
companies, were at the nexus between the government and market and 
between macroeconomic and microeconomic spheres. Although 
“enterprization” of banks was initiated back in the 1980s, there 
continued to be much confusion over the role and responsibility of 
                                                 
91 Interviewee 5. Also see Zhihao Liu (1998) for an explanation about the state’s plan 
to establish cross-regional PBC divisions. 
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 commercial banks in the 1990s. In fact, prior to 1992, the term 
“commercial banks” were cautiously avoided by Chinese policy makers 
and bankers on official occasions.92 The four major SOBs were called 
“specialized banks”, which emphasized their original role as fund 
providers for particular industrial or economic sectors, although their 
businesses were significantly expanded and diversified during the 
decentralization era. The newly established national banks were called 
“comprehensive banks” rather than “commercial banks”. The choice of 
words reflected central policy makers’ hesitancy to free banks from their 
macroeconomic and developmental functions and let them be fully 
oriented by commercial incentives.   
As interviewees revealed, even after policy banks were established, 
the specialized banks still had to carry out certain government 
entrusted tasks, e.g., making “command plan” loans such as fixed asset 
investment loans, and even “stability and unity” loans to large SOEs. On 
the other hand, the banks were restrained by state plans over total loan 
quotas. These quotas were fixed for each season in line with the state’s 
overall macroeconomic objectives and banks had little freedom to 
modify these artificially determined plans according to actual 
microeconomic and financial situations relevant to the banks 
themselves.93 
These legacies of the planning system imposed upon the SOBs 
many non-commercial responsibilities. And as described before, when 
local administrative authorities called upon the SOBs within their 
                                                 
92 Interviewee 3. 
93 Interviewee 3; interviewee 4. Also see Shen Rui (1996) and Yuan Zhenxing (1996) on 
state-owned commercial banks and their policy loan obligations. 
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 jurisdictions to perform these functions, the result was often 
contradictory to what the central government hoped to achieve: Instead 
of stabilizing the macroeconomic environment, banks were sometimes 
disturbing economic order through improper expansion of credit. And 
rather than helping the state advance its developmental goals, locally 
oriented activities tended to perpetuate the reliance of economically 
inefficient SOEs upon the state banks for welfare and assistance, 
resulting in cumulating non-performing loans for the banks, especially 
the four specialized banks, where more than 90% of the total 
non-performing loans were concentrated.94 
To redress these problems, the central government decided that its 
own expectations of the SOBs needed to be adjusted, i.e., SOBs should 
be profit-maximizers, rather than macroeconomic stabilizers, welfare 
providers or industrial policy promoters. Ironically, only by liberalizing 
the commercial banking sector and disentangling the banking system 
from the government can the central state have more effective macro 
control of the financial and the real sectors. To this end, the central 
government has taken a series of measures of banking deregulation and 
liberalization since the mid 1990s. 
Law on Commercial Banks 
The first step in formally deregulating banks was the new legislation. 
In 1995, the Law on Commercial Banks was passed by the National 
People’s Congress. The law acknowledges that the specialized banks as 
well as the newly established banks engaging in commercial banking 
business are “commercial banks”. The specialized banks, for example, 
                                                 
94 State System Reform Institute (1998): 186. 
 150
 were now called “commercial banks solely owned by the state”. 
Commercial banks were granted the legal person status as enterprises 
vis-à-vis as state institutions in the cases of policy banks and the 
central bank. And as enterprises, commercial banks were expected to 
“independently manage their businesses, shoulder their own risks, be 
responsible for their own profits and losses and follow the principle of 
self-restraint in conducting commercial activities.” Although these 
provisions only spelled out the basics of a standard commercial banking 
system, the law was nonetheless regarded as a cornerstone in China’s 
bank deregulation process. Before the Law on Commercial Banks were 
made and enforced, state banks had many “fathers and mothers in law” 
– government interference in banking business was constant. With the 
new law, at least legally the banks’ independent status is guaranteed.95 
Reform of the Credit and Loan System 
To free the commercial banks from the planning system, the central 
government also decided to change the practice of credit and loan 
management. Previously, the PBC would impose credit and loan quotas 
upon commercial banks according to the “comprehensive credit and 
loan plan” of the PBC. Commercial banks were not allowed to make 
loans beyond the planned volume, unless the PBC reexamined and 
modified the original plan. Such artificial restraint placed upon 
commercial banks not only made it difficult for the banks to mobilize 
funds efficiently, but also had little effect in actually disciplining the 
banks’ credit and loan activities. With bank activities integrated into the 
                                                 
95 Interviewee 4. Also see the PBC’s studies on the Law on Commercial Banks and its 
implications for the commercial banking system. Lijuan Wang (1995), Zheyi Hu (1995a, 
1995b). 
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 state plan, the demarcation between banks and state finance remained 
blurred, which tended to perpetuate banks’ reliance upon the state and 
give rise to irresponsible lending behavior.  
Again, the central government found that to make the banks 
exercise self-restraint over their lending activities, it was necessary to 
relieve them from the artificial restraint currently in place. Starting from 
1998, the PBC removed the control over bank loan quotas. Commercial 
banks were now allowed to determine their loan volumes according to 
their companies’ financial situations, as long as they maintained the 
required level of bank reserves and repaid the loans made from the PBC. 
This does not mean, however, that the banks could lend without 
constraint. As the asset-liability ratio system by then had been 
introduced into bank management, 96  banks were now expected to 
optimize their asset to liability ratios and plan their credit and loan 
activities accordingly.  
Making SOBs “Competitive” 
Whereas new rules and practices were adopted to make commercial 
banks independent legal entities, the SOBs still carried many burdens 
of the past. The most serious problem was the one of non-performing 
loans. According to Chinese official sources by 1994 bad debts of 
Chinese banks totaled RMB 1 billion yuan. 97 By the end of 1995, 
classified loans, namely, past due loans, doubtful loans and bad debt 
                                                 
96 Asset to Liability Ratio Management was experimented among newly established 
national banks such as the Bank of Communications as well as urban credit 
cooperatives in the late 1980s and 1990s. However, the practice was not introduced to 
the four state-owned specialized banks until 1994. 
97 China Daily, January 9, 1995: 4.. 
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 mounted up to nearly one fourth of the four major SOBs’ total loans.98 
The banks’ total liabilities exceeded their total assets, rendering the 
banking system virtually insolvent. Since 1998, the Chinese 
government has attempted a series of measures of bank recapitalization, 
such as setting up asset management companies (AMCs) to take over 
and manage the non-performing loans of the SOBs, directly injecting 
capital into bank assets as well as debt write-offs. All these efforts were 
intended to get the SOBs back on their feet and improve their 
competitiveness under the reformed and liberalizing financial system. 
Even with these measures, however, the bad loan problem remains 
daunting. In 2002, banks’ total “lost loans” amounted to 1.267 trillion 
yuan, whereas total net assets of the four major banks were only 592 
billion yuan.99 
Scholars have pointed out the crux of the problem lies in public 
ownership, which entails ownership issues for both state-owned 
financial institutions and state-owned enterprises – major customers of 
the state banks. This view argues that most of the existing problems in 
the financial sphere today such as the commercial banks’ bending the 
rules and playing games with the central bank, and the lingering SOE 
debt problem could all be ultimately attributed to the simplistic division 
of state-ownership in the reform era. Decentralization and reform only 
increased the number of parties representing public ownership, with 
each party, be it a local government, a state-owned enterprise, or a bank, 
attempting to claim the whole pie. In order for all the efforts taken so far 
                                                 
98 Jinrong Shibao: April 21, 1996: 5. 
99 Li Hua, China Economics Times, December 19, 2003. 
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 to demarcate the boundaries between the government and banking 
institutions to be truly effective, the ownership structure of both the 
SOBs and SOEs should be reformed.100 Although there has been an 
ongoing scholarly debate as to how the “stockization” (i.e., share-issue 
privatization) of SOBs should be operationalized, the central 
government has recently announced the timetable for the four SOBs to 
“go public”: between 2004 and 2007, the four SOBs should complete 
their initial public offerings in a sequence, starting with the China 
Construction Bank, and ending with the Agricultural Bank of China.101  
Again, with a “letting go” strategy, the central government actually 
expects to achieve more effective macro control over the financial 
system.  
 
The Logic of Banking Reform 
Similar to the case of Foreign Trade, banking reform in China 
experienced two major stages: administrative decentralization and 
market-oriented liberalization. This chapter has attempted to look into 
domestic structure changes resulting from decentralized 
decentralization for a possible explanation for the logic of banking 
reform, especially the rationale behind the shift from decentralization to 
liberalization, Specifically, under the decentralized financial system, the 
central state’s policy enforcement capabilities were eroded as local 
governments at the provincial and sub-provincial levels, having 
administrative power over both the local branches of the state’s credit 
                                                 
100  See Zhang Jie (1995), Zheng Jiangang (1997) on ownership structure reform of 
SOBs and adjustment of SOB-SOE relations. 
101 Caijing Shibao, January 12, 2004. 
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 planning body (PBC) and credit issuing organizations (commercial 
banks), oriented them towards serving local economic goals. Such 
institutional dynamics in turn had an unwanted effect upon the 
country’s macroeconomic situations, pushing decentralization strategy 
to a dead end. To get out of the quagmire and regain macro control 
capabilities, the central government found it necessary to deregulate 
and liberalize the banking system so as to separate the banking system 
from the government. With this shift of strategy, the expected role of 
banking has also changed in the eyes and conceptions of Chinese policy 
makers, i.e., from one of development promoter to one means among 
others to raise and mobilize funds in a marketized economy.   
Compared with foreign trade reform, the Chinese government has 
been very cautious with the reform and liberalization of the banking 
system. Resistance to change has also been stronger in the banking 
sector than in the foreign trade sector.  Accordingly, reform progress in 
the banking and finance has been relatively slow. This in the first place 
has to do with the complexity of the task and the special position of 
banking an finance in the Chinese economy during the reform era: 
While the “real economic sector” has largely benefited from the reform 
initiatives and enjoyed exponential growth as a result, the banking 
sector has been the one to bear the “cost of reform”.  When the major 
engine of growth changed from traditional heavy industries to 
export-oriented light and processing industries, for example, many 
state-owned enterprises were on the verge of bankruptcy and layoffs 
became inevitable. The banks, for a long time, had to shoulder some of 
the social burdens resulting from such industry reformation and 
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 restructuring. When the government finally decided that benefits of 
making the banks truly commercial outweighed those of keeping them 
as social welfare providers, the steps of change were also designed 
cautiously and implemented gradually to minimize social 
repercussions. 
Another reason for the gradual and particularly painstaking nature 
of the banking reform as compared with foreign trade reform has to do 
with the pattern of initial decentralization and its ensuing dynamics. In 
foreign trade reform, decentralization was undertaken on a regional 
particularistic basis and accompanied by an increasing number of 
“windows of opening to the outside world”. State monopoly on foreign 
trade was broken as numerous FTCs and export-oriented enterprises of 
a variety of ownerships engaged in foreign trade. The regional dynamics 
played out during the decentralization process created a bandwagon 
effect among the numerous foreign trade enterprises as well as their 
local governmental sponsors to push for greater foreign trade privileges 
and for enlarged windows of “opening up” opportunities, which 
coincided with the state’s determined efforts to marketize and liberalize 
the foreign trade sector.  
In the banking reform, however, initial decentralization was carried 
out without much regional differentiation and in a largely closed 
environment. Although SEZs enjoyed certain privileges with regard to 
interest rate, and the forms of financial institutions they were allowed to 
set up, in the banking sector there was no systematic arrangement 
based on regions like the foreign exchange retention system in the 
foreign trade area. Moreover, although financial authority was 
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 decentralized to the provincial and sub-provincial levels, state monopoly 
over commercial banking remained intact, with the four state-owned 
specialized banks mustering the dominant market power. The result of 
such institutional characteristics was that the bandwagon effect for 
change was largely absent, as banking institutions and local 
governments at various levels were mostly content with taking 
advantage of the existing system. The banking system as a whole, 
therefore, displayed substantial inertia and resistance to change. 
Overall, the reform experience of the banking sector again 
demonstrates that the institutional effects of administrative 
decentralization on the Chinese state’s internal structure provided the 
motivation for the central state to adopt market-conforming reforms. 
The chapter has sought to delineate a political logic of economic 
liberalization from the interactions between the central state, provincial 
governments and the market. The central government’s decisive move to 
liberalize the banking system suggests that the Chinese state was 
capable of moving beyond the political equilibrium of partial reform. 
What guided this move, however, was not the economic law that was 
driving the economy towards its market equilibrium as some author 
suggests. Rather, it was the urge to regain autonomy and control that 
drove the central government to liberalize the sector.
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 CHAPTER FOUR 
THE REPACKAGED IDEOLOGY 
 
The previous two chapters attempt to explain the logic of China’s 
economic reform by looking at the changes of the country’s domestic 
structure under administrative decentralization and their impact on 
state strategy. In many economic areas, the Chinese reform experienced 
a shift from decentralized planning to market-oriented liberalization.  
Apparently, the Chinese state, by allowing economic liberalization to 
happen, has been loosening its grip of the country’s economic activities 
– a sign that usually indicates a state’s retreat in the face of 
international market forces as neoliberal economists would argue. But 
as the cases of foreign trade reform and banking reform suggest, the 
liberalization drive was indeed initiated by the Chinese state and was 
intended to help the state reassert its policy autonomy and thereby 
acquire the ability to effectively regulate the economy and control the 
course of economic development. 
The question remains: How did the Chinese state manage to enforce 
its liberalization strategy in the first place, given its weakened authority 
due to administrative decentralization?  
As the previous chapters have mentioned, the regional 
particularistic decentralization in certain sectors such as the foreign 
trade sector created inter-regional competition and a bandwagon effect 
for further opening up, which could partially explain why the central 
government could rally support for its liberalization measures in such 
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 sectors. 1  However, in other sectors such as finance and 
telecommunications, where decentralization was carried out with less 
regional differentiation, vested interest tended to stick to the status 
quo.2  
It is true that China’s decision to pursue GATT/WTO membership 
was made in a relatively centralized fashion and GATT/WTO issues were 
defined as foreign policy issues, thereby bypassing most of the 
industrial ministries as well as provincial governments. 3  However, 
related to China’s GATT/WTO accession talks were eight years of 
domestic restructuring in both real and financial sectors. While the 
trade negotiations were off-again on-again, largely depending on the 
international situations China was caught in,4 domestic reforms were 
pushed forward without interruption throughout those years in order to 
“meet WTO standard”.5  
What mattered, in fact, was not whether a move on the part of the 
government was sanctioned by particular interest groups, given the 
centralized decision making process in China. Rather, the question was 
how the central government was able to gather enough consensus as to 
                                                 
1 See also David Zweig (2002) and Dali Yang (1997). 
2 See, for example, Mueller and Lovelock (2000), Chen Xiaohong (2000) on telecom 
reform; Mehran and Quntyn (1996), Lardy(1998), On Kit Tam (1995) on financial 
reform.  
3 See Susan Shirk (1994): 73. Susan Shirk was describing the situations related to 
China’s GATT negotiations in early years. My interviews with MOFTEC ministries 
confirmed her observation: When China finally bid for WTO membership, the talks 
continued to be dominated by a few key government agencies. In later years more 
industrial ministerial leaders were included into the discussion. But the whole 
negotiation process was still dominated and coordinated by MOFTEC under the direct 
leadership of the State Council.  
4 For example, the bombing of Chinese embassy in former Yugoslavia led to a 
suspension of the WTO bilateral talks between China and the US. 
5 See Magarinos et al ed. (2002), Jiang Zhuyan (1999),Qian Xiaoan (2000) for the costs 
of entry and domestic adjustments China had to make. 
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 keep its liberalization efforts legitimate and welcomed in the wider 
society despite resistance or opposition from certain groups or factions. 
As Wei-wei Zhang points out, the Chinese economic reform process was 
characterized by ideological controversy. Differences in opinions, 
derived from different ideological orientations, could affect the pace, 
scope, content and nature of economic reforms. 6  Seeking policy 
legitimation and building ideological consensus, therefore, was vital to 
effective policy enforcement. 
An interesting phenomenon to note is that generally speaking, the 
Chinese society demonstrated great enthusiasm over the issue of 
China’s WTO accession during the 1990s. The media painted a rosy 
prospect of the post-WTO life: ordinary citizens would benefit from 
lowered prices of consumer goods and services ranging from 
automobiles and designer clothing to telecommunication services. 
Mainstream economists championed the merits of globalization and 
trade liberalization, propagating concepts such as “efficient allocation of 
resources”, “comparative advantage”, “trickle down effect” whereas 
government officials openly proclaimed that globalization was an 
irreversible trend and that China should embrace this trend to benefit 
from international competition.7   
There were indeed discussions about the challenges looming ahead 
for national industries and agricultural sectors upon China’s WTO 
accession. “The wolf finally comes” was the eye catching title the media 
                                                 
6 Wei-wei Zhang (1996): 1-4. 
7 See for example, Ren Quan (2000); Fan Gang (1999, 2002), Lin Yifu (2000, 2001), 
Yang Fan (2000), Liu Haofeng and Liuyu (2000). 
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 used to describe the oncoming international competition.8 However, it 
appeared that the agreed-upon solution was to “dance with the wolf” 
rather than “fend it off”. 9 
Then was the Chinese society, as it appeared to be, so much 
influenced by neoliberal/neoclassical doctrines that it was ready to 
embrace the neoliberal world of free trade, free capital flow and free 
competition? Apparently, this looks inexplicably true as mainstream 
public opinion was eulogizing the “market mechanism” and 
“participation in international division of labor” and stressing the 
importance of building domestic competitiveness as if China was not a 
developing country and a transition economy with vulnerable domestic 
sectors and an ailing social security net, but a loyal supporter and 
enthusiastic advocate of the “Washington consensus.” 
However, a closer look at the reasons given by the media and 
economists for supporting economic liberalization and China’s WTO 
entry shows that they subtly differ from the neoliberal rationale. 
Underlying liberal doctrines is a fundamental belief in the freedom of 
choice and wealth maximization for individuals. 10  Advocates of 
economic liberalization in China, however, frequently resorted to 
concepts such as national interests and overall national strength to 
justify China’s pursuit of WTO membership.  
                                                 
8 This notion about “the wolf” derives from the ancient fable on false alarms. As there 
were so many ups and downs in China’s GATT/WTO talks, the Chinese people were 
prepared time and again for the challenges they would need to deal with in post-WTO 
world and many times they found it was only false alarm as the agreement didn’t come 
through. Hence the analogy to the wolf’s finally coming as the talks entered into final 
stages with substantive results coming out. 
9 See, for example, Wang Bingcai (1998), Liu Debiao (2000), Chen Yuming et al (2000). 
10 On neoliberalism, see David Harvey (2005), Saad-Filho and Deborah Johnston 
(2005), Noam Chomsky and Robert McChesney (1998). 
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 According to one official analysis of the political and economic 
consequences of China’s joining the WTO, for example, joining the WTO 
will create a benevolent environment for China’s economic development 
by reducing uncertainty in international trade and by allowing China to 
participate in formulating the rules and regulations governing 
international trade. In so doing, the analysis argues, China will be able 
to push for provisions and proposals that are conducive to the country’s 
economic development rather than passively accepting the rules set and 
partly manipulated by big powers. Moreover, by joining international 
competition, China will enhance its “economic standard” and thereby 
improve its economic performance. Finally, further opening the 
economy and joining the WTO will help ameliorate the China threat and 
therefore create a favorable external condition for China’s economic 
development in the next two decades or so.11    
The rationale for economic liberalization, therefore, appeared to be 
more grounded in nationalist considerations than in a commitment to 
neoliberalism. An exploration of the shift in ideological trends in China 
during the reform era and the process of liberalization suggests that the 
Chinese government, in its drive to enforce market-conforming and 
liberalization-oriented reforms, combined neoliberal rhetorics with 
economic nationalist objectives to legitimize its liberalization program 
and facilitate its enforcement.  
 
 
 
                                                 
11 Zou Dongtao, Hua Xiaohong eds. (1999). 
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 Economic Nationalism, Policy Choices, and the Chinese 
Liberalization Drive 
The concept of economic nationalism has often been associated with 
interventionist policies such as protectionist trade and industrial 
policies and an autarkic economic system.12 Recent studies, however, 
suggest that economic liberalization can be pursued for nationalist 
reasons. For example, Derek Hall’s study of liberalization in Japan 
shows that liberalization and deregulation in Japan were often 
motivated by nationalist goals and have to be understood in the context 
of the reform advocates’ perceptions of Japanese national identities. 
Klaus Müller observes that Germany’s adherence to liberal economic 
policies in the postwar period was rooted in the national pride that 
endorsed the establishment of a superior economic model for other 
nations to follow. Eric Helleiner shows that nationalists in Quebec 
support North America monetary union in an attempt to advance 
nationalist agenda for Quebec independence.13 
All these examples show that economic nationalism is not inimical 
to liberalization policies. The question, however, is how economic 
nationalism is related to the policy outcome of economic liberalization. 
Among studies of economic nationalism, one view holds that economic 
nationalism as a national identity has an autonomous explanatory 
power in accounting for economic policy choices.14 Another view treats 
                                                 
12 See, for example, Robert Gilpin (1987);Mancur Olson “Economic Nationalism and 
Economic Progress,” World Economy 10,3(1987);Otto Hieronymi ed. (1980);Peter G 
Peterson (1984)  
13 See Derek Hall, Klaus Müller, Eric Helleiner in Eric Helleiner and Andreas Pickel 
(2005). 
14 See, for example, Rawi Abdelal (2001);Woo-Cumings in Helleiner and Pickel (2005).  
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 economic nationalism as a legitimating tool serving materialist 
purposes, which should be examined as “a form of domestic political 
struggle” and defined as “the attempt to link a particular understanding 
of national identity to certain economic prescriptions, and thus take 
advantage of the legitimating effects that the concept ‘nation” brings 
with it”.15 
Whereas the former approach argues convincingly when a state’s 
economic behavior diverges from the rationalist expectations, it has less 
explanatory power in cases where state behavior is in line with the 
rationalist logic. As for the latter view, the problem, as I see it, is that by 
treating economic nationalism/national identity as a political tool 
whose content is determined by the materialist interests of state or 
social actors that promote such an identity, this view leaves national 
identity so much contested and so instantly constructible that the 
concept of the nation itself becomes hollow and ahistorical. What is the 
point, after all, for state actors or social groups to appeal to the notion of 
“nation” for legitimation of their policy preferences if there is no 
relatively stable and historically constructed national identity to talk 
about in the first place? 
This chapter does not intend to explore any direct causal effect 
between economic nationalism and the policy choice of economic 
liberalization in China. Rather, it explores how economic nationalism 
assisted the central state in enforcing this policy option.  
Economic nationalism as discussed in this study has two analytical 
attributes. First, I define economic nationalism in terms of purpose or 
                                                 
15 Maya Eichler in Hellener and Pickel (2005). 
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 objective. Arguments that associate economic nationalism with 
protectionism and mercantilism tend to understand economic 
nationalism as the ideological advocate of specific policy orientations 
and prescriptions. Yet evidence about nationalism-guided liberalization 
as mentioned above suggests that nationalist pursuit can be served by 
adopting liberal economic policies. Secondly, economic nationalism 
denotes societal objectives rather than state policy goals. As Abdelal 
observes, nationalism differs from statism in that it is an expression of a 
societal identity rather than one of an autonomous state.16 In this sense, 
economic nationalism can be understood as an expression of a common 
objective or purpose of the nation shaped and informed by historical 
memory and experience. It is therefore not the ideological 
representation of any specific economic approaches, but the social 
consensus of orienting economic activities towards enhancing national 
strength. 
In the case of China, the central state decided to liberalize the 
economy in an attempt to reassert state authority and control. To 
legitimize and facilitate this move, the central government tweaked 
neoliberal economic principles to be in line with a nationalist economic 
goal. At the state level, the story is largely rationalist. The central 
government invoked economic nationalism to serve its practical end. 
However, my argument is not entirely one about ideology serving 
materialist purposes, as the content of such an ideology was not 
supplied by the specific context of political struggles over competing 
                                                 
16 Rawi Abdelal (2001): 20.  
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 policy preferences17, but was grounded in the historically constructed 
national identity. Economic nationalism as an expression of a societal 
objective is not single-handedly created and manipulated by 
participants of domestic political struggles driven by materialist motives. 
Rather, it is historically informed and collectively shared by members of 
the society.  
As I will describe in this chapter, during the reform era the Chinese 
government has constantly appealed to economic nationalism to rally 
support for reformist policies. As party conservatives resisted reform 
initiative on the ground of ideological orthodoxies of socialism, the 
reformist government positioned market as a neutral and effective tool 
to promote economic growth, thereby appealing to the nationalist 
aspiration for national glory. Such an ideological repositioning gave the 
concept of “market” a positive connotation. Subsequently, the Chinese 
government presented the liberalization program as an extension of the 
planning vs. market debate and combined the rhetorical power of 
neoliberal economic doctrines and a nationalist end goal to justify its 
liberalization move. In pushing for both the plan-to-market transition 
and economic liberalization, the Chinese government, in an attempt to 
rally popular support for its policy initiatives, chose to adjust the official 
socialist ideology and the neoliberal discourses against the value system 
of economic nationalism. In this sense, economic nationalism, therefore, 
was not the ideological discourse that the Chinese state employed to 
manipulate public opinion, but the social criteria against which 
expedient ideological discourses were to be repackaged.    
                                                 
17 See Maya Eichler in Helleiner and Pickel (2005): 72-74. 
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 In the following sections, I will first examine the historical origins of 
modern Chinese nationalism and explore how economic nationalism 
became the societal basis for policy legitimacy in the reform era. Then I 
will describe how the Chinese government backed the neoliberal 
discourses with a nationalist end goal so as to build the popular basis 
for its liberalization strategy. This process entails two stages. During the 
first stage the Chinese government repositioned the official socialist 
ideology along the economic nationalist line to legitimize the plan to 
market transition. In the second stage the Chinese government 
positioned its liberalization program as a natural extension of the 
plan-to-market transition by exploiting the rhetorical compatibility 
between economic nationalism and neoliberal discourses. 
My investigation of the origins and attributes of modern Chinese 
nationalism is based on a review and analysis of existing literature in 
this regard. And I make the proposition about the economic nationalist 
foundation of China’s liberalization drive on the basis of a review and 
assessment of scholarly comments and media information. A more 
rigorous research strategy would require textual analyses of primary 
material on both the official and societal aspects of ideological 
orientations during the reform era in order to provide adequate and 
solid evidence for the argument, which is lacking in this preliminary 
study. Further study should seek to provide evidence for the proposed 
argument. 
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 Nationalism, Modernization and China’s Economic Reform 
Chinese Nationalism Revisited   
There are various interpretations of Chinese nationalism, its origins and 
its content. 18  But as several China scholars have noted, Chinese 
nationalism was initially a cultural or civilizational identity.19  Chang 
observes that in imperial China, foreigners invaded China only to be 
absorbed and assimilated by the Chinese culture.20 The distinction 
between the Chinese and the foreign was not so much racial-ethnical as 
it was cultural-civilizational. Conquerors like the Manchus had to adopt 
the Confucian state ideology and a whole set of Chinese bureaucratic 
and cultural practices to be able to govern the empire’s vast territories. 
This sense of cultural supremacy and superiority, however, was 
shattered when the Europeans arrived in the 19th century as the 
Chinese found that these Westerners could “be neither pacified, 
deflected nor assimilated”. “They were not only equipped with powerful 
armaments produced by modern industry, but were also convinced of 
their superiority in culture, morality and civilization.”21 To the Chinese, 
                                                 
18 On cultural or civilizational origins of Chinese nationalism, see James Townsend in 
Unger ed. (1996), Maria Hsia Chang (2001: 33-50), Arthur Waldron in Harumi 
Befu(1993: 36-60); on state nationalism or developmental nationalism, see John 
Fitzgerald in Unger, ed. (1996), Maria Hsia Chang (2001: 107-140); on various 
formulations about Chinese nationalism in post-Mao era such as patriotic nationalism, 
assertive nationalism or confidence nationalism, see Maria Hsia Chang (2001: 
175-204), Yongnian Zheng (1999:87-109) Allen Whiting(1983: 913-933), Michel 
Oksenberg (1986-87: 501-523), on new nationalism of the 1990s, see Peter Hays Gries 
(2004: ); on ethnic nationalism, see Dru C. Gladney in Dru C.Gladney ed. 
(1998:106-131), Emily Honig (1992); on the relations between economic openness and 
nationalism, see Wang Gungwu in Unger ed.(1996), Lucian Pye in Unger ed.(1996), 
George T. Crane in Unger ed. (1996); Also see Yongnian Zheng (1999), Dittmer and Kim 
(1993), Lung-Kee Sun (2002) on the formation of Chinese national identity. For 
Chinese scholars studies on Chinese nationalism, see, for example, Yu Zuhua (2001), 
Wang Xiaoming (2002), Zhao Jun (1996). 
19 See Maria Hsia Chang (2001) and Lucian Pye, James Townsend in Unger ed (1996). 
20 Maria Hsia Chang, op.cit : 57 
21 ibid: 58. 
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 therefore, the period of Western domination and conquest between the 
1840s and the 1990s was “a century of humiliation” not only because 
the Chinese territories were lost to and divided among Western imperial 
powers but also because the Sinic culture was marginalized and the 
sinocentric world order was toppled. Meanwhile, as many scholars 
observe, the building of the modern Chinese nation was closely related 
to the process of the old Chinese empire being assimilated into the 
system of modern nation-states. 22 Partly due to this simultaneity of 
state-building and nation-building processes, Chinese nationalism 
generally carried the following distinct characteristics. 
First of all, modern Chinese nationalism tends to regard 
state-building as its major objective. As Vivienne Shue observes, state 
legitimacy in China’s imperial era mainly hinged upon three key factors, 
i.e., “Truth”, “Benevolence” and “Glory”, each representing a set of 
norms and doctrines to maintain social harmony and stability as well as 
the Sinic world order. 23  Although the Qing government arduously 
pursued policies in accordance with the principles of Truth and 
Benevolence, the sheer military and technological backwardness 
vis-à-vis the Westerners rendered the world order centered on Chinese 
cultural superiority impossible to sustain. 24 Shue further observes 
that as a consequence the legitimating ideal of national “glory” 
traditionally understood in terms of civilized behavior and cultural 
florescence was redefined in the more vulgarly material terms of “wealth 
                                                 
22 See, for example, Yongnian Zheng (1999):22-29. 
23 Vivienne Shue in Gries and Rosen (2004: 30-32) 
24 ibid: 32-33. 
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 and power”. 25 The loss of civilizational glory and cultural superiority 
itself, however, was a major blow to the Chinese sharing a common 
cultural identity.  And an immediate source to blame was the 
incompetence of the imperial state. From reformers like Kang Youwei 
and Liang Qichao to revolutionaries such as Sun Yat-Sen all sought to 
strengthen or rebuild the Chinese state in one way or another. Even 
though Sun Yat-Sen’s nationalist proposal of “driving away the 
barbarians and restoring China”26 appeared to be a strong expression 
of ethnic nationalism, his main concern, as observed by John Fitzgerald, 
however, was his fear of the “death of the state”. By launching a 
revolution against the incompetent Manchurian rulers and replacing 
the imperial system with a republic polity, Sun saw a path leading the 
Chinese out of the crisis to avoid becoming “slaves who had lost their 
states” and avert the fate of “the destruction of the race”. Sun even 
equated his own principle of nationalism to the doctrine of the state. 27  
Following Sun Yat-Sen, almost all the revolutionary groups saw it their 
mission to build a strong and competent state and to do so, they 
employed various doctrines and tools, some even resorting to Leninism 
which was antipathetic to nationalism.28 It can be argued, therefore, 
that although modern Chinese nationalism rose in the course of the 
Chinese empire’s clashes with the European states that more than ever 
sharpened the sense of “we-ness” versus “they-ness”, the focus of 
                                                 
25 Ibid: 32-33. 
26 The barbarians here refer to Manchurian rulers of the Qing Dynasty. 
27 John Fitzgerald in Unger (1996: 68-69). 
28 It is in this sense that Mao and the communists were often regarded as nationalists 
in their hearts as although the ideology they upheld championed fraternalism between 
different nations, they never abandoned the idea of a distinctively Chinese nation 
when they set out to create their own state. (Fitzgerald, op.cit: 72).  
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 Chinese nationalism after the fall of the Manchus appeared to be on 
building “internal competence”. To this end, Chinese nationalists like 
Sun Yat-Sen naturally and willingly regarded the advancement of state 
interests as a priority on the nationalist agenda as to them state 
interests were hardly separable from national interests.29  
Related to this, the aspiration to restore past glory is another 
characteristic of modern Chinese nationalism. Wang Gungwu calls this 
restoration nationalism. According to Wang, whereas there are generally 
two terms for types of post-independence nationalisms, “preservation 
and “renewal”, one distinct feature of Chinese nationalism is that it 
combines elements of both preservation and renewal but ties in the faith 
in a glorious past more directly with a vision of a great future. 30 This 
“urge to link future with a more admired past” not only motivated the 
Chinese nationalists to pursue recovery of sovereignty, unification of 
divided territory and national self-respect31, but also led them to seek 
cultural rejuvenation and restoration of Sinic world order.32   
The implications of such nationalist priorities were twofold. One was 
that the Chinese nationalists tend to be utilitarian in pursuing “wealth 
and power” for the nation. In their efforts to modernize and strengthen 
China, nationalists were searching for every possible means – ranging 
from the May 4th Movement’s advocacy of Mr. Science and Mr. 
Democracy to the call for restoring Confucianist ideals in the New Life 
Movement, from proposing total Westernization to introducing the 
                                                 
29 Maria Hisa Chang (2001): 110-112. 
30 Wang Gungwu(1996):7.  
31 See Maria Hsia Chang (2001: 9) 
32 See Tu Wei-ming (1991), Wang Gungwu (1996), Chang Pao-min in Suryadinata 
(2000) for discussions about nationalism and a Sinic world order. 
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 Soviet model. 33  In other words, these efforts were “nationalist” by 
nature not because they stressed a distinct identity based on “the 
realities of the living Chinese mass culture” 34 , but because their 
ultimate purpose was to revive past glory by making China stronger and 
wealthier through modernization. Just as Sun Yat-sen stated, “To drive 
out the bandit remnants and reconstruct China in order to restore the 
order of the Ancients and follow the ways of the West, and thus cause 
myriads of people to be revived and all things to flourish, this is a task 
that fulfils Heaven’s way and meets the wishes of Man.”35 In Sun’s 
account, the revival of the people and restoration of the ancient order 
were to be pursued by following the ways of the West. Again, the 
nationalist goal was stressed here but the means could be un-Chinese.  
The second implication of an obsession with restoring past glory was 
the existence of a globalist element in Chinese nationalism. According to 
Chang Pao-min, the traditional Chinese perception of the world was 
based upon the all-encompassing concept of tian xia.36 The Chinese 
empire as the center of civilization was inclusive of all nations and races 
that were willing to be associated with and socialized into Chinese 
culture and way of life. Modern Chinese nationalism with its emphasis 
on a clearly defined and delineated territorial state distinct from all 
other states emerged only in the second half of the nineteenth century. 
However, the idea of globalism was inherent in the Chinese brand of 
                                                 
33 See Wang Gungwu (1996) and Chang (2001) for descriptions of nationalists efforts 
in the first half of the 20th century.  
34 Lucian W. Pye, op. cit.: 93. 
35 Sun Yat-sen’s letter to Herbert A. Giles in 1896, quoted by Wang Gungwu (1996). 
36 Meaning, under heaven, the world. 
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 nationalism, which led modern China to aspire for a global role for itself 
and strive to regain its cherished status at the center of civilization.37   
Economic Nationalism and the Policy of Reform and Opening to 
the Outside World 
As China struggled out of the Cultural Revolution in the 1970s, 
there was widespread disillusionment with the communist ideals in the 
Chinese society. Although the communist revolution led by Mao was 
sometimes described as a nationalist movement,38 an undeniable fact 
was that the communist party managed to achieve its leadership 
position in the Chinese revolution and consolidated its rule after the 
founding of the People’s Republic by appealing to a foreign ideology. In 
defeating other versions of Chinese nationalism to establish its 
authority and orthodoxy in China, the Chinese communist party 
adopted a selective but essentially hostile approach in treating Chinese 
traditional culture. According to Lucian Pye, the communist party 
turned the traditional Chinese formula of Ti (Essence) – Yong 
(Instruments) inside out. The traditional formula regarded Chinese 
value as Ti and Western technology as Yong. The communist party, 
however, regarded the Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought as the 
essence and some useful elements of the traditional culture (other than 
those bashed and attacked as “feudal legacies”) as the instruments.39 
The result was that a rigid orthodoxy became the core and this core was 
                                                 
37 Chang Pao-min in Leo Suryadinata (2000): 276-293. According to Chang Pao-min, 
China’s aspiration for a global role is based on cultural and moral pursuit rather than 
expansionist ambitions. The term “globalism” (rather than “imperialism”) is used here, 
which denotes integration rather than domination and cultural and moral influence 
rather than territorial expansion. 
38 See Wang Gungwu in Jonathan Unger (1996). 
39 Lucian W. Pye in Jonathan Unger (1996):103-107. 
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 “only the partisan position of a party and hence there was not even a 
pretence that it could be the basis of a nationalism that was more than 
just the slogans of a partisan movement.”40 Therefore, the communist 
party was, on the one hand, claiming that it was the only competent 
force to “save China” and to defend the nation against foreign aggression 
and bullying. On the other hand, its core ideology downplayed or even 
excluded traditional Chinese values rather than preserving them.  
By the end of the 1970s, however, the communist ideal was largely 
shattered as the country emerged from the turmoil and calamities of the 
Cultural Revolution. 41  Externally, China had departed from the 
communist camp to seek strategic relationship with the US. The 
communist movement itself was in decline and the socialist system 
worldwide was entering into crisis. As Wang Gungwu observes, the 
world itself had radically changed during the years when Mao had kept 
the PRC in isolation. By 1979, there was no world revolution to join or to 
return to.42   
In a world of relative capitalist success, the communist party led by 
Deng Xiaoping found a way to reestablish the party’s credibility and its 
popular basis for support by shifting away from the obsession with 
political orthodoxies and class struggles to focus on achieving the Four 
Modernizations.43 As Deng Xiaoping pointed out in 1978 and 1984, the 
                                                 
40 Ibid: 105. 
41 See Alan R. Kluver (1996) for a detailed analysis of the legitimacy crisis the 
communist party state faced in the late 1970s. Also see “Communique of the Third 
Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CPC” Peking Review vol 21, no 52 
(December 1978) for an official assessment of the economic and social problems the 
country was facing in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution. 
42 Wang Gungwu, op.cit: 114-121. 
43 The concept of Four Modernizations (modernizations of industry, agriculture, 
defense, and science and technology) was first put forth by Zhou Enlai in 1965.  
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 major contradiction in contemporary China lay in the gap between low 
productivity and people’s increased demands for consumer goods rather 
than in class struggle; in the end, if socialism could not achieve higher 
productivity than capitalism, the party would not be able to convince 
people of socialism’s superiority over capitalism. Political primacy, 
therefore, should be given to modernization and economic 
development.44  
This new emphasis on economic development not only aligned with 
the Chinese society’s general sentiment for striving for a more normal 
and wealthy life after a decade of political turmoil and sheer economic 
scarcity, but also appealed to the long-cherished goal of pursuing 
national revival among the Chinese people. As Wang Gungwu argues, 
contrary to the conventional interpretation of history, the 1911 
Revolution and the 1949 Revolution should be treated as two parts of 
the same revolution that had originated in the 1890s when Sun Yat-sen 
and his supporters began their quest for restoring China to greatness 
through radical changes. The communist party, with an “alien” Soviet 
ideology, was able to establish itself as the revolutionary leader by 
playing down its revolutionary ideals to be inside the Chinese revolution 
and by including the majority of the Chinese people into its 
revolutionary drive. However, after the founding of the People’s Republic 
and especially after 1956-1957 when Mao launched the anti-rightist 
movement against intellectuals, the revolution that had started to be 
inclusive was becoming more and more exclusive as the majority of the 
Chinese people became objects of ideological education and 
                                                 
44 Deng Xiaoping (1993a):182; (1993b):141. 
 175
 indoctrination rather than active participants of the nationalist 
pursuit.45  
By shifting the focus from “political movements” to “economic 
construction”, Deng Xiaoping and the reformist government were able to 
bring government policy orientation in line with the traditional 
nationalist aspirations. The new modernization drive re-included 
previously alienated social groups, especially the “intellectuals” and 
harnessed social energy for a new round of nation and state building 
through pursuing development. As Fang Ning et al observe, the official 
denouncement of the “Cultural Revolution” and the pronouncement of 
the “four modernizations” as a national goal helped replace the 
“sentiment of disillusionment” with a new sense of mission and 
responsibility for “revitalizing China”. 46   The implications of the 
government’s overriding policy focus on economic development, 
therefore, went beyond the provision of economic welfare. And the drive 
for economic growth was much more than a simple craving for material 
benefits. Economic performance was not merely employed to fill an 
“ideological vacuum”.47 Rather, the new policy orientation enjoyed solid 
social support as it provided a new and promising path towards 
restoring national glory that the revolutions of the early half of the 20th 
century set out to pursue. 
This new emphasis on “economic construction” resonated well with 
the general sentiment in post-Cultural Revolution Chinese society. The 
                                                 
45 Wang Gungwu in Unger (1996): 112-119. 
46 Fang Ning et al (2002): 22-27. 
47 Feng Chen (1996), for example, treats the Chinese government’s emphasis on 
economic performance as purely instrumental and as “a means to redeem what 
ideology failed to achieve”. 
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 policy of reform and opening to the outside world, articulated at the 
Third Plenum of the Eleventh Party’s Congress in 1978, won widespread 
popular support. 48  Since then, giving economic construction the 
“central priority” became the “basic national policy” in the post-Mao era.  
 
Neoliberal Developmentalism: The Nationalist Pursuit of Economic 
Liberalization 
As argued above, the government’s new policy line won popular 
support by appealing to the shared aspiration of the Chinese nation. 
This does not mean, however, that the path was cleared for enforcing 
the government’s reform and opening up strategy. Deng’s approach to 
reform was characterized by pragmatism and a learning-by-doing 
attitude. By stressing “practice as the sole criterion for testing truth”, 
Deng encouraged reforms experiments on the one hand, and avoided 
open theoretical confrontations with ideological orthodoxies on the 
other. “Marxism and Mao Zedong Thought” remained the officially 
sanctioned ideology and the communist party vowed to adhere to the 
socialist road.  
However, as the gap between economic realities and ideological 
orthodoxies widened, disputes between reformers and party 
conservatives were inevitable. More often than not, resistance to reform 
initiatives surfaced in the form of struggles on the ideological front 
rather than as open objections to specific economic policies and 
measures.49 Although the economic landscapes have been completely 
                                                 
48 See Alan R Kluver (1996:48-49) Wang Gungwu in Unger ed. (1996: 120-121) 
49 Feng Chen, op.cit: 4-5. 
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 transformed in the past 25 years, almost every major step in the change 
process involved painstaking political justification and ideological 
rationalization. On the one hand, the Marxist orthodoxies that the 
communist party had always upheld were increasingly challenged by 
the changing economic realities. Reformers found themselves in 
constant need to reinterpret the Marxist doctrines to quell voices of 
suspicion and dissent from “political hardliners” within the communist 
party. On the other hand, as reforms were rolled out, those whose 
interests were touched often resorted to Marxist orthodoxies to question 
and resist changes. Disputes and confrontations on the ideological front, 
therefore, were more than theoretical debates as they involved tensions, 
conflicts and negotiations of political interests in the reform era.50 
Ironically, when it comes to the enforcement of the liberalization 
program, it was the early round of ideological realignment that provided 
the basis and momentum for policy justification.  
As described in the previous chapters, the transition from planned 
economy to market economy entailed two major stages, i.e., 
administrative decentralization and market conforming liberalization. 
Indeed, the latter stage involved two different but interrelated processes 
– marketization and liberalization. China did not open its market as a 
fully developed capitalist economy. Rather, the country was 
experiencing the process of post socialist transition and the one of 
economic liberalization almost simultaneously. “Marketization” entailed 
the establishment of a market system as the country converted its 
planned economic system into a market-oriented one. “Liberalization”, 
                                                 
50 Wei-wei Zhang (1996): 134-152. 
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 on the other hand, primarily concerned the choice of economic models 
under a market system. In theory, these two processes required 
different policy justifications. As economist Wu Jinglian notes, the most 
critical task of marketization was the establishment of the price 
mechanism whereby price was to be determined by supply and demand 
rather than by plans and targets.51 The major obstacle to such a shift, 
however, stemmed from the Marxist-Leninism orthodoxies that 
regarded economic planning as a defining characteristic of socialism 
and “market mechanism” as an attribute of capitalism. Liberalization, 
on the other hand, was a policy issue faced by market economies 
worldwide and the choice here was largely between economic efficiency 
and social equity.  
To induce and legitimize the marketization move, Deng Xiaoping 
positioned “market mechanism” as a neutral economic method that 
could be applied to both the socialist and the capitalist systems. By 
invoking the “criterion of productive forces” to judge whether a reform 
measure or approach is conducive to the development of socialism or 
not, Deng appealed to the economic nationalist logic of seeking 
economic growth by whatever means available and effective. In this way, 
“market”, although portrayed as “a neutral economic tool”, acquired 
positive connotations as the nation favored development and progress 
over orthodoxies and dogmas.  
The popular preference of “market” over “plan” aided the policy 
justification process of the liberalization drive, although in this latter 
case, the crux of the problem was not between plan and market but 
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 between a free market approach and a more protectionist and 
welfare-based approach. In enforcing the liberalization measures and 
pushing for the country’s WTO accession, the Chinese government 
extended the logic of the previous round of policy justification to the 
current round, positioning economic liberalization as an effective means 
to achieve economic growth. Given the nationwide enthusiasm towards 
building a market economic system, the audience were receptive to the 
neoliberal economic argument that carried an overriding emphasis on 
market and treated economic liberalization as a necessary step in the 
transition from the planned economy to the market economy. The 
rhetorical power of the neoliberal discourses, however, was grounded in 
the nationalist aspiration for a powerful comeback onto the “world 
stage” rather than in a commitment to liberal principles such as 
freedom of choice and wealth maximization for individuals. 
Socialism, Capitalism and the Market Economy 
Before the mid 1990s, the most disputed theme was the one of 
socialism vs. capitalism. As to what constitutes socialism, the 
traditional and “orthodox” view in China focused on three “fundamental 
characteristics”, namely, public ownership, distribution according to 
work, and proletarian dictatorship.52 In the pre-reform era, these three 
characteristics were embodied in state control over the national 
economy, egalitarian income distribution system and preeminent status 
of workers and peasants in the society.  
The reform initiatives challenged the status quo on these fronts. As 
the reforms were carried out on an experimental and particularistic 
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 basis, the new tagline was “let part of the population get rich first”. The 
egalitarian distribution system was disturbed not only at the 
individual’s income level where “more work, more remuneration” was 
replacing “distributional equality”, but also at the regional level as 
profit-sharing scheme between the center and localities favored certain 
regions over others.  
In the meantime, as the central state loosened its grip on regional 
economies and introduced certain market elements into the 
decentralized economy, the old rigid planning system was partially 
transformed and state monopoly in many economic sectors broken. The 
effects of such changes were mixed. On the one hand, the new measures, 
by providing incentives to individuals, enterprises and local 
governments through profit-sharing, instilled vigor into the economy 
and geared it towards high growth. On the other hand, the loosening of 
state control over economic planning, the new and growing market 
elements, as well as the entry of non-state actors in economic activities 
were obvious deviations from the orthodox socialist model as perceived 
by traditional views. Although these phenomena and practices were 
deliberately introduced by the government under the principle of 
“feeling for the stones when crossing the river”, they lacked theoretical 
endorsement. When problems and difficulties arose in the course of 
decentralization, as described in previous chapters, such “deviations 
from Marxist principles” often became targets of blame and those 
opposing the reform measures tended to argue for the reversal of the 
practices in order to maintain loyalty to the socialist cause.    
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 Such ideological confrontations grew particularly salient when the 
reform efforts encountered bottlenecks towards the end of the 1980s. As 
domestic price reforms failed and caused inflation, run on banks and 
social instability and international environment turned hostile due to 
the June 4th incident, the policy of reform and opening up was facing 
mounting pressure. The conservative view attributed the turmoil in the 
country’s economic and political scenes to the revisions that reform 
initiatives had done to Marxist-Leninist classics: On the political front, 
this view accused, the opening up policy resulted in the invasion and 
infiltration of bourgeois thoughts, which in turn undermined the 
foundation of socialism – the proletarian rule; in the economic sphere, 
the conservatives pointed fingers at the loosening of the planning 
authority during decentralization for the chaos and disorder in 
economic life, although the reforms during this period was hardly 
market-driven. In fact, as “planned economy” was considered one of the 
key features of socialism, the Chinese government carefully avoided the 
word and “market” and instead crafted the phrase “the planned 
commodity economy” to introduce elements of “prices and markets” in 
its effort to enforce its economic strategy of “revitalizing the domestic 
economy and opening to the outside world”.53 Yet maintaining the 
planning mechanism was generally believed to be essential to adhering 
to the socialist road. Market, on the other hand, was regarded as a 
feature of the capitalist system. Accordingly, price and market 
mechanism that had been introduced by the reform, albeit in a primitive 
                                                 
53 Resolution of the 3rd Plenary Session of the 12th National Congress of the CPC.  
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 form and distorted manner, was suspiciously capitalist in the eyes of 
communist conservatives.  
In late 1989, the country entered a period of “rectifying (economic 
environment) and straightening out (economic order)”. The bold 
measures of price reforms that had been tried out since 1988 were 
suspended and price caps were enforced by administrative orders on 
consumer necessities and major production materials.54   Although 
these measures helped the central government curb the surging 
inflation and thereby restore social stability, they also signaled a retreat 
from the experiment with the “market mechanism”. The entire reform 
program was on the verge of being rolled back in the name of adhering to 
the socialist road.55 
The situation was only reversed when Deng Xiaoping made his 
Southern Tour Speech in 1992. In this speech, the term “socialist 
market economy” was formally adopted. 56 According to Deng, plan and 
market are both methods of resource allocation and are not defining 
features of a country’s social system. “Planned economy is not 
necessarily socialist whereas market economy is not necessarily 
capitalist. They are both economic method…Whether there is more 
‘plan’ or ‘market’ in our economy should be not be our concern. And 
plan need not dominate the economic scene.”57 
                                                 
54 State Council “Decision on strengthening management and control over price rises.” 
October 1989 
55 Ma Licheng and Ling Zhijun (1998): Chapter 5. 
56 It was in 1979 that Xiaoping first used the term “socialism market economy” when 
he met with American and Canadian visitors. Then he was using the term to 
emphasize the necessity of learning from capitalist countries without changing the 
socialist nature of the country’s political system. 
57 Deng Xiaoping, Southern Tour Speech, 1992. 
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 Deng’s comments on plan and market de-linked the choice of plan 
or market with the country’s social system and established a new rule 
for the reform era, i.e., no more questioning on whether a reform 
measure is socialist or capitalist by nature. His theorizing about plan 
and market as politically neutral economic methods provided new 
discourses for pushing the Chinese reform forward in the 1990s. 
Before the Southern Tour Speech, the official discourse for 
economic reform was partially defined and confined by the so called 
“bird cage theory” advanced by communist veteran Chen Yun. 
According to Chen, revitalization of the economy should be guided by 
planning. And “this is analogous to the bird and the cage. One cannot 
always hold the bird in one’s hand and will have to let it fly someday. 
However, it should only be allowed to fly inside the cage. Without the 
cage, the bird will fly away and never come back.”58 This means that 
“while the market mechanism is employed to revitalize the economy, it 
should only play its due role as allowed by the plan”. 59 By 1992, reform 
measures had been carried out largely in consistence with this 
philosophy. The dual track economic system that was introduced 
during this period was in a sense a natural but unintended result of this 
kind of thinking. On the one hand, market was only allowed to play its 
part in the above-plan portion of the economy. Not only were the sectors 
and industries where market mechanism was introduced determined by 
plan, for the same product there was also artificial dichotomy of the 
“normal price” and “bargained price”, with the former set by plan and 
                                                 
58 Chen Yun(1995): 320. 
59 Ibid. 
 184
 the latter determined by actual supply and demand in the limited 
market sphere. 60   On the other hand, the dual track system, by 
introducing market incentives into a planned system, diverted 
resources significantly from projects and sectors under state plan. As 
reforms went on, negative effects of the dual-track system increasingly 
manifested themselves in the country’s economic life, such as the 
deterioration of the central government’s fiscal situation due to heavy 
subsidy to keep down the “normal price”, shortage and inflation due to 
oversupply of money and surging demand under the distorted price 
system, as well as corruption arising from the opportunities to make 
profits by selling across the two price tracks.61  
As efforts to “unify commodity prices” failed and caused consumer 
panics and run on banks in the late 1980s, pressure was up for 
abolishing the dual-track system. Without a proper theory to justify a 
market-conforming approach to economic reforms, however, the 
conservative forces were quick to blame the market portion of the 
dual-track system for causing chaos in the country’s economic life. As a 
result, attempts to merge tracks in the late 1980s and the early 1990s 
resorted to the old planning mechanism. For example, in 1989 and 1991, 
the central government decided to merge the two price tracks for 
important production materials such as rubber and cement. The 
initiative, however, stipulated a fixed price for all factories producing 
such materials.62 The rights to set and adjust prices that enterprises 
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 had just gained recently were revoked. The old practice under the 
planning system was reinforced. 
In retrospect, Chinese economists regard such “merging track” 
efforts as a setback for the policy of reform and opening up.63 Under the 
mixed price system of the 1980s, the general tendency was towards 
loosening control over price regulations and empowering enterprises in 
setting prices. The merging track measures refocused the government’s 
efforts on regulation and control by administrative means. The 
economic reality after a decade of reform, however, was getting too 
complex for the planned track to handle. Usually, it took around half a 
year for a decision regarding a price change to be evaluated and made at 
the central planning level and then passed on through different 
departments to be finally enforced in the “market”, which was too slow 
to react to price changes in the international market and increasingly 
unfeasible as the Chinese economy became more and more 
internationalized.64 
At the beginning of the 1990s, therefore, there was the practical 
need for marketizing the price system. However, as the process of 
marketization would inevitably involve a whole series of reforms that 
would challenge the established notion of socialism, such a practical 
need could not be addressed properly due to political pressure and a 
more conservative approach was adopted to re-control price and market 
with central planning in the name of “deepening reform and 
straightening out economic order”.  
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 Deng’s southern tour speech cleared the way for the needed reform 
by positioning “market” and “plan” purely as economic methods rather 
than as the defining features of socialism. This new argument became 
official discourse at the Communist Party’s Fourth National Conference 
in 1992. The Conference formally announced that the objective of 
economic reform was to set up a socialist market system. For the first 
time “market” took the place of “planned commodity economy” or “a 
system where planning is aligned with market” to become the desired 
foundation for economic activities. Being treated as an economic 
approach, “market” was no longer a fundamental part of the social 
system and therefore was able to avoid being the target of attack in 
future disputes regarding socialism vs. capitalism. 
Apparently, there was still a strong association between socialism 
and market in official discourses as embodied in the term “socialist 
market system”. However, Deng’s speech had also, to a great extent, 
redefined “socialism” itself. According to Deng, the three fundamental 
objectives of socialism were: 1) liberate and develop productive forces; 2) 
eliminate exploitation and narrow the difference between the rich and 
the poor 3) achieve common prosperity. Of these three tasks, however, 
the first one was the basis for realizing the other two. “Only when the 
productive forces are liberated through reform can the latter two be 
realized.”65 This argument was soon propagated as “the New View on 
Socialism”. In this view, the traditional definition of socialism that 
regards public ownership, remuneration according to work and 
proletarian rule as the three pillars of socialism has one critical 
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 drawback, i.e., it overlooked the elements of productive forces and 
common prosperity. 66  These two elements should indeed be the 
fundamental characteristics of socialism whereas the three pillars 
should be means with which to attain the two fundamental 
characteristics.67 In this way, enhancing productive forces became the 
first and foremost task of socialism as it was the prerequisite to 
achieving common prosperity. And when the “means” do not fit the ends, 
it would be legitimate for policy makers to undertake proper reforms in 
these areas or even seek alternative means.68 
When it comes to “market”, therefore, the emphasis was more on 
market as a competent approach to enhance productive forces rather 
than on the socialist nature of the market system. Accordingly, 
although “market” was positioned as a neutral economic tool, it began to 
have a positive connotation and almost became a symbol for the policy 
of reform and opening up.  
Despite accusations from communist leftists that the overriding 
focus on economic growth was turning the communist party into “a 
party of productive forces” , Deng’s new definition of socialism and his 
endorsement of the market system were well-received by the wider 
society. It was suddenly a fashion for workers, professionals and even 
civil servants to engage in moonlighting, usually various sorts of trading 
activities in commodity markets.69 Some bureaucrats even resigned 
from their posts to “jump into the sea (of business)”. In other cases, 
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 government agencies at various levels set up their own “subordinate 
companies”; many of them spun off to become profit-seeking economic 
entities.70 By June 1992, the total number of companies nationwide 
increased by more than 20% over the previous year.71 It appeared that 
the whole nation demonstrated great enthusiasm and motivation 
towards the cause of “building the socialist market system” that Deng 
and the central government decided to pursue. According to Wei-wei 
Zhang, the business fervor unleashed by the new campaign for building 
a market economy was less driven by profit-seeking impulses than by 
renewed support for the policy of reform that the government had 
initiated more than a decade ago. In the aftermath of the June 4th 
Incident, the delinkage of market from capitalism and the emphasis on 
developing productive forces signaled to the Chinese people that the 
government under the strategic leadership of Deng Xiaoping by no 
means wanted to roll back the reform program and to restore the 
political and economic order of the Maoist era.72 As Wei-wei Zhang 
argues, Deng’s talks contributed to a reconciliation between the regime 
and the society after the Tiananmen Crisis.73 If the social turmoil in the 
late 1980s in part reflected a surging desire among the Chinese people 
to pursue the May 4th spirit of political freedom, 74  the post-1989 
Chinese society gained a more realistic assessment of the need for the 
country’s stability and refocused energy on the other goal of the May 4th 
Movement, i.e., economic modernization. Previous dissatisfaction with 
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 problems and evils that had manifested themselves in the reform 
process was now redirected towards the conservative attempt to revert 
the course of reform in the name of keeping the socialist road. The 
support for the government’s position on the question of reform was 
therefore translated into enthusiasm towards the market. “Market” 
almost became a synonym for reform, progress and development.75 
Development through Liberalization: An Economic Nationalist 
Agenda 
The politicization of the market prepared socially for the new round 
of economic liberalization. As the Chinese economy entered into a new 
round of high growth, problems intrinsic to the decentralized planning 
system resurfaced. The economy was overheated due to overly high and 
repeated investments in capital construction and industrial projects 
across the nation. Raw materials were in shortage and inflationary 
pressure was mounting. Instead of ordering factories to stop or reduce 
production through administrative directives, the central government 
determined to achieve “soft landing” by conducting macro adjustment of 
the market. As mentioned in the previous chapters, the central 
government sought to straighten out economic order and attain macro 
control through market-confirming economic liberalization. 
Surrounding China’s accelerated efforts on its GATT/WTO 
accession, a series of domestic reforms were underway in the 1990s. 
Although these reforms were being carried out under the overarching 
theme of building socialist market system, the problem went beyond a 
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 choice between market and planning. Rather, it was a matter of 
choosing between different market models. As the country’s economy 
was further opening up under the liberalization program, issues and 
problems that had been carefully avoided in previous rounds of reform 
were now waiting to be addressed. The reform of SOEs was facing a 
bottleneck as measures that were based on the existing ownership 
structure such as the contract responsibility system proved inadequate 
to help SOEs improve their efficiency and achieve financial turnarounds. 
As competitive pressure from the international market, reform of the 
SOEs was inevitably moving towards the sensitive area of changing 
ownership structure.76 Consequentially social issues such as worker 
layoffs and inadequate social welfare provisions became increasingly 
acute. The tension between economic efficiency and social justice that 
had been once regarded as the “fundamental problem” of capitalism was 
now manifesting itself in the Chinese society.  
Given the central government’s policy priorities in the 1990s, 
maintaining high-speed economic growth and enforcing 
market-conforming reforms were pursued in preference to equality and 
social fairness.77 Up until the early 1990s, the Chinese government had 
adopted a partial approach towards economic reform. Changes were 
carried out on an experimental or “above target” basis and overall such 
changes created positive spillover effects in the society and generated 
popular support for the reform program.78 The liberalization program of 
the 1990s, however, would inevitably create losers as major economic 
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 sectors experienced painful restructuring and adjustment. The 
challenge for the central government was how to rally support for this 
new drive in order to attain the policy goal of regaining macro control. 
The Chinese government found rhetorical justification for the new 
program in neoliberal economic doctrines. The previous planning vs. 
market debate had successfully positioned “market” as a pro-reform 
and pro-development concept. The country’s quick reaction to Deng’s 
Southern Tour Speech and the new business wave and growth spiral 
nationwide signified the Chinese people’s great enthusiasm towards 
building a market system. The central government wasted no time in 
harnessing such energy to help carry its liberalization strategy forward, 
although “market” in the new context was in fact not only distinguished 
from the old planning system, but also associated specifically with the 
open and laissez faire form of market economy. As “new leftist” scholar 
Han Deqiang observes, the mainstream economic discourse of the 
1990s was one of market romanticism; state policy championed free 
competition and the media were selling hard the concepts of the 
“invisible hand” and “comparative advantage”. 79  Such neoclassical 
rhetoric, however, was woven into a more familiar argument about 
building the country’s glorious future through maintaining high-speed 
economic growth. Although the Chinese government’s remedies for 
structural problems in the Chinese economy were neoliberal by nature, 
the rhetorical emphasis was less on economic freedom and individual 
choice than on how such solutions could improve economic efficiency, 
thereby enhancing economic growth for the nation. Liberal 
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 prescriptions were aligned with nationalist goals to provide backings 
and justifications for the liberalization drive. 
Neoliberal Discourses and Chinese Government’s Policy Goals   
As an economic doctrine and the foundation of economic policies, 
and sometimes equated with neoclassical economics, neoliberalism has 
become widespread in the past 30 years or so. Consistent with classical 
libertarian thinking, neoliberalism champions the rule of the market 
and free trade. And as a modern laissez faire economic theory, it rejects 
the statist liberalism’s argument for extensive state regulation and 
selective intervention in a capitalist economy.80 Reflected in economic 
policies, these theoretical tenets endorse free competition through 
deregulation, privatization and reducing social safety net for the poor as 
well as free capital flow across national borders.  
Apparently, as a late developing country in catch-up mode, China 
appears to be a least likely advocate of the neoliberal doctrines. A closer 
look at the main tenets of neoliberalism and the Chinese government’s 
reform agenda in the 1990s, however may help explain the apparent 
anomaly as to why China willingly adopted the discourses of “the rich”. 
The following table compares the major elements of the neoliberal 
argument and the priorities of the Chinese government in the 1990s, 
when administrative decentralization weakened the authority of the 
central state and the central government needed to play the market 
against economic irregularities created by decentralized planning.  
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 Table 4.1: Neoliberal Discourses and State Policy Goals 
 
Neoliberal views Chinese state’s  policy priorities 
Economic growth as measured 
by changes in real GDP is given 
priority over other 
socioeconomic issues 
Promoting and maintaining 
economic growth as the primary 
task. 
Free market approach is 
imperative to improving 
economic efficiency – 
deregulation is needed; 
government intervention in the 
economy should be minimal.  
Building a market system to 
eliminate “economic 
irregularities” resulting from 
decentralized planning.  
An open trade system is 
essential to healthy economic 
growth. 
Promoting export-oriented 
“outward looking” economy. 
Competitiveness-building 
should be stressed over social 
welfare provision; social justice 
will ultimately be achieved 
through the trickle-down effect 
of economic growth.  
Reforming state-owned 
enterprise; breaking the “iron 
bowl”; making enterprises 
economic entities responsible 
for their own profits and losses. 
Free capital flow improves 
economic efficiency and is 
conducive to economic growth. 
Reforming the banking system 
and building capital markets. 
Privatization of state assets is 
necessary for the healthy 
functioning of a laissez faire 
market economy 
Ownership reform as an 
alternative to the “contracting 
system” under decentralization. 
 
To the Chinese central policy makers, the decision to liberalize the 
economy not only involved lowing tariffs and opening domestic sectors, 
but also entailed a series of domestic reforms such as ownership reform 
and social security reform. As mentioned before, the previous stage of 
reform under decentralization was considered as a period of “reform 
without losers”. Market experiments were made in limited geographical 
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 areas and in the above-plan portion of the economy. The Chinese people 
were able to taste “the sweetness of the market” while continuing to 
enjoy the benefits and welfare provided by the planning system. The 
move to liberalize the economy, however, created a dilemma for the 
Chinese government. On the one hand, further opening up of the 
economy would inevitably expose Chinese domestic sectors to foreign 
competition, which, in turn, called upon the government to ameliorate 
the shock by building a competent social safety net. On the other hand, 
liberalization of a transition economy required a fundamental 
restructuring of the state sector and the abolishment of many 
socioeconomic practices under the planning system. To many Chinese 
enterprises and individuals, this meant the removal of the shelter and 
protection that the socialist planning system had provided.  
Independent scholar He Qinglian observes, reforms after 1992 
followed the path of “efficiency first”. As part of the market-conforming 
reforms in major economic sectors, the Chinese government pushed for 
“stockization” (share-issue privatization) of state-owned enterprises and 
privatization of state assets to solve the efficiency problem that was 
fundamental to the planned economic system. These moves, however, 
caused more and more “members of the society” to bear the ever 
increasing costs of the reform.81  
As the table shows, the central government’s reform priorities, in 
many aspects, matched neoliberal economic doctrines at the rhetorical 
level. As Deng Xiaoping noted in 1992 that without market economy, 
competition, comparison and exchange (among countries), science, 
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 technology and products would remain underdeveloped, which will in 
turn adversely affect consumption and trade.82 He called for market 
reforms “at a bolder and faster pace”. Accordingly, 
neoclassical/neoliberal economic arguments to a large extent became 
the mainstream discourses in the Chinese political and economic circles 
in the 1990s. Han Deqiang observes that during the course of reform 
and opening up, classical and neo-classical economics were 
increasingly gaining voice in officially endorsed policy debates.83 Into 
the 1990s, “competition and capital became the key words of economic 
reform. State policy was increasingly justified and guided by the logic of 
free competition, and the WTO became the media’s favorite.”84 As a 
self-proclaimed “new-leftist”, Han sees the root cause for such an 
orientation in policy and public opinion as lying in government officials 
and mainstream economists’ worship of Western economic theories that 
started with Adam Smith’s free trade to neoliberal economic 
globalization. According to Han, “the majority of the Chinese economists 
were enthusiastic followers of Adam Smith and Milton Friedman’s 
economic theories. Government officials of all levels were trained with 
the ‘Smith dogma’ and therefore unconditionally believed in free trade 
and market economy. Neoliberalism advocated by multinational 
corporations dominated the academic circle and shaped public opinion, 
whereas reformers in the central government were eager to copy the 
American example in every aspect, from setting up “second board” 
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 financial market to deregulating and disintegrating the 
telecommunication industry.”85   
Whereas Han and other new-leftists portray market-conforming 
liberalization of the 1990s as a result of ideological transformation, the 
actual process only partially complied with their observation.  
A closer look at the liberalization process suggests that the 
free-market fervor as described by the new-leftists was largely a 
managed effort on the part of the Chinese government to facilitate the 
enforcement of its reform measures. Rather than being swept over by 
the neoliberal doctrines, policymakers in the central government only 
selectively employed neoliberal rhetorics to support and justify their 
policy choices in the 1990s. First of all, the Chinese leaders tended to 
stress the elements of “efficiency” and “growth” that were associated 
with the neoliberal proposal while downplaying “freedom of choice” 
borne with the liberal arguments. At the operational level, neoliberal 
economic principles were cited to rationalize the government’s strategic 
moves in liberalizing the economy. But the end goal of following 
neoliberal prescriptions was carefully formulated as enhancing national 
strength and glory. 
For example, as China accelerated its trade and investment 
liberalization in the wake of its failed attempt to access the WTO in 1995, 
oppositions in the academic circle warned against the “uncurbed inflow 
of foreign investment and uncontrolled trade opening up”, which, 
according to them, would lead to the dominance of the Chinese market 
                                                 
85 ibid; Han sees Smith and Friedman’s theories as the foundations of the neoliberal 
thinking. 
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 by Western corporations and impose the “American rules of the game” 
upon the Chinese market and national industries.86  As an official 
response, the People’s Daily carried a series of articles to defend the 
government’s reform measures and emphasize the necessity of further 
opening up the economy. The arguments, for the most parts, were 
reminiscent of the IMF or World Bank view on free flow of trade and 
investment. Investment by multinational corporations on a large and 
systematic scale, it was argued, would promote market competition and 
push Chinese companies towards building truly competitive brands, 
and in turn would strengthen domestic enterprises in the long run.87 
Foreign investment’s participation in the Chinese economy through 
joint venture not only brought in capital but also technological and 
managerial know-how, which would be conducive to endogenous 
innovation of Chinese companies and the competitiveness of SOEs.88 It 
remained an important strategic task, therefore, to further improve the 
environment and conditions for foreign investment, standardize market 
rules and foster fair competition.89  
The ultimate justification of these arguments, however, rested upon 
the claim that the liberalization measures were indispensable to 
attaining the goal of modernizing China. In supporting lowered barriers 
for foreign consumer products, for example, a People’s Daily article cited 
the examples of successful joint ventures between China and Western 
companies and argued that such cooperations helped create powerful 
                                                 
86 See, for example, Yu Quanyu(1996), Zhou Chunguan (1996), Wang Luolin (1996). 
87 Gong Wen, People’s Daily (09/05/1996) 
88 Jiang Xiaojuan, People’s Daily (09/21/1996) 
89 People’s Daily (07/14/1997) 
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 brands for their respective industries and therefore would enhance 
China’s overall national strength in the long run.90  “In the world today 
there are no strictly domestic or foreign markets. Entry of foreign 
companies in the domestic markets may cause some domestic 
enterprises to lose market share or even exit the market. However, this 
will strengthen the competitiveness of Chinese industries as a whole, 
which, in the long run, will allow products “made in China” to thrive in 
the international markets.”91 Echoing such an argument, Long Yongtu, 
Deputy Minister of MOFTEC, chief-negotiator of China’s WTO accession 
talks, commented on several occasions, positioning China’s entry to the 
WTO as a necessary step for the country’s comeback to the “world stage” 
with enhanced economic capacity.92  The neoliberal justification for 
economic openness, therefore, was carefully combined with a common 
aspiration for national glory to persuade the audience.  
More illustrative of this utilitarian and selective employment of 
neoliberal discourses was the Chinese government’s changed policy 
tone in the early 2000s under the new leadership of Hu Jintao and Wen 
Jiabao. In the post-WTO era, the Chinese government, on the one hand, 
continued to pursue all-round market-conforming reforms in 
accordance with the WTO arrangement, on the other hand, the new 
government began to give more emphasis to the social issues and 
problems that came along with the liberalization process. At the 3rd 
Plenary Session of the 16th CPC Central Committee, Hu Jintao declared 
                                                 
90 People’s Daily (09/05/1996) 
91 Ibid. 
92 Economics Daily (10/12/1997); Xinhua News Agency 2001; also see Chen Jiyong 
(1999). 
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 that the government was committed to pursuing a development strategy 
that was “human-oriented”. With this commitment, the government 
pledged to go beyond a mere concern for GDP growth to “foster social 
harmony and development” in order to strike a balance between 
“economic efficiency and social justice” and between “participation in 
the global economy and domestic social harmony”. The central 
government has invited more economists and social scientists outside 
the circle of “mainstream economists” to participate in policy debate and 
consultation.93 However, rather than breaking away from past practice, 
as some of the new-leftist scholars argue , at the policy level there has 
been more continuity than difference between the two “administrations”. 
Liberalization programs in key economic sectors have continued to be 
enforced. Domestic ownership reforms, stockization and privatization of 
state-owned enterprises have continued to progress. The major 
difference from the previous period is that the Chinese government is 
now more candid about the social repercussions of marketization and 
liberalization. On the one hand, social problems associated with the 
liberalization process such as unemployment, widening income gap, 
inadequate health care protection and peasant worker rights problems, 
have created increased tension within the society, pressing the 
government to confront these issues and seek solutions for them. On 
the other hand, with the WTO accession a fait accompli and 
market-conforming reforms an irreversible trend, the government is 
now in a position to spare some energy from defending and justifying 
the liberalization moves and refocus it on tackling the problems and 
                                                 
93 Han Deqiang, opt. cit. 
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 evils that inevitably came along. As Long Yongtu admitted in an 
interview with the Finance and Economics Magazine, “the most 
important role of the WTO agreement has been to impose a timetable 
upon China’s liberalization process. With those commitments, industry 
and institutional reforms followed suit. The WTO accession was only a 
beginning of further opening up and it ensures that the opening up 
process is irreversible.” The government’s refreshed concern over 
distributional justice and social harmony, therefore, was directed 
towards supporting the liberalization program with complementary 
measures rather than rectifying the overall orientation of reform. The 
observable consistency in policy orientation underlying the two periods 
suggests that the Chinese government’s propagation of neoliberal 
principles in the 1990s was largely at the rhetorical level and arose from 
the practical need of justifying the reform measures. 
Neoliberal Developmentalism: the Nationalist Foundation of 
Economic Liberalization  
If neoliberal economic principles were tweaked to be in line with a 
nationalist economic goal to facilitate the enforcement of liberalization 
strategy, the question is why the Chinese audience were particular 
receptive to such discourses. As argued before, associated with Chinese 
nationalism is an aspiration to restore past glory and to this end the 
Chinese modernization effort has been characterized by a utilitarianism 
attitude in pursuing wealth and power and a globalist ambition. The 
neoliberal prescriptions, while fitting into the Chinese government’s 
reform priorities in the 1990s, were also rhetorically compatible with the 
nationalist sentiment. In other words, by weaving neoliberal discourses 
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 into an economic nationalist argument, the Chinese government sought 
to justify liberalization measures with a nationalist end goal. But the 
liberal and nationalist components of such an argument were not 
strange bedfellows artificially put together to justify state policies. 
First of all, the overarching goal of achieving modernization made 
the neoliberal prescriptions a possible and desirable choice for 
policymakers and the general public alike. As mentioned before, the 
political legitimacy of the communist regime in the reform era to a large 
extent hinged upon the government’s ability to create growth and 
development. This does not mean, however, that economic well-being 
was the only thing that the Chinese cared about in the post Cultural 
Revolution era. Rather, such an overriding concern on economic growth 
was in line with the nationalist tradition of pursuing “wealth and power” 
in order to restore past glory. The communist party’s failure to attain 
this nationalist goal through Marxist-Leninist model left the 
reform-minded politicians a mixed legacy in the post Cultural 
Revolution era. On the one hand, the political crisis and economic 
bankruptcy caused by the Cultural Revolution eroded the credibility of 
the Marxist-Leninist ideology, driving central policymakers to search for 
new ideological basis for maintaining regime legitimacy. On the other 
hand, the failure of socialist orthodoxies and the memory associated 
with them provided the reformers a particular advantage in their 
struggle against communist conservatives. As argued before, although 
Deng Xiaoping positioned plan and market as neutral economic 
methods, market carried a positive connotation as it provided an 
alternative and effective means to revitalize the economy, whereas plan, 
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 given its association with the largely discredited socialist orthodoxies, 
was generally regarded as something that held back China from 
pursuing the wealth and power that were essential to regaining the 
country’s past glory. Yu Guangyuan, renowned Chinese economist 
observes that after Deng Xiaping’s Southern Tour, there was growing 
consensus in the Chinese society that the criteria for judging an 
economic system is not whether it is socialist or capitalist but whether it 
is advanced or backward. And whether a system is advanced or not 
depends on whether and how much it can promote the development of 
productive forces. The old rigid planning system was increasingly 
regarded as an impediment to promoting the development of productive 
forces.94  
Voices of dissent and complaint did exist. But such complaints in a 
sense confirmed Yu’s observation. For example, the internally circulated 
edition of the party’s magazine Qiushi carried an article in 1994 warning 
about “a general trend of thought and sentiment among party members, 
government officials and the wider society that championed the 
development of productive forces” as the sole criterion for evaluating 
reform measures”. “Should this trend continue, the communist party 
will degenerate into the party of productive forces and the socialist 
cause will be in jeopardy”95  Likewise, economists favoring planning 
also deplored the situation of “market worshipping”, as according to 
their observations, the general public and the media tended to equate 
“market” with reforms and treat “market mechanism” as the panacea for 
                                                 
94 Yu Guangyuan (1995)  
95 Li Mingsan in Qiushi issue 23, edition for internal circulation (1994) 
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 all economic problems. If one was against the market approach, he was 
easily labeled as against reform and with a “rigid mindset”. 96  
In fact, the term “market” had very different meanings in different 
periods of time. In the beginning of the reform it meant the limited 
reforms “above the plan” to “revitalize the economy”. In the context of 
building a socialist market system it meant getting the price determined 
by supply and demand rather than completely or partially determined 
by plan. When it came to China’s WTO accession and corresponding 
liberalization moves, however, market was used to refer to an open and 
laissez faire economic model. In this final case, the crux of the problem 
was actually not about market vs. planning, but about which market 
model to adopt. However, the Chinese government positioned the new 
initiative as a continuation and extension of the previous stages of 
reform. In this way, liberalization was pitted against planning, which 
allowed the government to capitalize on the positive connotation of 
market in previous rounds of the reform and to convince the general 
public that economic liberalization essential to promoting development 
and growth and therefore was the “good cat that can catch the mouse”. 
The power of liberal rhetorics, therefore, was grounded in the nationalist 
commitment to a strategy of high growth. 
Secondly, neoliberal discourses also resonated well with the 
underlying globalist aspiration of Chinese nationalism. As mentioned 
before, Chinese nationalism was hardly shaped by the “we vs. they” 
awareness. Rather, inherent in it was the idea of globalism that drove 
modern China to aspire for a global role after “a hundred years’ 
                                                 
96 See Tang Changli (1996), also see Hu Jun (1995). 
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 humiliation.” From the beginning of the reform, reform minded 
policymakers tried to position the policy of reform and opening to the 
outside world as a strategic effort to redress a glaring historical mistake, 
i.e., the closed-door policy of the Manchurian government, which was 
believe to be the major cause for China’s economic backwardness and 
its being bullied and humiliated by Western powers in modern history. 
It was argued that the international political environment after the 
founding of the PRC prevented the country from adopting an open-door 
policy earlier. But time was ripe for the country to “opening to the 
outside world”, which was a necessary and indispensable move in order 
for China to achieve a powerful comeback to the world stage. 
Consequentially, concepts such as globalization and economic 
openness were very differently received in China than in its third world 
counterparts. Han Deqiang notes that against the backdrop of China’s 
WTO accession initiative, the political environment for those opposing it 
became rather hostile. “Trade protection is equated with favoring the 
heavily bashed ‘closed door policy’. People who oppose China’s WTO 
endeavor are criticized as being short-sighted and narrow-minded. The 
media propagated the WTO accession as a win-win for both China and 
the world.”97 Han might not be accurate and unbiased in describing the 
situation as there were indeed heated debate about the pros and cons of 
China’s entry to the WTO.98 But he was right in his observation about 
the political dynamics surrounding the WTO accession issue. As 
economist Hai Wen observes, the issue of WTO accession was more than 
                                                 
97 Han Deqiang (2001) 
98 See for example, Zuo Dapei (1996), Zhang Shuguang (1996), Renlie (1996). 
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 an economic issue; it was about international acceptance and about the 
Chinese nation’s aspiration to return to the center stage of world 
affairs.99 Ordinary Chinese citizens may know little beyond the fact that 
WTO accession will eventually lower the prices of imported cars and 
other consumer goods. But they saw the WTO accession as an event 
concerning national pride and a positive step to lift the country’s image 
in the international arena. 100  
The aspiration to achieve “national renaissance”, therefore, provided 
rationale and motive for the country’s commitment to the WTO 
framework and related liberalization measures. The rhetorical power of 
the neoliberal discourses in justifying the Chinese government’s 
liberalization moves was grounded in the Chinese nationalism’s 
distinctive characteristics that were derived historically. A neoliberal 
approach with an end goal of achieving development and national 
rejuvenation supplied the content of Chinese economic nationalism and 
rationalized the market-conforming moves taken by the Chinese 
government in the 1990s.
                                                 
99 Hai Wen (1999): 33-34. 
100 According to an opinion poll on China’s WTO accession by Outlook Weekly and 
CCTV, 94% of the population believed that China’s WTO accession would lift China’s 
image and promote its status in the international society and 86% believed that it 
would enhance the country’s overall national strength. And these two items were voted 
as the top two benefits of China’s joining the WTO on the benefits list.   
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 CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION 
 
The reform experience of China entails three distinctive yet 
interrelated themes, namely, development, marketization and 
liberalization. As a late developer making the transition from a planned 
economic system to a market-oriented one in an age of increasingly 
globalized trade and finance, China offers a fresh opportunity for 
studying the interplay between state and market as well as the rationale 
behind the state’s approach to the market.  
 
State, Development and the Over-asserted Growth Hypothesis 
The statist approach in studying economic development generally 
argues for a causal relationship between state intervention and 
economic growth. It is often assumed that a state committed to 
economic development will adopt an economic approach that is 
differentiated from a market-conforming one. 1  Empirically the 
development experiences of a number of newly industrializing 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Chalmers Johnson (1982; in Deyo 1987), Robert Wade (1990; 1992; 
1993), Alice Amsden (1989; 2001), Frederic C. Deyo, ed., (1987), Ziya Onis (1991). The 
literature on East Asian developmental states generally treats an interventionist 
approach to the economy as a necessary condition for economic growth. So does Kohli 
(2004) in his more general comparative studies. Evans’s (1995) study has a different 
focus: instead of tracing causality between state intervention and growth outcomes, 
one part of his study seeks to explain variations in the specific forms of state 
intervention. Yet state intervention is still taken as given and the possibility of the 
state’s taking a non-interventionist approach is left unexplored. On the role of 
bureaucratic state and industrial policy, also see Helen Shapiro and Lance Taylor 
(1990), Meredith Woo-Cumings (1999), W. G. Huff (1995), Linda Low (2001), Kris Olds 
and Henry Wai-Chung Yeung (2004).    
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 economies, especially East Asian NIEs, appeared to offer positive 
evidence for this argument.  
The statist enterprise in search of the cause for economic growth 
suffers from a few methodological weaknesses other than the most cited 
one about case selection on the dependent variable. Firstly, the time 
span of these projects was mostly limited to the period between the 
1960s and late 1980s when the political needs of the Cold War created a 
rather tolerant environment for the NIEs to grow with an export-led 
strategy while maintaining a certain degree of domestic protection. The 
rise of the neoliberal consensus and the trend towards globalized 
finance and trade in the post-Cold War era have posed empirical 
challenges to the statist claim. On the one hand, the interventionist 
approach was at least partially blamed for causing the vulnerability of 
some of those NIES in the face of major market turbulences such as the 
Asian Financial Crisis.2 The very merit of state intervention was put 
under question. On the other hand, as more and more NIEs swim with 
the tide to liberalize their economies, statist scholars are left with a 
smaller pool of empirical examples to study with. Kohli, for example, 
explicitly states in his study of developmental states that the study 
focuses primarily on the period before the neoliberal trend set in.3 Then 
is the causal claim made by statists a generalizable one? Or do statists 
omit important variables for growth even for the period of their intensive 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Chris Rowley and Johnseok Bae “Introduction: The Icarus Paradox 
in Korean Business and Management” in Rowley and J. Bae ed. (1998), Paul Krugman 
(1997). 
3 See Kohli (2004: 23) 
 208
 studies? And are states no longer concerned about growth once they 
adopt a hands-free approach to the economy?  
Secondly, the statist studies have primarily focused on capitalist 
developmental states. In such cases the state usually faces a 
well-developed market and a clearly demarcated private sector. It is on 
the basis of such a domestic structure that the examination of the 
state’s approach to the market is made. Such studies, however, largely 
exclude the situation where market is in its embryo and where state 
may actively “intervene” to create a market and enforce rules that are 
market conforming. 
The Chinese experience of reform and development in the past three 
decades has provided an opportunity whereby a state’s development 
drive, market transition initiative and the globalization trend were 
juxtaposed to form the new context for observing state-market 
interactions. As a matter of fact, the Chinese case alone does not 
invalidate the statist hypothesis on the interventionist model of 
state-led growth. Nor was this study intended to do so. Rather, by 
providing an empirical alternative of a state’s approach to the market in 
seeking developmental goals, the sectoral examples of the Chinese 
reform illustrate that a state’s strategic actions to promote economic 
development can be compatible with a market-conforming economic 
model and that the introduction of such a model is not necessarily an 
indicator of the “withering of the state” in the face of market forces. In 
other words, there can be different growth models for developmental 
states to pursue. The actual choice of model is largely determined by the 
specific historical and socioeconomic conditions that a LDC is in. 
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State Structure, State autonomy and Development strategy 
In this study I have examined the reform processes in two critical 
economic sectors: foreign trade and banking. Reforms in both sectors 
went through the stages of administrative decentralization and 
market-conforming liberalization. The course of development in the 
latter stage constitutes a puzzle to both students of Chinese politics and 
those of developmental states in general. Signaled by its determined bid 
for the WTO membership, the Chinese state shifted away from a partial 
and dual-track approach to pursue full-scale market-conforming 
liberalization in major economic sectors. As the two cases in my study 
illustrate, the logic of the state’s policy choice can be found in the 
change of the state’s institutional structure and the effect of such a 
change upon state autonomy and in turn, its policy enforcement 
capabilities.4 It was in pursuit of the lost autonomy and control that 
central state policymakers resorted to market-conforming 
liberalizations.  
The explanations I give for the logic of economic reform in China are 
differentiated from and complementary to those of existing studies in 
Chinese politics. The study draws insights from existing studies on the 
logic of China’s economic reform, especially Shirk’s observations about 
the political basis of economic decisions as well as Wedeman’s analysis 
of how reform measures impacted central-local relations and 
interactions. However, unlike the rational-choice institutional 
                                                 
4 State autonomy here follows Leftwich (1995)’s definition that it is “the ability of the 
state to achieve relative independence from the demanding clamor of special interests 
(whether class, regional or sectoral)”  
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 explanation that sees the government’s policy outcomes as deals and 
compromises struck between self-interest maximizing politicians5, I 
treat the state as a historically grounded institution and seek to explain 
its policy choice by exploring the characteristics and changes of state 
structure and the ensuing socioeconomic dynamics. And unlike the 
“growing-out-of-plan” argument and the “equilibrium-seeking” theory6, 
which offer fundamentally economic explanations for the logic of 
Chinese reform, my study has tried to identify the political incentive 
behind the paradigm shift of development strategy on the part of the 
Chinese state.  
Empirically I have studied the sectors of foreign trade and banking 
intensively to test my hypothesis on the logic of economic liberalization 
in China. I selected these two sectors for three major reasons. First of all, 
the two sectors are self-contained and relatively homogenous units for 
observing and comparing the complete processes of economic reforms at 
the sectoral level. Secondly, the two cases provided the setting for 
observing key variables and processes while controlling for the factor of 
external influence. The presence of foreign players in the foreign trade 
sector and the lack of foreign participation in the banking sector allowed 
me to evaluate the explanatory power of a domestic institutional 
analysis of China’s economic liberalization. Thirdly, while institutional 
change as a major explanatory variable is present in both sectors, the 
actual mode of administrative decentralization in the two sectors 
                                                 
5 Susan Shirk (1993) is an example in point. Wedeman (2003) is basically a 
rational-choice institutionalist analysis, too. But the latter part of his analysis leaves 
the political games in the background and invokes the economic law as the ultimate 
explanation.  
6 See Barry Naughton (1995) and Andrew Wedeman (2003) respectively. 
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 displayed a degree of variation. This allowed me to observe and assess 
the causal mechanism between institutional change, state autonomy 
and policy outcomes. 
Decentralization in both the foreign trade and banking sectors 
empowered the provincial and sub-provincial governments, providing 
them with unprecedented means and resources to pursue 
developmental or entrepreneurial goals within their own geographical 
areas. On the national scale, however, such provincial/local initiatives 
were often expressed as local protectionism and rent-seeking behavior 
at the expense of the central authority. The autonomy of the central 
state was eroded as the state apparatus was horizontally intersected 
and its ability to pursue the overall national developmental goal 
compromised. Reflected in the economic sphere, parochially driven 
strategies gave rise to interregional trade barrier and financial arbitrage, 
aggravating the indebtedness of state-owned enterprises and draining 
the central government of its incomes and resources. By introducing 
WTO conforming trade standard and financial rules, the central 
government sought to remove the rent havens created during the 
decentralization period and restore the bureaucratic coherence and 
cohesiveness required for effective policy enforcement. 
Central to this account was the description of a shift of strategy on 
the part of the central state in an attempt to advance its political 
objectives, which sets the argument apart from the more economic 
arguments that see the liberalization drive either as part of a 
well-designed transition that was implemented incrementally and step 
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 by step or as a political follow-up to match the equilibrium seeking 
economic reality.  
As the study shows, the reforms of the foreign trade and banking 
sectors largely followed the same logic. But liberalization of the foreign 
trade sector was carried out more smoothly and at a faster pace than 
that of the banking sector. Such differences can be explained by looking 
at the differences in institutional arrangement for these two sectors and 
the ensuing dynamics under the decentralization program. The regional 
particularistic arrangement of foreign trade decentralization and the 
regionally differentiated privileges associated with such an arrangement 
created a bandwagon effect when the liberalization program was finally 
introduced. In the banking sector where no regional particularistic 
benefits were directly involved, the industry demonstrated weaker 
propensity to change as vested interests were more inward-looking and 
sought to preserve the benefits gained from the administratively 
decentralized banking regime. This finding is partially consistent with 
the observations about “spatial internationalization” and “competitive 
liberalization”, both of which highlight the effect of regionally 
differentiated reform strategy upon the dynamics of economic 
internationalization and liberalization.7 But the contrast between the 
two cases gives an example of varied dynamics across sectors with 
regard to the opening up process, suggesting that it would be partial 
and simplistic to explain the liberalization process in China as a 
self-induced one that worked itself out amid inter-regional competition. 
In my account the initiative on the part of the central state was crucial 
                                                 
7 David Zweig (2002, Dali Yang (1997). 
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 to the country’s turn towards full-scale liberalization. In fact, it was by 
eliminating much of the regional differences under the decentralization 
scheme that the central government created conditions for all-round 
market-conforming reforms. 
 
Economic Liberalization and Ideological Justification 
The reform process in China was filled with political struggles. But 
oppositions to reform policies were often expressed not as direct 
objections to the reform programs the government initiated but as 
disputes and confrontations in the ideological sphere. As Kohli observes, 
very often developmtental states have to resort to ideological 
mobilization to win acceptance in the society.8 This also applies to the 
Chinese state. The central state policymakers introduced the 
liberalization program in order to eliminate economic irregularities and 
regain macro control and policy autonomy. But the ultimate success of 
this initiative hinged upon whether the government could rally enough 
social support in enforcing the program. My study shows that during 
this process the Chinese government repositioned and reinterpreted the 
neoliberal economic ideology to legitimate and justify the liberalization 
measures. Underneath the neoliberal/neoclassical rhetorics was a 
nationalist core and an attempt to link liberalization measures with 
national developmental goals. Although institutionally the Chinese 
government took big steps towards a liberal regime, ideologically the 
reform program in the 1990s was still driven by economic nationalism. 
In my study I mainly focus on how the Chinese government tweaked 
                                                 
8 Kohli (2004): 10. 
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 neoliberal discourses to be compatible with economic nationalism and 
to justify reform measures and mobilize public opinion. This argument 
is mostly rationalist as it does not take ideology as a central explanatory 
variable to account for state behavior and policy choice. But the 
explanation is still different from the ones that treat ideology solely as a 
practical legitimating tool, as my study suggests that the content of 
economic nationalism was historically grounded and constructed rather 
than supplied by the specific contest of political struggles. Economic 
nationalism, as an expression of the social consensus on aligning 
economic activities with the end goal of enhancing national strength, 
was shaped and informed by the historical memory and experience of 
the Chinese nation. The attributes of modern Chinese nationalism 
determined that the neoliberal discourses were rhetorically appealing 
and powerful to the Chinese audience. Although not further explored, 
potentially there exists some normative compatibility between the 
Chinese strand of economic nationalism and the neoliberal economic 
ideology.    
 
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
Possible Fusions between State and Society  
In exploring the effect of institutional change upon state autonomy 
and policy enforcement capacity, my study has focused primarily on 
changes to the internal structure of the state. My research gathered 
data mainly on the changed role of provincial and municipal 
governments under the decentralization scheme and how this affected 
the coherence and cohesiveness of the central state apparatus and in 
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 turn state autonomy. But a closer look at the state society dynamics at 
the sub-provincial level -- especially at the village and township level 
--reveals that in many instances it was not a matter of local states 
pursuing developmental or entrepreneurial goals that conflicted with 
the national development strategy but a matter of the state getting 
entangled with the society. What was unique about the state-society 
relations in China was that, unlike in a mature capitalist economy 
where public and private spheres are clearly defined and where there 
are existing and established private interests for the state to regulate 
upon, the decentralization era in China saw new markets and sectors in 
the making and therefore new interests in the making.9 As Dorothy 
Solinger observes, under the reform program there emerged new 
borderline institutions that were at once both public and private in 
nature; the officials and merchants were shaped alike and have become 
dependent, mutually interpenetrated semi-classes.10 The local end of 
the central state apparatus was therefore ‘entangled’ with the society 
through local state and society’s collaboration, cooptation or 
state-society hybridism.11  
A study of possible fusion between state and society at the local level 
could strengthen my argument about the erosion of state autonomy 
under the decentralization regime. According to Kohli and Evans state 
                                                 
9 Barry Naughton, “China’s Transition in Economic Perspective” in Goldman and 
MacFarquhar (1999); Margaret M. Pearson (1997). 
10 Dorothy Solinger in Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, ed. (1992).  
11 See Baum and Shevchenko’s discussion on corporatism and civil society in “The 
state of the state” in Goldman and MacFarquhar, in which they describe the new 
hybrid pattern of state-society interactions. Margaret Pearson (1997) also describes 
the rise of new business elite and the emergence of hybrid state-society relations in 
Post-Mao China.  
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 autonomy does not preclude linkages to the society. An autonomous 
state is not necessarily insulated from the society but may have 
institutionalized channels effectively linking itself and the society.12 The 
pre-reform Chinese state had been equipped with such institutionalized 
channels that reached deep into the society. However, when the state 
and the society became entangled or even fused with each other at the 
local level, central state autonomy and authority could be significantly 
weakened as the local branches of the state apparatus got partially 
captured by societal interests13. An empirical examination of such 
dynamics at the local or enterprise level, which is not pursued in this 
study, could potentially strengthen my argument concerning the effect 
of institutional changes on state autonomy. 
The Effect of Case Selection on Findings  
In this study I have selected the sectors of foreign trade and banking 
to explore the logic of economic liberalization. One major reason for 
selecting these two cases, as stated earlier, is that these two cases are 
self-contained and comparable units for studying the interaction 
between institutional changes, state-society dynamics and reform 
outcomes. In each sector there was an old plan-based regime at the 
onset of the reform. And when the industries were commercialized, state 
players continued to dominate the sectors. Administrative 
decentralization empowered provincial and local governments, 
subjecting state-owned industry players to multi-level leaderships, 
causing central state interests to be tapped away and its developmental 
                                                 
12 Evans (1995: 12); Kohli (2004:10). 
13 This is different from the phenomena of intra-state entanglement as demonstrated 
in this study. 
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 goals compromised. It was in response to such problems that the 
central state launched the liberalization program. Both cases focus on 
analyzing state actors and state-owned enterprises and trace a change 
process that was state-dominated. In other economic sectors where 
there was no such an intact mechanism to reform upon, however, the 
change process could demonstrate different dynamics. For example, 
Zweig’s study of China’s internationalization approaches the issue of 
economic liberalization by looking at central government’s institutional 
innovations such as SEZs in the reform era and the influence of FDI in 
these areas. The SEZs and the new FDI regime adopted in these areas 
were components of the reform program in the 1980s. They were 
products of system change rather than targets of institutional reform. 
Observations and analysis based on the developments in these 
innovative and “above-plan” areas with less state presence and 
involvement at the very outset, therefore, tend to produce more 
societal-based explanations that highlight the interaction and 
collaboration between domestic societal actors and international 
market forces.  In fact, an observation about state-initiated and 
state-dominated change and a more societal-based analysis may 
capture different dimensions of socioeconomic changes in China. 
Further comparing and contrasting these cases could potentially yield 
new and more comprehensive insights into the liberalization process in 
China.  
Market Conforming Reforms and Normative Change 
In this study I treat the Chinese government’s liberalization 
initiative as part of the central state’s effort to reassert central authority. 
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 The market-conforming measures were compatible with the national 
developmental goal that the central state was trying to pursue. And the 
neoliberal/neoclassical economic discourses were propagated to the 
public in the 1990s to justify and legitimate the liberalization program 
that the Chinese government initiated.  
What is not fully identifiable in the current period, however, is what 
long-term effect the liberalization program will have on the organization 
of the Chinese state and its normative commitment. The question here 
is whether the Chinese state, in adopting neoliberal measures to 
advance its developmental goals, will be eventually transformed by the 
neoliberal rules and principles that come along with the liberalization 
program. An interesting development in this regard is that MOTEC, the 
preeminent government agency that played a pivotal role in China’s 
WTO accession process was merged with the trade sections of the State 
Economics and Trade Commission and the State Planning Commission 
in 2003 to become the Ministry of Commerce. Not only has the new 
bureaucratic organization shrunk significantly in size, its also 
possesses much less power than its predecessor. As trading rights have 
been granted to individual enterprises, the major function of the 
Ministry of Commerce is to “monitor market orders” and “provide 
assistance for enterprises engaged in foreign trade.”14 The changed role 
and status of MOFTEC is just one example of how the organization and 
function of the state can be transformed as liberalization goes on. 
Whether the state will maintain its developmental objectives or whether 
it will ultimately evolve towards the neoliberal minimal state in this 
                                                 
14 China Industrial and Commercial Times (March, 7, 2003). 
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 self-initiated liberalization drive remains a question to be answered by 
future research. 
 
The reform experience of China has been the focal point of three 
interrelated and ongoing processes—development, marketization and 
liberalization. This study has used China’s sectoral examples to 
demonstrate how changes in the country’s state structure under the 
decentralization scheme affected the central state’s autonomy and 
effective control over the economy and in turn, shaped its choice of 
development path. The Chinese examples show that market-conforming 
reforms may be advanced by the state intentionally to reassert its 
autonomy and control. This constitutes an empirical anomaly to the 
conventional view on state-market relations, which tends to pit the state 
against the market, especially against the backdrop of economic 
globalization. The Chinese experience can serve as a starting point for 
more systematic and cross-country comparative investigation of 
state-market relations and interactions along any one of the three 
dimensions of late development, post-socialist transition, and economic 
liberalization.  
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